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ABSTRACT 
 
 
An Examination of the Deaf Effect Response to Bad News Reporting in 
Information Systems Project 
 
By 
 
Michael John Cuellar 
 
04/01/2009 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Mark Keil 
 
Major Department: Computer Information Systems 
 
 
 Information systems project management has historically been a problematic area. One 
of the reasons for this has been the issue of escalation where resources continue to be committed 
to a failing course of action. While many causes of escalation have been proposed, this 
dissertation investigates one possible cause: that the project manager may not hear, ignores or 
overrules a report of bad news to continue a failing course of action: the Deaf Effect response to 
bad news reporting. This effect has not been previously studied within the information systems 
literature. In this dissertation, the Deaf Effect is examined through a series of three laboratory 
experiments and a case study. It finds that in a conducive environment, where the bad news 
reporter is not seen as credible, and the risk of project failure is seen as low, decision makers 
tend to view the report of bad news as irrelevant and thus ignore or overrule the report of bad 
news and continue the current course of action. Role Prescription of the bad news reporter, 
illusion of control and a perception of a highly politicized environment are factors that also 
increase the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. 
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Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Information systems (IS) project management has historically been a problematic area. 
IS projects frequently fail and are notorious for going significantly over budget and falling 
behind schedule. The Standish Group, a Massachusetts-based consulting organization, 
reports that while software productivity has improved over the past 12 years, software 
“value” is still only 59 cents per dollar spent. Nineteen percent (19%) of projects still fail 
outright and 46% have cost or time overruns or don’t meet the customer’s needs 
(Rubenstein 2007). In some cases, mismanagement of software projects means that 
they escalate out of control, continuing to absorb valuable resources without ever 
delivering benefits to the organizations that undertake them (Keil 1995). A survey 
sponsored by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) found that 
30–40% of all software projects undergo some degree of project escalation (Keil and 
Mann 1997). 
This escalation of commitment to a failing course of action is a well-known phenomenon 
in software project management and considerable work has been done to gain a better 
understanding of why executives continue to commit resources in the face of negative 
signals about the status of projects (Depledge 2003; Keil 1995; Keil and Flatto 1999; 
Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen and Wassenaar 2000b; Ross and Staw 1993; Staw 
1976; Staw 1981). While many explanations have been explored, recent work has 
focused on the communication failures that occur within organizations and how these 
may contribute to the escalation of commitment. A small, but growing number of studies 
have examined the so-called “Mum Effect” (Keil and Robey 1999; Keil and Robey 2001), 
or the reluctance to report bad news. In addition, Keil and Robey (1999, 2001) coined 
the term “Deaf Effect” suggesting that executives’ refusal to hear bad news might also 
promote escalation. That is, for reasons that are not well understood, executives may 
(consciously or unconsciously) ignore bad news even when those who report to them 
are bold enough to transmit the message. In those cases, it is important to know why 
senior management did not heed those who warned them that the project was in danger 
of failing.  
Incidences of projects in which the Deaf Effect has occurred are numerous and involve 
serious failures. Perhaps the most notorious is that of the Challenger Disaster 
(Hauptman and Iwaki 1990) in which a group of engineers attempted to signal to their 
management that there would be failure of space shuttle solid rocket boosters if the 
shuttle launched at a low temperature. Their objections were ignored resulting in the 
destruction of the Challenger and the deaths of seven astronauts. In the management 
literature, Wissema (2002) records 14 cases of failure to attend to signals of impending 
failure which resulted in failures of executive succession and appointment, product 
development, acquisitions, diversification, internationalization and other actions. In the 
information systems literature, Keil and Robey(2001) documented three  instances in 
which auditors attempting to report troubled projects encountered the Deaf Effect. In 
another prominent failure, the UK Child Support Agency (CSA) spent 456 million GBP to 
develop an enterprise support system which they deployed despite 40 audits of which 28 
identified serious concerns and which had at implementation 52 known critical defects 
(Computer.Business.Review 2006). The defects in the system resulted in creation of 
over 600 workarounds (ZDNet.co.uk 2006), an increase in complaints from clients of 
50% (McCue 2004) and 36,000 cases being “stuck” in the system and requiring manual 
processing outside of the system (ZDNet.co.uk 2006). The chairman of the Public 
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Accounts committee referring to this project said, “Ignoring ample warnings, the DPW 
[Department for Works and Pensions], the CSA and IT contractor EDS introduced a 
large, complex IT system at the same time as restructuring the Agency. The new system 
. . . stumbled and now has enormous operational difficulties” (ZDNet.co.uk 2006). This 
disastrous system failure eventually resulted in the shutdown of the agency. Finally, the 
Denver International Airport baggage handling system is another example of where the 
Deaf Effect occurred. This new airport opened 16 months and $2 billion over budget due 
to the failure of the automated baggage handling system development effort. During the 
development of this system, “[the baggage handling system development contractor] told 
them from the beginning that they were going to need at least one more year to get the 
system up and running but no one wanted to hear that” (Montealegre and Keil 
2000,p.433). It wasn’t until the baggage system test failed completely that it was 
recognized that the system would not be available as planned (Montealegre and Keil 
2000).  
Failures involving the Deaf Effect thus represent a serious problem. Refusal to act on 
reports of bad news can result not only in loss of time and money but waste of resources 
and even in the failure of the organization. Thus it is important that the mechanisms that 
cause this effect be identified and conditions that predispose this effect to occur be 
identified so that practitioners can take action to insure that reports of bad news are 
attended to. To this point, the IS and management research disciplines have not devoted 
much effort to the study of this phenomenon.  
The contribution of this dissertation is to provide the first systematic study of the Deaf 
Effect by developing and empirically testing an individual level model of how the Deaf 
Effect might occur and investigating a project status reporting system to identify 
organizational conditions that might inhibit or encourage the Deaf Effect. It is organized 
as follows: this chapter provides a summary of the background literature on the Deaf 
Effect.. Chapters 2 through 4 present the results of three laboratory experiments that 
develop and test the model. Chapter 5 reports the results of an exploratory case study of 
a state government project reporting system.   
This chapter is organized as follows. First literature on project escalation and the Deaf 
Effect is reviewed to provide a historical and theoretical background to the study. 
Second, the Deaf Effect is defined and placed within that literature. It closes with 
descriptions of the four studies that comprise this dissertation.  
1.2 REVIEW OF THE ESCALATION LITERATURE 
In this section, I review the project escalation literature. Staw (1997) has provided a 
review of the literature up to that point in time. The discussion that follows summarizes 
that review and provides additional information from the literature subsequent to 1997.  
Escalation has been defined as 
“[a situation] where losses have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to 
persist or withdraw, and where the consequences of these actions are uncertain” 
(Staw 1997). 
The general pattern of escalation that we see has been described by Staw (1997) as a 
tendency to become locked into escalation situations: to throw good money after bad. It 
is not a singular decision but rather a persistent course of action. This escalation course 
of action was found in a number of studies, e.g. Staw (1976), Teger (1980), Brockner 
and Rubin (1985), Arkes and Blumer (1985). However, it does not always occur. 
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 13 
Sometimes withdrawal occurs (McCain 1986). When there are alternatives that are 
clearly superior, or clear-cut financial information is available, withdrawal will occur 
(Bowen 1987; Northcraft and Neale 1986; Northcraft and Wolf 1984). 
Escalation is not solely an IS related phenomenon. What makes it significant within the 
IS realm is the nature of information systems projects. Information systems are 
intangible objects and information systems projects are complex undertakings. Therefore 
the progress of an information systems development project is often not obvious upon 
inspection. This leads to considerable uncertainty as to the status of a project even to 
the participants. Additionally the nature of information systems development as a service 
leads to difficulties in understanding the nature of projects. The creation of a service 
arrangement, such as an IT development project, is a transaction that requires an 
exchange of information between the customer, and the service provider in order to 
define the service to be performed (Chesbrough and Spohrer 2006). This knowledge is 
likely to be tacit and difficult to transfer and even when the transfer has occurred it would 
be difficult for any one person to have a comprehensive understanding of a project. Thus 
different participants might have different conceptions of the goal of the project and thus 
different views of the progress toward reaching those goals. The intangibility of the 
product, the complexity of the activity and the service nature of the arrangement all 
make IS project governance especially challenging and subject to escalation. 
Staw (1997) believes that escalation is a  multi-determined outcome. That is it is not the 
result of a single causal factor but rather is the result of multiple forces operating at 
multiple levels of analysis. Individuals facing escalation situations do so in the face of 
social and/or organizational forces that surround them.  
Staw and Ross (1987; 1989) have developed a classification system for escalation 
causes. They divide these causes into different categories dealing with level of analysis. 
Keil (1995), and Newman and Sabherwal (1996), following Staw and Ross, sort causes 
of escalation into the same categories.  The section that follows discusses the literature 
that falls into each category.  
1.2.1 Project Determinants 
These are objective features of a project that affect the financial value or utility of a 
course of action. These include the size of the goal or payoff (Rubin and Brockner 1975), 
level of costs required  to achieve the goal (Brockner, Rubin and Lang 1981), the 
availability of alternatives (Northcraft and Neale 1986) salvage value (Northcraft and 
Wolf 1984),and the presence of lock-in conditions (a high cost of withdrawal, little 
salvage value and high up front expenses already incurred).  
An additional project determinant is the presence of real options. A project has real 
options when the managers have the opportunity but not the obligation to adjust the 
future direction of the project in response to external or internal events. Escalation may 
occur as a response to real options embedded in a project. Managers may opt to 
continue because they value the options and thus increase the value of the project over 
that reported by a strict financial analysis. Second, they value strategic options such as 
the opportunity to pursue new strategic options rather than simple operational options 
more highly (Tiwana, Keil and Fichman 2006). 
1.2.2 Psychological Determinants 
Psychological determinants are elements of the decision maker’s psychological makeup 
or responses to situations that might cause escalation. For example: 
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Optimism and illusion of control. These are biases that distort the evaluation of 
situations. Optimism leads the decision maker to overestimate the possibility of positive 
events occurring. For example, executives who view themselves as very competent tend 
to take more risks (Krueger and Dickson 1994). Illusion of control is held to underlie such 
optimism (Staw 1997). Illusion of control has been defined as an expectancy of a 
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant (Langer 1975). This belief may be based on their perception of their own 
competence or of their special skills. Langer and Roth (1975) found that success bred a 
belief in their skill in subjects while lack of success lead to the opposite conclusion.  This 
illusion of control or skill leads to distortions in perception or expectations of the project. 
Keil, Depledge and Rai (2007) in a role playing experiment, found a significant inverse 
relationship between problem recognition and escalation and that selective perception 
and illusion of control were found to significantly affect both problem recognition and 
escalation. 
Self-justification. Self-justification is one of the oldest explanations for escalation. The 
idea behind this concept is that once a decision is made the decision maker will not only 
distort information but change behaviors to rationalize their decision (Staw 1976). 
Personal responsibility is a key factor in this explanation. Without a sense of 
responsibility for the solution, there is no reason for self-justification (Whyte 1986) 
Framing Effects. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) suggests that people 
don’t have the same risk preferences for positive and negative outcomes. When the 
decision is framed as a choice between positive outcomes, decision makers become risk 
averse. In the opposite case, they become risk-accepting attempting to eliminate the 
loss by taking a gamble on a better outcome. Whyte (1986) suggested that prospect 
theory provided an explanation for escalation in the absence of personal responsibility. 
Sharp and Salter (1997) found that the same framing effects occurred in both North 
American and Asian subjects.  
Sunk Cost Effects. In this stream of literature, it is recognized that sunk costs, those 
costs expended that cannot be recovered, may trigger a psychological response for 
decision makers to attempt to recover past expenditures through further commitment of 
resources. Arkes and Blumer (1985) with further studies by Garland and colleagues 
(1990; 1991) found that sunk costs influence decision makers over time. This applied to 
both project continuation and resource allocation decisions.  
However, later studies found that in project completion decisions, it might be that sunk 
costs are only effective when accompanied by substantial project completion. Conlon 
and Garland (1993) found that information about project completion influences allocation 
decisions to a far greater extent than does sunk costs. Keil, Truex and Mixon (1995), in a 
qualitative analysis of explanations for decisions made in a laboratory experiment, found 
that sunk cost was given as a rationale three times more than completion status. Boehne 
and Paese (2000) found a strong project completion effect. That is that as a project 
nears completion, the goal of completing the project overrides economic considerations 
and even accountability. They found no support for sunk cost effects on escalation and 
suggest that in a project context, previous sunk cost effects (Arkes and Blumer 1985; 
Garland 1990; Garland and Newport 1991) were a confound with the completion effect. 
Project completion was not a total explanation, as some of the subjects decided to kill 
the project based on failure to meet profitability goals. Moon (2001) also found that there 
is an interaction effect between sunk cost and level of completion. At high levels of 
completion, the effect of sunk cost approached an exponential curve as the level of 
completion increased. Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, and Hofmann (2004) in laboratory 
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experiment and an archival field study of the road construction industry found results that 
support the Moon study. As a task approached completion, task completion is rated as 
increasingly important and economic motives as less important. Keil, Mann and Rai 
(2000a) found that the completion effect was a better classifier of projects that escalated 
than models constructed from self-justification, prospect theory and agency theory.  
Financial and Mental budgets. Financial and mental budgets (Heath 1995; Tan and 
Yates 2002) have also been found to have a de-escalating effect on monetary based 
decisions. People tend to set budgets for projects and resist exceeding them. Escalation 
was only likely to occur when there was no budget or expenses were difficult to track.  
Perceived Risk and Risk Propensity. Perceived risk is shaped more by perceived 
downside potential than the actual probability of failure. An individual’s willingness to 
pursue a risky project appears to be influenced more by risk perception than any innate 
propensity to take or avoid risks (Keil and Wallace 2000). Wong (2005) found that risk 
propensity had a direct effect on escalation and was only partially mediated by risk 
perception.  
1.2.3 Social Determinants 
Social elements are those elements of the environment in which the nature of social 
structures influence the decision process.  
External Justification and Binding. Staw (1997) indicates that the social environment 
may affect decision makers behavior through a number of mechanisms. There may be 
social costs for withdrawal. By advocating the termination or redirection of the project, 
they may lose face or be viewed as incompetent. Similarly, the decision maker in 
seeking to demonstrate competence may decide to continue on with the project. A highly 
politicized environment may make terminating the project infeasible given the desire to 
maintain their position. Accountability to others can be as important as the need to 
internally rationalize their decision. Managers may hesitate to recognize losing projects 
when their external reputations are at risk and when information about a project’s 
performance is not widely known. This indicates that commitment to a project is not an 
isolated affair (Staw 1997).  
Leadership Norms. Leadership norms may influence a decision to continue a failing 
course of action. There may be social rewards for persistence on a project so as to turn 
a losing project into a winner. If being consistent and successful is strongly valued in the 
society or organization then persistence in the face of a losing project may be viewed as 
the appropriate behavior (Staw 1997).  
Groupthink. Groupthink, when a group of people share opinions and assess situations 
in the same manner (Wissema 2002), is a social characteristic that could lead to 
escalation. Groupthink forms when a homogenous team is unchanged for a long period 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; Wissema 2002).  Groupthink tends to cause rigidity of 
response which is acceptable for routine problems but leads to difficulties when the 
decision making team encounters novel or ill-defined problems (Filley, House and Kerr 
1976; Janis 1972). Groupthink may also be exacerbated by the presence of “yes-men.” 
Managers might surround themselves with those who agree with them. The “yes-men” 
filter out messages that disagree with the situation as perceived by the managers, thus 
preventing the message from reaching the decision makers with the consequence that 
bad news reports are not acted on (Dunbar and Goldberg 1978). This not only reinforces 
the groupthink, but also leads to a situation in which management perceives the situation 
much differently from those at a lower level in the organization. 
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1.2.4 Organizational Determinants 
These determinants are aspects of the organization that influence the decision making 
process.  
Institutional inertia. Organizations have imperfect sensory systems making them 
impervious to changes. They are therefore slow to respond to external stimuli. Missing 
cues as to failing projects may result in escalation. Similarly, political resistance to the 
idea of terminating or redirecting a project may result in escalation. Similarly an 
organization’s identification with a product or project can make withdrawal unthinkable 
(Staw 1997). 
Agency situations. Agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) suggests that managers 
(principals) have imperfect information about the activities of project managers 
(agents).They are subject to the risks of adverse selection (a subordinate 
misrepresenting their capabilities for a position) and moral hazard (the subordinate 
shirking their responsibilities to the principal or acting in their own interests instead of 
those of the principal). Studies have shown that agency effects may cause escalation. 
Where adverse selection exists, managers who initiated a project and become 
associated with the results of that project will tend to continue that project. Information 
asymmetry and an incentive to shirk must exist for this to occur. (Harrison and Harrell 
1993). Under conditions for moral hazard, IS practitioners tended to implement a system 
with quality problems. However, this is modified by ethical considerations: moral equity 
(what is right) and relativism (is the behavior acceptable in this ethical context) 
considerations (Tuttle, Harrell and Harrison 1997). Sharp and Salter (1997) found that 
agency theory had a strong explanatory capability in North American subjects, but not 
for Asian subjects.  
Organization Structure and Values. An unclear organizational structure or weak 
culture could also lead to escalation (Wissema 2002). Where there is an unclear division 
of responsibilities, signals indicating problems in a project can be missed as managers 
assume that others are attending to those signals. Alternately, one manager may be 
overwhelmed and ignore the signal or another may simply pass it on to that manager. 
Similarly, where there is a weak culture, the signal may be lost in wrangling over how to 
respond or who is to respond to the signal.   
1.2.5 Contextual Determinants 
Finally, Staw (1997) indicates that extra organizational influences may cause escalation. 
For example, in the case of the Shoreham nuclear reactor project, there was external 
pressure from the Federal Department of Energy and various pro-nuclear groups for 
continuance of the project against the effects of anti-nuclear activist groups (Ross and 
Staw 1993).  
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1.3 MODELS OF ESCALATION 
Four different attempts have been made at creating a model to describe escalation. The 
first, was a temporal model of escalation described in Ross and Staw (1986). It was a 
stage model in which there were three stages to escalation: 1) Beginning the course of 
action; 2) Receiving questionable or negative results and 3) Receiving highly negative 
results. In each phase psychological and social forces were described as holding the 
decision makers in place in the current course of action. This model did not receive 
much empirical support (Staw 1997) and Staw (1997) proposed an alternative 
“aggregate” model (figure 1.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staw’s model portrays commitment to a course of action as the result of behavioral 
variables interacting with perceived project economics. The behavioral variables in 
addition to directly affecting the commitment to a course of action also influence how the 
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Figure 1.1: Staw (1997)’s aggregate model of escalation 
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decision maker sees the project economics. Commitment is held to be the balancing of 
forces between negative economic data and the behavior variables. The key assumption 
is that “the behavioral forces must match or exceed the strength of any negative 
economic data in order to hold [decision makers] in a failing course of action” (Staw 
1997, p. 209).  
In an unpublished conference article, Royer (2002) proposed an eight phase process-
oriented model of both escalation and de-escalation based on two case studies. Royer’s 
model includes four escalation phases: (i) blindly going on, (ii) relentlessness, (iii) 
diagnosis, and (iv) verification.  
 
 
Royer based her model on the concept of collective belief. Her model accounts for the 
rise of collective belief in a project, its persistence through bad news and then provides 
for the de-escalation of the project. Escalation is held to arise when the collective belief 
in the success of a project persists through negative feedback. Factors that account for 
this persistence include groupthink and cognitive biases. Only when the collective belief 
is broken down through the presence of revealers or entrance of actors outside the 
collective who don’t hold to the belief challenging the groupthink will escalation occur.  
Ma¨hring and Keil 243
Figure 2: Royer’s (2002) eight phases of escalation and deescalation.a
Birth of the Idea
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aShaded parts of the model represent the escalation process according to Royer.
throughout the escalation process. In addition, current escalation research remains
inconclusive on the effects of success beliefs on escalation and the idea that collec-
tive project success beliefs would have a decisive impact on escalation is not well
supported (Arkes, 1991; Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin, 1997; Schmidt & Calan-
tone, 2002; Whyte & Fassina, 2007). Furthermore, the model blurs the distinction
between escalation and deescalation as the latter two of Royer’s four escalation
phases have previously been identified as part of deescalation (Montealegre & Keil,
2000). Similar to the Staw and Ross model, the cases that Royer analyzed exhibited
distinct differences and fit her model to varying degrees: “the MiFi case does not
include the relentlessness phase and the Phileas case includes successive identical
phases” (2002, p. 6).
RESEARCH APPROACH
Research Design and Data Collection
An in-depth case study served as the empirical basis of this research and was
used to develop the process model of escalation. Case studies are especially useful
Figure 1.2:  Royer’s (2002) Escalation Process Model from Mahring and Keil 
(2008). 
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Mahring and Keil (2008) proposed a process model of escalation (figure 1.3). In this 
model, they argue that an escalating project begins with the framing of the project  
 
which they describe as being ambiguous. This allows the project to drift until conflicts 
concerning goal and direction arise signaling problems in the project. Solutions are 
attempted without a change in direction but the solutions attempted don’t match the 
problems resulting in increasing problem visibility. This results in a movement to the third 
stage in which the problems and problem continuation are rationalized. This continues 
until the rationalizations lose their credibility at which point de-escalation is enacted.  
1.4 DE-ESCALATION STUDIES 
Staw (1997) does not include de-escalation studies within his classification scheme. De-
escalation studies have investigated how projects have or can be de-escalated. These 
studies are of interest to this dissertation since the Deaf Effect can be considered a 
failure to de-escalate. Knowing the conditions under which de-escalation occurs may be 
enlightening to the study of why de-escalation does not occur. 
Simonson and Staw (1992) found that a) making negative outcomes less threatening, b) 
setting minimum target levels that if not reached result in change of policy and c) 
evaluating decision makers on process rather than outcome were most effective in  
making decision makers more responsible to available evidence.  
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Figure 1.3: Adapted from Mahring and Keil (2008)’s escalation process model 
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Montealegre and Keil (2000) found de-escalation is a gradual process vs. a sudden 
event. It is not random but a patterned sequence of events. De-escalation is a dynamic 
process that is simultaneously constricted by actions in the antecedent episode, yet 
capable of constructing new patterns of commitment to alternative courses of action. De-
escalation is a four phase process – 1) problem recognition; 2) re-examination of 
previous course of action; 3) search for alternative solutions; 4) implementing an exit 
strategy. Phase 1 requires a clear understanding that there is a problem. There needs to 
be unambiguous signs of issues or external events that trigger a general reassessment 
of resource allocation and allow de-escalation to occur. The Deaf Effect would prevent 
any of these steps from being taken. 
McNamara, Moon and Bromiley (2002) found that increased monitoring of decision 
makers and changing decision makers attenuated escalation in commercial lending 
decisions. However, this had second order effects in decision makers avoiding 
recognition of the problem in order to avoid increased scrutiny or loss of control of the 
account.  
Heng, Tan and Wei (2003) found that in conditions of low sunk cost, superiors or peers 
who assisted in shouldering blame or providing assurance facilitated de-escalation of 
commitment to a course of action, However, in case of high sunk cost none of these 
options were effective.  
Pan, Pan and Flynn (2004; Pan, Pan, Newman and Flynn 2006) investigated how a 
manager de-escalated commitment and turned around a government e-procurement 
project. In this project, the Deaf Effect occurred because the project manager was 
looking at the sunk cost already in the project.  The project steering committee was 
unwilling to de-escalate the project because they feared reporting their problems to the 
cabinet deputy responsible for the area and additionally were unwilling to disappoint 
everybody involved in the project. Pan, et al. identified that the manager used the 
techniques of behavior disconfirmation, continuous commitment, provision of 
psychological safety, development of new attitudes and behaviors, and the alignment 
and integration of the new attitudes and behaviors to turn around the project. They 
subsequently recast these findings into an evaluation model of escalation and de-
escalation in IS projects based on the theories of approach-avoidance conflict and 
punctuated equilibrium (Pan, et al. 2006). We see in this example, that organizational 
aspects such as perception of their management’s expectations of their performance 
caused the project steering committee to continue escalation to this failing course of 
action. 
1.5 COMMUNICATION ISSUES 
Recently another stream of research has emerged subsequent to Staw (1997), to 
provide another explanation for project escalation: failures of communication. This line of 
research finds its inspiration in social psychology theory (O'Neal, Levine and Frank 
1979; Tesser, Rosen and Conlee 1972) and the management theories of whistle blowing 
(Miceli and Near 1992) and organizational communication (Morrison and Milliken 
2000).It has developed an approach to viewing escalation as being caused by a failure 
in the organizational communication systems used to report bad news about the project 
to the decision maker.  
The literature in this section considers how organizational communication systems result 
in a) suppression of bad news reports (the Mum Effect) (Keil and Robey 1999; Keil and 
Robey 2001; Smith and Keil 2003; Smith, Keil and Depledge 2001), b) distortion of the 
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message in project status reporting or through intrusive supervision, or confrontational 
regulation (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, Iacovou and Thompson 2005) or, c) the refusal 
of the decision maker to heed the report of bad news (the Deaf Effect) (Keil and Robey 
2001) 
1.5.1 The Mum Effect. 
The Mum Effect term was coined by Tesser and Rosen (1972), and the effect has been 
investigated in a number of escalation studies (Smith and Keil 2003; Smith, et al. 2001; 
Tan, Smith, Keil and Montealegre 2003). The model proposed by Smith and Keil (2003) 
holds that perceptions of project situations create an assessment that the status ought to 
be reported which in conjunction with personal ethical standards creates an assessment 
that the individual has a responsibility to report. Given the assessment of a responsibility 
to report, the potential reporter assesses the alternatives to reporting including the 
probability of retaliation etc. This final assessment leads to a decision to report or not 
report.  
 
 
1.5.2 Tourish and Robson’s Theory 
Tourish and Robson (2006) have recently proposed a theory that describes how critical 
upward communication is suppressed in organizations. Their theory (figure 1.5) argues 
that managers by means of the systems they set up or by their reactions suppress 
critical upward communication. They may simply ignore critical communications, 
question it more severely than supportive messages or may have information systems 
that filter out critical message. Thus, they consciously or unconsciously reinforce 
ingratiating behaviors and suppress dissenting messages so that potential reporters of 
bad news may cease to report it. This results in a disjunction in knowledge of the status 
of projects between the employees and the managers so that the managers may make 
decisions based on inaccurate information resulting in iatrogenic interventions leading to 
project failure. 
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Figure 1.4: Smith and Keil (2003)’s model of the Mum Effect 
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1.6 THE DEAF EFFECT 
The term Deaf Effect was coined by Keil and Robey (1999) and some limited evidence 
of the phenomenon as it relates to IT projects was reported in one subsequent study 
(Keil and Robey, 2001). They reported on a survey of IS auditors who were attempting to 
report bad news. In at least three cases their reports were ignored by decision makers. 
The auditors themselves on attempting to report were in some cases terminated. 
Another anecdotal report of the Deaf Effect comes from the report of the Challenger 
Disaster (Hauptman and Iwaki 1990). There, a group of engineers tried to indicate to 
management that the launch of the shuttle at low temperatures might result in a failure of 
the O-rings on the solid rocket boosters resulting in catastrophic failure. Despite 
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Figure 1.5: Tourish and Robson (2006)’s theory of Critical Upward Communication 
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repeated attempts to communicate to management that there were significant risks of 
failure, they were ignored and management approved the launch.  
The frequency with which the Deaf Effect occurs and the range of factors that may 
contribute to the phenomenon remain unknown at this time. The only empirical study 
that addresses the Deaf Effect appears to be that of Wissema (2002), who studied 14 
cases of management failure. In those cases he identified that managers often ignored 
warning signals of impending failure; a phenomenon that he referred to as “red light 
running”. He indicated that managers either did not notice, ignored, suppressed or 
scorned “warning signals which . . . would have contributed to preventing an incorrect 
decision.” (p. 522). He found nine factors that contributed to low red-light sensitivity: 
tension between styles of decision making, focusing on a single issue to the exclusion of 
all else, haste and impatience, tiredness and stress, overconfidence, groupthink, unclear 
structure or culture, poor information systems and ignoring intuition. 
Based on anecdotal stories from Keil and Robey (2001) and those of such non-IS 
occurrences as those related by Wissema and that of the Challenger Disaster, I formally 
define the phenomenon as occurring  
When a decision maker doesn’t hear, ignores or overrules a report of bad news 
to continue a failing course of action 
In terms of bad news reporting, the Deaf Effect is distinct from the “Mum Effect” which 
can be defined as the failure to transmit a report of bad news (Keil and Robey 2001). 
Where the Mum Effect occurs, the potential bad news reporter is unwilling to report bad 
news whereas in the Deaf Effect, the bad news reporter transmits the message, but the 
intended recipient either doesn’t hear it or refuses to act upon it.  
1.6.1 The Deaf Effect and the Escalation Literature 
The place of the Deaf Effect in the escalation literature can be seen from how it is 
explained by the models summarized in the literature review. In terms of Staw (1997)’s 
model (figure 1.1), the Deaf Effect can be seen as the result of biases that result in 
improper project economics being perceived by the decision maker. These biases are 
created by the various escalation determinants. Thus the solution to the Deaf Effect is to 
prevent the creation of biases by the elimination of the escalation determinants. 
Questions remain however, as to what the biases are that result in the Deaf Effect and 
which determinants lead to the Deaf Effect. 
In Royer (2002)’s model, the Deaf Effect can be seen as blindly going in the face of 
negative news about the project and relentlessly continuing in the face of revealers. 
Royer’s model does not however provide an explanation for why the decision maker 
goes blindly on or continues relentlessly. 
In terms of Mahring and Keil (2008)’s model (figure 1.3), the Deaf Effect can be seen as 
a factor that prevents correct identification of problems in phase 1. No problems may be 
identified or they may be minimized so as to not be considered correctly thus generating 
the mismatch between problems and solutions. However, their model does not provide 
us an explanatory mechanism as to why the Deaf Effect occurs in the first place. 
Finally, in Tourish and Robson (2006)’s model (figure 1.5), the Deaf Effect can be seen 
as a mechanism for communicating the idea that dissent or critical upward 
communication is not desired. By not acting, this signals to the organization that the 
report of bad news is not welcome. This results in suppression of the report of bad news 
(the “Mum Effect”) or in the desire of potential reports to report bad news in a low volume 
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 24 
(attenuation of the salience) or to make the news appear less bad than they really 
believe that it is (distortion). This describes more of an organizational level of deafness. 
The organization doesn’t respond to the report of bad news. It doesn’t explain why the 
decision maker is “deaf” in the first place.  
1.7 THIS DISSERTATION 
The preceding review of the escalation literature has shown that the Deaf Effect has not 
previously received systematic study in either the management or IS literature. 
Additionally, the escalation models don’t provide good explanatory purchase for the 
occurrence of the Deaf Effect. A gap exists in explaining how the Deaf Effect occurs and 
therefore how it can be avoided in project situations. This dissertation seeks to fill that 
gap by contributing the first systematic study of the Deaf Effect. As such it is an 
exploratory investigation into the phenomenon at the individual level. The first three 
studies (chapters 2-4) report laboratory experiments that progressively build up the 
parameters of a variance model. The last study (chapter 5) is a case study in which the 
history of a project in which the Deaf Effect occurred is explored to determine if the 
model developed in laboratory experiments has explanatory power in the field. The 
following sections briefly describe the objectives of each study. The final chapter 
summarizes what has been learned in this dissertation. 
1.7.1 Chapter 2 (Laboratory Experiment 1): Construction and Test of a Model 
at the Individual Level 
This study constructed a model of the occurrence of the Deaf Effect and tested it in a 
laboratory experiment. Using Evans’ Heuristic-Analytic theory of decision making and 
Miceli and Near’s whistle-blowing theory, it proposed hypotheses that the Deaf Effect 
occurs when the decision maker does not consider the report of bad news to be 
sufficiently relevant. Additionally, it hypothesized that the relevance of the message is a 
function of the credibility of the bad news reporter. The hypotheses were confirmed, but 
male gender was also found to be a factor in increasing the willingness to continue the 
current course of action. 
1.7.2 Chapter 3 (Laboratory Experiment 2): Effects of Gender, Risk and Role 
Prescription on the Deaf Effect 
In the previous study, gender was seen to be a significant factor on the decision to 
continue a course of action. Additionally, while the contours of the model were found to 
be true, the Deaf Effect was not technically observed in that study. In this study, the 
model from study 1 is expanded by consideration of the effects of risk propensity and 
risk perception to explain the effect of gender on the decision to continue the current 
course of action. Role Prescription is added to explain the lack of occurrence of the Deaf 
Effect in study 1. The model was tested in a laboratory experiment. Relevance of the 
bad news report, Risk Propensity, and Risk Perception were found to be significant in 
the explanation of the decision to continue a course of action. Male gender was found to 
increase Risk Propensity and decrease Risk Perception.  
1.7.3 Chapter 4 (Laboratory Experiment 3):  Effect of Societal Collectivism on 
the Deaf Effect 
The previous studies were conducted in the individualistic culture of the United States. It 
is possible that collectivism and its emphasis on allegiance to the group may cause the 
occurrence of the Deaf Effect to be diminished. In this study, I considered the effects of 
perceived societal collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect using the GLOBE 
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framework of cultural variables. This experiment replicated the study of Chapter 3 in the 
USA, Germany and China. This study found that how the decision maker perceives the 
values of the culture had little effect on the occurrence of Deaf Effect but the structural 
model found in the previous two studies was substantially replicated in all three 
geographies. However, while the structural model was replicated, the effect sizes of Risk 
Perception and Relevance of the bad news report were reversed in China vs. the 
western cultures. This suggests that in China, individuals place more emphasis on the 
inherent riskiness of the project rather than the report of bad news in determining 
whether to continue a course of action. Additionally, in Germany, Role Prescription was 
found to not have a significant contribution to the relevance of the report of bad news. It 
is suggested that this occurs because in Germany, internal auditors (the description of 
the role prescribed bad news reporter) are viewed as time wasters who don’t add value 
to the project.  
1.7.4 Chapter 5:  A Case Study of the Deaf Effect 
The previous studies were conducted in laboratory experiments using student subjects. 
In this study, I moved the examination to the study of the occurrence in the Deaf Effect in 
an actual project situation. This study examined the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in an 
Information Systems project in a state government organization over a time period from 
2003 to 2006. Gathering data through interviews of project personnel and observation of 
project status review meetings, this study suggests that the pattern identified in the 
structural model of the first three experiments holds in an actual project situation among 
IS professionals. It also suggests that illusion of control and highly political environments 
are potential causes for rejection of the report of bad news.  It also found that given the 
motivation to shirk, information asymmetries allowed the project director to distort the 
status of the project in reporting to the oversight committees.  
1.7.5 Chapter 6: Summary 
The final chapter reviews the findings from the four studies undertaken in this 
dissertation and summarizes them, identifies the contribution, limitations and 
implications for research and practice.  
 
1.8 SUMMARY 
Escalation of commitment continues to be a serious issue in information systems project 
management. While various causal factors have been proposed, recently a new set of 
factors based in the communication of project status and critical upward communication 
has been proposed as explanatory factors. This dissertation adds to this stream of 
research by studying the Deaf Effect, when decision makers don’t hear, ignore or 
overrule reports of bad news to continue failing courses of action. In a series of four 
studies, it makes an initial exploration of the Deaf Effect by building up a variance model 
at the individual level in laboratory experiments and then verifying that model in a case 
study.  
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2 CONSTRUCTION AND TEST OF A MODEL AT THE 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL1 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
Project escalation is known to frequently occur in the context of information systems (IS) 
projects. The reluctance to hear bad news--a phenomenon that has been labelled the “deaf 
effect”--has been suggested as a possible reason for why projects are allowed to escalate for as 
long as they sometimes do.  The deaf effect response to bad news reporting has received little 
research attention, yet may account for many cases of project escalation. The research reported 
here provides a description of conditions under which the deaf effect is likely to occur. 
Hypotheses regarding factors involved in causing the deaf effect are articulated based on Miceli 
and Near’s theory of bad news reporting effectiveness and further elaborated using insights from 
the cognitive psychology literature of decision making. The extended theory was then tested 
experimentally using a role-playing experiment.  Results suggest that when a decision maker 
perceives a relevant message, s/he is willing to de-escalate the project. Bad news reporter 
credibility and the gender of the decision maker were found to be key factors in the determination 
of message relevance. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Information systems project failures typically exhibit ample warning signs of impending 
failure, but for reasons that are not well understood, these warning signs are frequently 
ignored. In many cases, there are team members or even a single individual that seek to 
call attention to critical issues and ask for a delay or change of course in the project 
direction. In those cases, it is important to know why senior management did not heed 
the “bad news reporter” who warned them that the project was in danger of failing. This 
failure to heed the bad news reporter has been called the “deaf effect” (Keil and Robey 
2001).  
The information systems discipline is rife with this phenomenon. For example, the UK 
Child Support Agency recently spent 456 million GBP on a new system. During the 
development period, it received 70 audits of which 70% had identified serious concerns. 
Yet it was delivered with 52 critical defects and, three years after delivery, productivity 
has fallen from pre-implementation levels and the staff has to use 600 workarounds 
(Computer.Business.Review 2006). In the famous Providian Trust case (McFarlan and 
Dailey 1997), an internal auditor attempted to signal serious issues with a project and 
ended up getting fired for his trouble. The system went on to fail spectacularly.  
Failures involving the deaf effect represent a serious problem, and this is an 
understudied area. Only one IS study has discussed this failure to respond. While Keil & 
and Robey (2001) have demonstrated that the deaf effect does occur, no study has yet 
investigated how or why this effect occurs. The research question that we seek to 
investigate is “What are some of the causal factors that that create the deaf effect?” 
In this research, we propose that credibility of the bad news reporter affects the decision 
                                                
1This paper has been published in the e‐Service Journal as Cuellar, M. J., Keil, M., and 
Johnson, R.D., “The Deaf Effect Response to Bad News Reporting in Information Systems 
Projects,” e‐Service Journal (5:1), pp. 75‐97. 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process behind the response to bad news reporting.  This proposition is tested by means 
of a laboratory experiment. The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of 
relevant literature on whistle-blowing, bad news reporting, and decision making, along 
with the hypotheses to be tested. Then, we introduce the experimental design, present 
the results of the study, and briefly discuss its implications. 
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature reveals that only one publication (Keil and Robey 2001) has 
dealt with the deaf effect in information systems project management. Keil and Robey 
(2001) described the “deaf effect” as a failure to respond to messages of impending 
project failure. Based on a survey of internal auditors, they demonstrated that the deaf 
effect exists in IS project management situations. The auditors surveyed recounted 
instances in which they had reported bad news about projects only to find that their 
concerns were ignored by senior management.  
Without an existing literature or theory base that bears directly on this phenomenon, we 
review reference theories from management and cognitive psychology that can be used 
to construct hypotheses regarding factors that may promote the deaf effect. In this 
section, we examine the literature related to whistle-blowing effectiveness, and decision 
making theory, which can be used to inform a model of the deaf effect response to bad 
news reporting.  
2.3.1 Near and Miceli’s Model of Whistle-Blowing Effectiveness and the Deaf 
Effect 
Whistle-blowing as used by Near and Miceli is defined as “the disclosure by organization 
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control 
of their employers, to person or organization that may be able to affect action” (Miceli 
and Near 2002, p. 456). In the IT project context, the bad-news reporter is not 
necessarily disclosing illegal, or immoral practices, but rather the fact that they believe 
that the present direction of the project is a failing course of action. The question then 
arises as to whether this literature has appropriate bearing upon consideration of the 
deaf effect.  
We hold that the two phenomena are sufficiently similar to allow us to use the whistle 
blowing literature to inform our study. While in the case of the deaf effect, nothing illegal 
is being disclosed, the reporter is disclosing what s/he perceives to be a failing course of 
action that is not being addressed by the project leadership. This failing course of action 
is similar to illegitimate acts when sponsored by management because although 
management has endorsed the project, continuing a failing course of action is 
inappropriate and represents a waste of corporate resources. Reporters of bad news 
also face pressures similar to those of whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers of illegal 
activities find that disclosure of the problem is a high risk activity and thus are reluctant 
to report (Miceli and Near 1992; Miceli, Near and Schwenk 1991). Reporters of bad 
news in projects perceive reporting similarly (Keil and Robey 2001; Smith, et al. 2001). 
Thus we find that bad news reporting is conceptually similar to whistle-blowing. 
Near and Miceli (1995) describe a model of whistle-blowing effectiveness. They argue 
that the effectiveness of whistle-blowing is based on the personal characteristics 
(credibility and power) of the whistle-blower and the complaint recipient, moderated by 
the support for the whistle-blower and the wrongdoer as well as situational and 
organizational characteristics of the wrong-doing. They describe credibility as being 
composed of the indicators of the whistle-blower’s perceived motives, ability to convince 
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others of their correctness, trustworthiness and power as the whistle-blower’s status, 
position in the hierarchy, and perceived value to the organization. Thus a well-respected 
whistle-blower in a position of power will be more effective than one who has little 
standing and resides in the lower echelons of the organization. 
Near and Miceli (1995) further proposed that characteristics of the wrongdoing and the 
organization also have an effect on the organizational response. If the organization has 
been dependent on the form of wrongdoing, or there is little evidence or legal basis for 
complaint about the wrongdoing, the organization’s willingness to change will be lower. 
Conversely, if the organization looks favorably on whistle blowing and is less 
bureaucratic, their willingness to change will be higher. From the standpoint of the deaf 
effect, this seems to indicate that the deaf effect would be more likely to occur when the 
decision maker is dependent upon continuance of the current course of the project to 
maintain his/her organizational status or reputation.  
2.3.2 Cognitive Psychological Theories of Decision-making 
Since the deaf effect response is a failure of the decision making process, an 
examination of decision making theory is appropriate for building a theory of its 
causation. In this section, we examine the cognitive psychology behind decision making 
to investigate the factors that come into play when a decision is made. 
There are many different psychological theories of decision making.  However, current 
theory in this area suggests that decision making can be regarded as a two-step process 
(Evans 1984; Evans 1989; Kahneman 2003; Stanovich and West 1998, pp. 309-310). 
These theories hold that the two-step process arose due to the vast amount of data 
available to a decision maker. In any non-trivial problem, finding a solution requires 
searching through a vast number of possible solution paths. Thus, humans are 
confronted daily with more information than can possibly be processed. To handle this 
onslaught of data effectively, they developed heuristic processes to conserve their 
scarce processing power. And when one does think about these selected pieces of 
information, it is in the context of a mental model of the world rather than the actual 
world itself as the world is too large to comprehend totally (Evans 1989). Two major 
theories in this area are those proposed by Evans (1984; 1989) and Kahneman (2003). 
In both theories, the decision is held to be made in two phases. In the first phase, 
(intuition/heuristic), reasoning is performed in a largely automatic, unconscious, pre-
attentive manner. In phase 2 (reason/analytic), reasoning is deliberate, conscious and 
monitored. It is generally held that information is selected as relevant or accessed during 
the first phase for consideration in the second phase. We adopt the Evans’ Heuristic-
Analytic (HA) model for use in this paper. 
 
2.3.2.1. Heuristic-Analytic Theory 
HA theory postulates that thinking is selectively focused on ‘relevant’ parts of problems 
and that prior knowledge, heuristics, and schemas are retrieved as determined 
necessary by pre-attentive heuristics (Evans,1996). See figure 2.1. Evans (1989) 
postulates that the major cause of bias in human reasoning lies in the heuristic 
processes adopted to select information for processing. If a heuristic fails to select a key 
piece of information or selects an irrelevant piece of information for processing, the 
subsequent analysis will be flawed. The analysis itself will be accurate only to the extent 
that the mental model of the world that one has constructed is accurate (1989). 
In the heuristic phase, two groups of factors affect the selection of relevant information: 
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message characteristics and the mental model of the decision maker. The message 
characteristics include such components as vividness/salience, comprehensibility and 
certain linguistic cues. Vividness/salience refers to how well the message stands out 
from competing messages/sensations within the decision maker’s environment. 
Linguistic cues signal the decision maker on how to focus their attention (Evans 1996).  
The decision maker’s mental model refers to the model that the decision maker has of 
the real world including their conception of cause and effect relationships, expectations, 
beliefs and other structural factors. In the heuristic phase of decision making these 
structures are accessed pre-consciously to assist in filtering relevant from irrelevant 
information. From the decision maker’s bank of experience, additional available relevant 
information is also accessed.  
 
 
2.4 A RESEARCH MODEL OF THE DEAF EFFECT 
In this section, we use the insights from cognitive psychology and Miceli and Near’s 
whistle-blowing effectiveness theory to develop a research model (figure 2.2) that 
provides the basis for an initial experiment on the causes of the deaf effect. We adopt 
the basic process from Evans for the proposed model.  
 
Heuristic 
Processing 
Salience 
Vividness 
Linguistic 
Factors 
Bad News 
Reporter’s 
Message 
Relevant 
Information 
Prior 
Knowledge 
Mental 
Model 
 
Decision 
Decision 
Processing 
Figure 2.1: Model of Heuristic-Analytic Decision-Making Process 
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Bad News Reporter  
Credibility     H3 – 
               H2 + 
       
 Relevance      Decision 
    of the Message   H1 - 
Figure 2.2: Research model for this experiment 
 
Evans (1989) states that decision makers pre-attentionally select the information that 
they believe will be relevant to making the decision using their mental model heuristics. 
Thus the bad news reporter’s (BNR’s) message would be evaluated for relevance using 
the decision maker’s mental model heuristics.  Once it the message passed the 
heuristics, it would be considered in the decision process. From this we see that to be 
effective, a BNR’s message must be considered as relevant before it can be actively 
evaluated. We therefore propose hypothesis 1: 
H1: When the report of bad news is considered relevant, the decision 
maker will be more likely to discontinue the present course of action 
Part of this pre-attentive processing is to determine whether the bad news report must 
be attended to. This is where the credibility of the whistle-blower as postulated by Near 
and Miceli (1995) may be processed. If the decision maker determines that the whistle-
blower is not credible, then the message may be disregarded. We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will tend 
to have their messages considered as relevant 
Miceli and Near also indicate that whistle-blowers that who are credible are also more 
effective in terminating wrongdoing. The Heuristic Analytic Theory indicates that during 
relevance processing, information is selected and passed on to the analytic process for 
analysis. Thus the decision makers may bring their assessment of the credibility of the 
whistle-blower into their decision process. The effect of the BNR’s credibility may not be 
completely mediated by the relevance decision but may also have a direct effect on the 
decision. Therefore we propose hypothesis 3: 
H3:  Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will be 
more effective in convincing the decision maker to change their course 
of action 
2.5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.5.1 Experimental Model 
We tested these hypotheses using a role-playing experiment with student subjects. 
While the use of student subjects can pose limitations in terms of external validity, there 
is ample precedent for using student subjects in studies with organizational decision 
making tasks (Sitkin and Weingart 1995) and, specifically, decisions associated with 
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project management (Harrison and Harrell 1993; Smith, et al. 2001).  There is support in 
the literature for using students as surrogates for managers in studies that focus on 
decision making and which do not require deep knowledge of particular domain. Remus 
(1986), for example, reported no differences in decision making between students and 
managers in the context of production scheduling.  Locke (1986, p. 6) notes that “both 
college students and employees appear to respond similarly to goals, feedback, 
incentives, participation, and so forth, perhaps because the similarities among these 
subjects (such as in values) are more crucial than their differences.”   Liyanarachchi and 
Milne (2005) have indicated that in situations where only psychological processes are 
being tested and not attitudes and knowledge that would be developed through 
experience, students stand as a good surrogate for experienced managers. Additionally, 
the role-playing scenario was constructed so as to place the subject in the role of a 
recent graduate, which provides a decision making context that is close to what might be 
expected from the subject population.   
2.5.2 Scenario Description 
We created a role-playing experiment that included the elements of the deaf effect 
described above. Modeled partially on the Providian Trust case (McFarlan, 1997), the 
subjects were cast as a project manager responsible for development of a new system 
to be put into production. As part of standard procedures, an internal auditor has 
reviewed the project and given a negative report on its readiness for production. The 
auditor has not given specific or understandable reasons for why s/he believes the 
project will fail and the decision maker was not given enough information to resolve the 
problem himself alone, forcing him to rely on the assertions of others. Exogenous factors 
were introduced to motivate the subjects in the direction of putting the system into 
production. The decision maker can choose to have a known problem in dealing with his 
management’s expectations if s/he chooses to delay the project, or an uncertain 
catastrophic problem if s/he implements the system and the auditor is right or no pain at 
all if the system implementation goes well. 
Two alternate case scenarios manipulated the credibility of the auditor (see Appendices 
A and B). In creating this manipulation, we made use of source credibility theory. 
According to this theory, source credibility is primarily composed of two dimensions: 
Expertise, the extent to which a speaker is considered to be capable of making correct 
assertions and trustworthiness, the extent to which a speaker can be relied upon to 
make true assertions (Hovland, Janis and Kelley 1953). In general, a highly credible 
source is more effective in creating attitudinal or behavioral change than a source with 
low credibility. The expertise and trustworthy trustworthiness dimensions have 
differential weights; in general, trustworthiness has a larger impact than expertise 
(McGinnies and Ward 1980). In terms of the construction of the message, evidence and 
argumentation used by the source have mixed effects. The presence of unfamiliar 
evidence increased increases the credibility of the low credibility source, but left leaves 
the high credibility source unchanged (McCroskey 1969; McCroskey 1970). The quality 
of arguments changed changes attitudes more for the high credibility source than for the 
low and decision makers were are more likely to act based on strong arguments of a 
highly credible source and least likely to act when the highly credible source gave gives 
weak arguments (Moore et al, 1986).  
When the message disagrees with the recipients’ initial opinion, a highly credible source 
was is more effective the more the message disagrees with the recipient’s opinions, 
while the low credibility sources were are more effective with only a moderate level of 
disagreement (Bochner and Insko 1966). When faced with various kinds of threats 
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(physical or social) for non-compliance with the message, the most effective in changing 
attitudes was is the strong threat delivered by a highly credible source (Miller and 
Basehart 1969). A bias also seems to exist in the message style; low credibility sources 
tend to have their negative information rejected more significantly than positive 
information. Similarly, a high credibility source has the negative information given more 
credence than positive (Czapinski and Lewicka 1979). Language intensity has a 
contrasting impact. For high credibility sources, it enhances their message. However, for 
low intensity sources it decreases their effectiveness (Hamilton, Hunter and Burgoon 
1990). 
In the positive scenario for our study, the auditor was portrayed as valuable to the 
company and had having a track record of successfully evaluating projects (i.e., 
possessing expertise and trustworthiness). In the negative scenario, the auditor had a 
poor track record.  Moreover, the subject’s team and manager dismissed his credibility 
and the auditor was said to “cry wolf” in order to gain attention (i.e., the auditor lacked 
expertise and trustworthiness). As indicated by the source credibility literature, the lack 
of evidence produced by the auditor will not hurt him in the high credibility manipulation 
nor provide needed enhancement in the low credibility treatment. The scenario uses a 
negative message contrasting with the subject’s initial opinion, has extreme language 
(“disaster waiting to happen”), and places the subject in a socially threatening 
environment, all aspects that should enhance the positively placed auditor and not 
enhance the negatively placed auditor.  
2.5.3 Operationalization of Variables 
The key experimental variables were operationalized using a set of questions with a 
Likert scale. The individual scale items for each variable were centered prior to analysis. 
Dependent Variable:  Decision. The dependent variable, Decision, was operationalized 
as a single, eight-point Likert scale question in which the subject was asked to choose to 
“Test Further” or “Move to Production”. Anchor points for the variable were “Definitely 
Test Further” and “Definitely Move to Production.” Intermediate points were “strongly,”, 
“somewhat” and “slightly” on each side of the scale. While it might be thought that 
“Decision” is a binary yes/no variable, we wanted to additionally measure the strength of 
their decision. We wanted to get a reading on whether they subjects believed strongly in 
their decision.  
Independent Variables: Relevance, Salience and Perception of Auditor Credibility. 
The independent variables were operationalized using multi-item seven-point Likert 
scale questions anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end 
points and “neutral” in the mid-point. The last relevance question was reverse scaled. 
We measured salience as a manipulation check to ensure that there was not a variation 
in salience of the auditor’s message between the scenarios. 
2.5.4 Instrument 
Students were instructed to read the scenario as described above and then were asked 
to make a decision as to whether to move the project into production (i.e., implement it) 
or delay the project for further testing.   
A subsequent questionnaire (Appendix C) then asked for the reasons for their decision. 
Demographic data were collected for Gender, Age, and Years of full-time paid work 
experience. 
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2.5.5 Statistical Controls 
A number of demographic variables were statistically controlled for in the study. Gender 
was dummy coded (female = 0 and male =1) as was the class from which the samples 
were drawn. We also collected age, and years of full-time experience. These variables 
were centered prior to the analysis. We also collected information on the salience of the 
auditor’s message that we used as a manipulation check to ensure that the salience did 
not vary across the manipulations. 
2.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section describes the results obtained from the study. In this study, causal linkages 
were noted moving in a single direction from credibility to relevance and from relevance 
to Decision. While many behavioral studies are non-directional, there seemed to be only 
one logical possibility for movement in this study.  
2.6.1 Demographics 
The demographics of our subject pool can be seen in Table 1.  Subjects had an average 
age of 20.5 years and an average work experience of 2.5 years.  Fifty-seven percent of 
the subjects were female and 43% were male.   
2.6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks 
We obtained 60 usable responses.  Table 2,1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key 
variables. Table 2,2 shows the same variables split into treatment groups. Two tailed t-
tests were performed at 5% alpha in order to determine significant differences in the 
scores between the two treatment groups. These are shown in Table 2,3. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation N 
Decision 2.83 1.924 60 
Relevance 4.95 1.303 60 
Salience 4.62 1.025 60 
Auditor Credibility 4.472 1.33 60 
 
 
Table 2,2 shows the same variables split into treatment groups. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Group 
 
Treatment Variable Mean Standard 
Dev. 
 
Negative Decision 3.26 2.016  
N=31 Relevance 4.63 1.294  
 Salience 4.56 1.138  
 Auditor 
Credibility 
3.67 1.128  
 Gender   16 male/15 
female 
Positive Decision 2.37 1.712  
N=30 Relevance 5.26 1.26  
 Salience 4.68 .912  
 Auditor 
Credibility 
5.28 .995  
 Gender   11 male/19 
female 
 
Two tailed t-tests were performed at 5% alpha in order to determine significant 
differences in the scores between the two treatment groups. These are shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 2.3: Results of Two Tailed t-Tests 
Variable Difference  t-score Significance 
Decision .89 1.859 .068 
Relevance -.62 -1.897 .063 
Salience -.12 -0.438 .663 
Auditor Credibility -1.61 -5.868 .000 
 
These tests show that the perception of the auditor’s Credibility varied significantly 
across the treatment groups. The manipulation therefore was effective. Salience, which 
was held constant, did not vary significantly indicating that the perception of the salience 
of the auditor’s message was stable across the treatments. The Decision variable 
changed almost a point across the manipulations indicating that those receiving the 
positive manipulation were less likely to move the product into production than those 
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 35 
receiving the negative manipulation. Similarly, the subjects receiving the positive 
manipulation had a higher perception of the Relevance of the auditor’s message and a 
higher perception of the auditor’s credibility. 
The Decision variable for both treatment groups showed that subjects tended to favor 
delaying the product implementation. They also tended to consider the auditor’s 
message relevant in both treatments. 
2.6.3 PLS Analysis 
We subjected the data to a PLS analysis using the SmartPLS program V2 M3 (Ringle, 
Wende and Will 2005). Our figure 2.3 shows our structural model. is as shown here: We 
analyzed each of the demographic variables against the model constructs to determine 
any effects from them as well as the predicted effects. In addition to the PLS analysis, 
we executed a bootstrap analysis using the default parameters of 100 sample size and 
200 samples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: PLS Structural Model (from Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows the quality measures from the PLS analysis: 
 
Table 2,4: Quality Measures from the PLS Analysis 
 AVE Comp. 
Reliab. 
R Square  Cronbach’s 
Alpha  
Communality  Redundancy 
        Age 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Credibility 0.6476 0.8455 0.0290 0.7447 0.6476 0.0077 
   Decision 1.0000 1.0000 0.6183 1.0000 1.0000 -0.0018 
     Gender 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
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Relevance 0.7152 0.9248 0.1920 0.8943 0.7152 0.0399 
 YearsFTE 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
 
We see that the Reliability reliabilities for both the credibility and Relevance variables are 
over .84, the AVE is over .64 and the Cronbach’s alpha is over .74 for each, indicating 
that we have good convergent validity for these constructs. PLS performs a confirmatory 
factor analysis of the measurement model. The results of this analysis are shown in 
Table 2.5:  
Table 2.5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 Age Credibility Decision  Gender Relevance YearsFTE 
        CAge  1.0000     -0.1353   0.2774  0.1426   -0.2434   0.4564 
  CYearsFTE  0.4564     -0.0003   0.2550  0.1451   -0.0974   1.0000 
    Decision  0.2774     -0.4244   1.0000  0.1646   -0.7341   0.2550 
      Gender  0.1426     -0.0892   0.1646  1.0000    0.0229   0.1451 
 IAHighlyReg  0.0693      0.7269  -0.2662  0.0553    0.1981   0.1500 
  IAMostCred -0.1696      0.8955  -0.4389 -0.1143    0.4327  -0.0085 
IAOrgLoyalty -0.1628      0.7826  -0.2635 -0.1110    0.2112  -0.1138 
   RelvDisIA -0.2024      0.2816  -0.4443 -0.0574    0.5931  -0.1185 
  RelvHighly -0.1461      0.3602  -0.6097  0.0529    0.9020   0.0111 
 RelvMorInfl -0.2301      0.4636  -0.7186  0.0674    0.9090  -0.1020 
 RelvMosInfl -0.2608      0.2685  -0.6717  0.0401    0.8849  -0.1783 
RelvVeryImp -0.1856      0.2127  -0.6128 -0.0409    0.8952  -0.0201 
 
From this analysis, we see that all measurement items factored as expected and that we 
have no cross-loading.  Additionally, the Latent Variable Correlations (Table 2.6) show 
that none of the correlations exceeds the square root of the average variance indicating 
good divergent validity for the Relevance and credibility constructs. The path coefficients 
for the study are shown in Table 2.7. The significant paths are indicated. Figure 2,4 
shows the significant paths. 
Table 2.6: Latent Value Correlations (with SQRT(AVE) Inserted on the Diagonal) 
 Relevance Credibility Decision Gender Age Years 
FTE 
Relevance 0.846      
Credibility 0.3838 0.805     
Decision -0.7341 -0.4244 1.0000    
Gender 0.0229 -0.0892 0.1646 1.0000   
Age -0.2434 -0.1353 0.2774 0.1426 1.0000  
YearsFTE -0.0974 -0.0003 0.2550 0.1451 0.4564 1.0000 
 
The path coefficients for the study are shown in Table 2,7. The significant paths are 
indicated.  
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Table 2.7: Path Coefficients and t-Statistics for Bootstrap Analysis 
 Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Age -> 
Credibility* 
-0.1632 -0.1650 0.0774 0.0774 2.1095 
Age -> 
Decision 
-0.0032 0.0099 0.0771 0.0771 0.0421 
Age -> 
Relevance* 
-0.1973 -0.1909 0.0893 0.0893 2.2095 
 Credibility -> 
Decision* 
-0.1586 -0.1548 0.0734 0.0734 2.1612 
Credibility -> 
Relevance* 
0.3648 0.3772 0.0849 0.0849 4.2971 
Gender -> 
Credibility 
-0.0783 -0.0842 0.1090 0.1090 0.7185 
Gender -> 
Decision* 
0.1411 0.1520 0.0657 0.0657 2.1680 
Gender -> 
Relevance 
0.0864 0.0909 0.1049 0.1049 0.8238 
Relevance -> 
Decision* 
-0.6605 -0.6604 0.0526 0.0526 12.5575 
YearsFTE -> 
Credibility 
0.0855 0.0805 0.1058 0.1058 0.8083 
YearsFTE -> 
Decision* 
0.1716 0.1736 0.0590 0.0590 2.9072 
YearsFTE -> 
Relevance 
-0.0198 -0.0192 0.0986 0.0986 0.2003 
Drawing the significant paths in a diagram, we see figure 2.4: 
 
 
   Credibility -.1586   Years Full Time Exp 
         -1632      .3648                     .1716 
               Relevance  Decision 
                            -.1973   .1411 
       Age    Gender 
Figure 2.4: Schematic diagram of results from PLS analysis 
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We find that as the Relevance of the auditor’s message increases, that the willingness of 
the subject to decide to put the system into production decreases by approximately 2/3 
of a point for each point increase in the Relevance score. Additionally, we find that as 
the credibility of the auditor increases, the Relevance of the message to the subject’s 
decision making process increases.  Age tends to have a negative effect on the 
Relevance of the auditor’s message. Male subjects and those who have full time work 
experience tend to be more likely to put the system into production.  
2.7 DISCUSSION 
Three hypotheses were tested: 
H1:  When the report of bad news is considered relevant, the decision maker 
will be more likely to discontinue the present course of action 
H2: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will tend to 
have their messages considered as relevant 
H3: Reporters of bad news that who are considered credible will be more 
effective in convincing the decision maker to change their course of 
action 
We found evidence supporting all of our hypotheses. We found that relevant messages 
from the auditor were strongly significant and decreased Decision by approximately 2/3 
point for each point increase in the Relevance score. This result indicates that to the 
extent that the message is found to be relevant, the likelihood of changing course in 
information systems projects is significantly increased. Thus hypothesis 1 was 
supported. It was found that the credibility of the bad news reporter does co-vary with 
the Relevance measure. Bad news reporters with higher credibility tended to have their 
messages viewed as relevant in the context of information systems projects. Hypothesis 
two was thus confirmed. We also found that credibility co-varies with Decision with 40% 
of its effects being on Decision, which confirms hypothesis three. Thus, the whistle-
blower’s credibility not only affects how the subjects view the relevance of the message 
to their decision, it also directly influences the subjects’ decisions. 
Both treatment groups were strongly in favor of delaying the project. Even in the 
negative treatment group, where the credibility of the auditor was significantly 
questioned, the subjects opted to delay. One explanation for this effect stems from the 
position of the auditor. Miceli and Near (2002) found that whistle blowing is more 
effective when role-prescribed. In the descriptive comments section of the questionnaire, 
several of the subjects referred to credibility that accrued to the auditor as a result of his 
that role or the unwillingness to contradict the auditor even in the face of negative 
comments by their team members and manager. 
In an unexpected result, it was found that Gender had an effect on Decision. Women 
were more likely to delay the project than men. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that women are more willing to accept personal negative impacts in order to 
avoid negative impacts to the organization. Additionally, we note that age tended to 
decrease the credibility of the auditor and the relevance of the message and that 
increasing full time work experience tended to increase the likelihood of putting the 
system into production. These effects could be a result of socialization in the workplace. 
It might be that as employees gain experience in organizations, they learn to defer to 
managerial pressure and do what they perceive that their manager wants done when 
they are in situations of uncertainty. 
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Because the bad news reporter’s credibility was not fully mediated by perceived 
Relevance and because Gender had an effect on Decision, we must modify the 
experimental model by adding Gender as an effect on Decision and an effect from bad 
news reporter credibility to the decision point. 
 
Auditor Credibility          Years of Full Time Exp 
  
 
  Message Relevance   Decision 
 . 
 
        Age Gender 
Figure 2.5: Revised model 
 
2.7.1 Implications for Research 
The results on bad news reporter credibility results also support Miceli and Near’s 
proposal that whistle-blowers that who are more credible are more effective in 
terminating the offending behavior. The experiment has shown that when an internal 
auditor is perceived as credible, the subjects are more likely to stop the project for 
further testing. 
Additional research is required to provide further development of this theory. The study 
should be repeated with other subjects to test for generalizability. Active IS 
professionals, especially project managers, should be studied to determine if the effect 
occurs as described in that population. Variations of the study should be conducted with 
subjects asked to play roles that do not have a role prescription for bad news reporting 
to see whether this influences the deaf effect. More research is also needed to explore 
the effects of age, full time work experience and Gender that was were observed in this 
study.  
The other areas of the model also need to be explored. Does the presence of additional 
“noise” in the communication channel contribute to the decision maker not perceiving 
that a message is trying to be sent? Are perceptual features critical to the relevance 
determination? What other heuristics are used to determine relevance? The entire 
analytic processing section needs to be researched. What is the process in by which the 
decision is made? How is credibility considered? What factors beyond credibility are 
considered in the analytic portion of the decision? 
Additional research should be done on the organizational antecedents of the deaf effect. 
What organizational factors favor the occurrence of the deaf effect? Are there actions, 
deliberate or inadvertent, that managers take that incent subordinate decision makers to 
continue failing courses of action in spite of bad news reports? Do organizational politics 
make decision makers more likely to ignore bad news reporters?  Does the cohort at the 
top of a project have an effect on the occurrence of the deaf effect? Does homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of the cohort modify the response to bad news? 
While many questions remain to be answered, this study has shown evidence that the 
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deaf effect response to bad news reporting is founded in the perceived relevance of the 
bad news reporter’s message, which in turn is influenced by his/her perceived credibility 
and salience of the message. 
2.7.2 Implications for Practice 
In terms of implications for practice, this study suggests that managers should seek to 
raise the credibility of bad news reporters within the organization. Particularly for 
auditors, who have to provide project assessments, efforts should be made to make 
them credible to project teams. Raising their expertise and trustworthiness could do this. 
They should have a significant knowledge base in the project’s technology and in 
assessing project risk factors. Management should also provide indications of their 
confidence and trust in them auditors by utilizing their services and providing support for 
their bad news reporting actions. Auditors should also work with project teams in non-
threatening situations by becoming information resources to members of project teams, 
thereby providing assistance in terms of providing proactive support in preventing or 
mitigating project risk factors. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examined the deaf effect response to bad news reporting in information 
systems project management in terms of Miceli and Near’s (2002) work on whistle-
blowing effectiveness, and Evans’ Heuristic-Analytic theory of decision making. We 
developed a research model that hypothesized that the credibility of the bad news 
reporter affected how relevant the decision maker found the bad news reporter’s 
message. We tested the model in a role-playing experiment and found support for the 
basic propositions of the theory examined. Bad news reporter credibility is partially 
mediated by the relevance processing and has an effect on the decision.  
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3 EFFECTS OF GENDER, RISK AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION ON 
THE DEAF EFFECT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first paper in this dissertation found that the credibility of the bad news reporter has 
a negative effect on the decision to continue the current course of action. The effect of 
credibility was mediated by the perceived relevance of the bad news report. These 
effects are illustrated in figure 3.1.  
The Credibility of the auditor and the Relevance of the message were associated with a 
decision to discontinue the failing course of action. When the auditor was credible and 
his/her message considered relevant to their decision, the subject was more likely to 
consider changing the course of action to hold the project for further testing. The 
Credibility of the auditor also positively impacted the Relevance of the message of bad 
news so that more credible auditors tended to have their message considered as 
relevant. Male gender was found to decrease the willingness to change course of action.  
One limitation of paper 1 was that in spite of the manipulation, the Deaf Effect was not 
actually induced in a technical sense.  While the relevance of the message was 
positively associated with the strength of the decision, most of the subjects elected to 
change the prior course of action regardless of the manipulation (i.e., few subjects 
exhibited a true Deaf Effect whereby negative feedback was ignored in the decision 
process). One possible explanation for this is that in the scenario, the bad news reporter 
Message 
Relevance Decision to 
Continue 
Credibility 
Years of  
Experience 
R2=. 192 R2=. 618 
 
-0.660 
T=12.56** 
 
 
 
0.365 
T=4.30** 
 
 
-.159 
T=2.16* 
 
0.171 
T=2.91* 
 
0.141 
T=2.17* 
 
-0.197 
T=2.21* 
 
-0.163 
T=2.11* 
 
Figure 3.1: Relationships between Credibility, Relevance and Decision to 
continue a course of action  
adapted from paper 1 
 
Age Gender 
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was portrayed as an auditor (i.e., someone who is role prescribed to report bad news) 
and this may have lent a certain level of credibility to the message, irrespective of the 
attempt to manipulate the auditor’s credibility.  
An additional issue with the previous paper is the occurrence of gender as a significant 
factor in the decision to continue a failing course of action. The phenomenon that males 
were significantly more likely to continue the current course compared to females was 
unexplained by the proposed model.  
The research presented here, seeks to address and propose explanations for these 
issues. The research questions addressed here are:  
1) What is the effect of Role Prescription on the Credibility of the bad news 
reporter and the relevance of their message and,  
2) What factors are there that might account for the finding that female 
decision makers were more likely to discontinue the current course of 
action? 
This paper is organized as follows. First, the literature that provides insights on the 
research questions is examined and new hypotheses and an expanded research model 
are proposed. Then this model is subjected to a laboratory experiment. Finally, the 
results of the model are discussed. 
3.2 RESEARCH MODEL 
In order to examine both of those questions, the whistle blowing effectiveness literature 
as well as literature on the relationship of Gender and risk in decision making are 
examined. 
3.2.1 Insights from the Whistle-blowing Literature: 
In paper 1, it was seen that the whistle-blowing phenomenon was sufficiently similar to 
that of project status reporting to be able to apply its insights to the this research. In the 
whistle-blowing effectiveness literature, Miceli and Near (2002) in two secondary 
analysis studies, one of anonymous survey data of the US Merit Systems Protection 
Board and one of anonymous survey data from federal government agencies, found that 
Role Prescription was positively associated with effectiveness in whistle blowing. 
Whistle-blowers who indicated that they believed that their complaints were resolved or 
expected them to be resolved tended to indicate that it was part of their job to blow the 
whistle on wrongdoing. 
Extending this to the Deaf Effect, I can therefore hypothesize that  
H1a: Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is negatively associated with 
continuance of the current failing course of action 
Miceli and Near believed that this effect occurred as a result of their position power. Role 
prescribed bad news reporters therefore are inherently held to be more legitimate or to 
have higher expertise as a result of their roles. Pornpitakpan (2004) saw that perceived 
expertise was a component of Credibility. Thus the fact that in paper 1, an auditor was 
used as the bad news reporter could explain why they did not strongly induce the Deaf 
Effect. Thus the following can hypothesize: 
H1b: Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is positively associated with 
the reporter’s Credibility.  
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Additionally, it may be that the effect of Role Prescription is not only to increase 
Credibility and decrease willingness to continue the current course of action. It may also 
be that the report of a role prescribed reporter is considered to be more important than 
one from a non-role prescribed bad news reporter and thus more relevant and must be 
considered simply because of their position. Near and Miceli (1995) following French 
and Raven (1959) indicate that role prescribed whistleblowers (such as internal auditors) 
may possess perceived power to reward or punish organization members. Therefore 
their reports of bad news may take on more importance and relevance than those who 
are not role prescribed to report bad news. I therefore hypothesize:  
H1c:  Role Prescription of a bad news reporter is positively associated with  
the Relevance of the report of bad news.  
3.2.2 Effects of Risk on Decision Making. 
The experiment reported in paper 1 also found that Gender had a significant role in the 
decision process; males were significantly more likely to ignore the report of bad news. 
To explain how this finding might arise, solutions were sought in the cognitive 
psychology literature. This literature indicated that women differed significantly from men 
in the area of risk propensity. I therefore investigated the literature on risk and decision 
making to understand how risk propensity and risk perception might affect a decision 
maker’s willingness to continue a course of action in the face of bad news. This section 
therefore describes first, Sitkin and Weingart’s(1995) model of risk effects in decision 
making. I then follow with a discussion of the literature on the relationship between 
Gender and risk propensity. 
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found that risk propensity and risk perception mediated the 
effects of outcome history and problem framing on decision making behavior.  The more 
risk a subject perceived, the less likely they were to engage in risky decision making 
behavior. In turn, the perception of risk was found to be negatively impacted by the 
subjects’ risk propensity and the nature of the problem framing. These results have been 
replicated in studies of escalation (Keil, et al. 2000b) and the willingness to report bad 
news (Smith, et al. 2001). Therefore, I make the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The level of Risk Propensity is inversely related with Risk Perception. 
H2b: The level of perceived risk is positively related with discontinuance of 
the current course of action.  
H2c: The effect of Risk Propensity on Decision will be completely mediated 
by Risk Perception. 
3.2.3 Effects of Credibility and Role Prescription on Risk Propensity and Risk 
Perception 
Sitkin and Weingart(1995) did not consider the effects of Credibility or Role Prescription 
on the perception of risk or Risk Propensity. Those relationships are addressed in this 
section. 
Risk Propensity. I argue that Credibility and Role Prescription have no effect on Risk 
Propensity as that construct is developed over the decision maker’s history (Sitkin and 
Pablo 1992). The effects of this decision making situation will not have an effect on 
propensity until the decision is made and the results seen. 
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Role Prescription. Similarly, a bad news reporter either is or is not prescribed to report 
bad news. This construct does not seem to be dependent upon Risk Perception or Risk 
Propensity. However, Risk Perception being a determination of the potential of 
unfavorable events occurring in the project would not seem to depend on whether the 
bad news reporter was role prescribed because any effect that it would have on Risk 
Perception would be mediated through the Credibility of the reporter or the relevance of 
the message. 
Risk Perception. In terms of Risk Perception, the questions seem to be whether 
credibility is antecedent or subsequent to the perception of risk. In the Credibility to Risk 
Perception relationship, it could be argued that where the decision maker perceives the 
risk as high then they might consider a reporter of bad news as credible. However, in the 
case of the Deaf Effect, the scenario is that the decision maker previously had a 
perception of low or no risk prior to the report of bad news. Therefore, it seems in the 
case of the Deaf Effect, that Credibility is antecedent to Risk Perception. That is, that 
where a bad news reporter is credible, his message tends to increase the perception of 
risk. I therefore hypothesize the following: 
H2d: The Credibility of the bad news reporter is positively associated with 
the perception of risk in the situation. 
3.2.4 Gender and Risk 
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) did not consider the effects of gender in their study. They 
noted that researchers had identified this as a potential factor, and suggested that 
gender might be integrated into future studies. The effects of gender on risk taking are 
now considered. 
Prior to 1980, the literature on the effects of gender on risk propensity suggested that 
females were more risk averse than males (Johnson and Powell 1994). After 1980, 
research continued to confirm findings that women are less confident in their decisions 
than men and that they are therefore more cautious risk takers, although the differences 
appeared to be less clear-cut than before. In an important meta-analysis of 150 studies 
of gender differences in risk taking, Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999) found that males 
were more likely to take risks than female participants although the gender differences 
varied according to context and age level. In studies of hypothetical choice tasks similar 
to Cuellar, et al. (2006), the 25 studies analyzed suggested a strong gender influence 
with males being more risk accepting. There was also a significant decline in risk 
acceptance as the subjects became older. In a subsequent study, Nicholson, Soane, 
Fenton-O’Creevy and Willman (2005) again found that men report higher rates of risk 
taking than women although women took greater risk in the career dimension (defined 
as quitting a job without another one to go to) and the social dimension (defined as 
publicly challenging a rule or decision).  
On the basis of these findings, I argue then, that the gender effect that was observed in 
paper 1 was a result of the fact that women in the United States have historically been 
more risk averse than men. This situation derives from the fact that women have had 
less confidence in their decision making abilities compared with men (Johnson and 
Powell 1994). While the Nicholson, et al. study reported that women did take more risks 
in publically challenging a rule, that would apply more to willingness to report bad news 
(the Mum Effect) than it would to being willing to hear bad news (the Deaf Effect). This 
should be reflected in the model by a decreased Risk Propensity and increased 
perception of risk among women. It is therefore hypothesized that following the Johnson 
et al. study:  
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H3a: Male gender is negatively associated with Risk Perception.  
H3b: Male gender is positively associated with Risk Propensity. 
Extending the Sitkin and Weingart study with the insights from the effects of Gender on 
Risk Propensity, it can hypothesized that: 
H3c: The effect of Gender on Decision is mediated by Risk Perception 
and Risk Propensity. 
The final research model is displayed in figure 3.2. 
 
H1a - H1c+ 
H1b + 
H3a - 
H2a - 
H2d+ 
H3b + 
Figure 3.2: Research Model for the Experiment  
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Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 3 – The Effect of Gender, Risk and Role Prescription 46 
The basic contours of the research model from paper 1 were retained in this study. As 
reported in paper 1, the bad news reporter’s Credibility is held to have a negative effect 
on the decision to continue the current course of action that is partially mediated by the 
perceived Relevance of the report of bad news. The perceived Relevance of the report 
of bad news itself is held to have a negative association with the decision to continue the 
current course of action. The new hypotheses show the Role Prescription construct 
having a positive association with both Credibility and Decision. Risk propensity is 
negatively associated with Risk Perception which is in turn negatively associated with 
the decision to continue the failing course of action. Additionally, if the gender of the 
decision maker is male, this is positively associated with Risk Propensity and negatively 
associated with Risk Perception. 
3.3 DESIGN AND VALIDATION OF THE LAB EXPERIMENT 
The research model was tested using a laboratory experiment in a 2x2 fully factored 
design in which Role Prescription and Credibility were independently manipulated . 
3.3.1 Development of the Materials and Instruments 
The scenarios utilized (Appendices A-D) were modified versions of the scenarios used in 
paper 1. For this study, language was introduced to manipulate the Role Prescription of 
the bad news reporter. In the positive manipulation, the bad news reporter was an 
auditor as in paper 1. S/he was also described as having the specific responsibility to 
report on project problems. In the negative manipulation, the bad news reporter is a peer 
project leader who volunteers to review the project. S/he is specifically described as not 
role prescribed to review projects and report on their findings. Additionally, the scenario 
was modified to specifically state that insufficient time was left in the schedule to do 
further testing and still make the implementation date. This change was made because 
in the study reported in paper 1, some subjects chose to delay and then commented that 
they would do the testing prior to the implementation 
The instrument was improved by rewording one question to match the revision of the 
scenario and adding two more items measuring Credibility. I did this to improve the 
reliability of the construct over that reported in paper 1, which was somewhat low, 
although acceptable. I drew on the source credibility literature (Pornpitakpan 2004) to 
add two measurement items dealing with the key dimension of Credibility: 
trustworthiness and expertise. Additionally, I revised an item to reflect the effect of 
organizational power on Credibility by asking about the bad news reporter’s perception 
in the organization. I added items on Risk Perception, Risk Propensity and Role 
Prescription to the instrument. The risk items were adapted from Sitkin and 
Weingart(1995) to fit into a seven point Likert scale format. I added a single item to 
assess the subject’s perception of the Role Prescription of the bad news reporter.  
3.3.2 Scenario 
These scenarios (Appendices A-D) were modeled in part on the Providian Trust case 
(McFarlan, 1997) and the Challenger Disaster scenario (Hauptman and Iwaki 1990). In 
both cases I saw some common features that are incorporated into this scenario. In both 
cases, there were pressures external to the decision maker that moved the decision 
maker to continue the current course of action. There was also a decision maker who 
could not perform the evaluation on his/her own and a bad news reporter or reporters 
who could not communicate the potential disaster situation in terms that unambiguously 
indicated a coming disaster. Additionally, the decision maker was led to believe there 
were severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make a 
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decision. Each of these four items is included in the scenarios.  
Contents of the Scenario. The subjects were instructed to play the role of a project 
manager responsible for development of a new application system to be put into 
production. The development team has indicated that the project is complete. A bad 
news reporter has reviewed the project and given a negative report on its readiness for 
production. To manipulate Role Prescription, the bad news reporter is described as an 
internal auditor, whose job is to assess projects and report bad news in the positive 
manipulation or a project manager from a different development team whose role 
specifically does not include examination of projects and reporting bad news.  The bad 
news reporter does not provide understandable reasons for why S/he believes the 
project would fail and the subjects are thus placed in a situation in which they must 
decide to what extent they should rely on the assertions of others. The manipulation of 
Credibility is performed by describing the bad news reporter as expert and highly 
regarded in the organization (positive manipulation) or inexpert and not highly regarded 
(negative manipulation). Additionally, the subject is informed that the environment in 
which they work stresses the meeting of dates and budgets by word and reward and 
punishment system. Additionally, the management chain above the subject is said to be 
pressing for on time implementation of the system. The subject could choose to delay 
the project and face the known problem of dealing with their management’s 
expectations, or the subject could choose to implement the system and face the 
uncertain prospect of a catastrophic problem. The subject is then asked to decide 
whether s/he would continue with the scheduled deployment or delay the project for 
further testing. 
3.3.3 Procedure 
The experiment was administered in a classroom setting. Access was obtained by 
permission of the instructors. The time obtained was usually in the last part of a class or 
in time remaining after the administration of a test. Prior to administration of the 
instruments, instructions for completing the instrument were given to the class. Subjects 
were informed that this was an experiment on decision making and that their 
participation was completely voluntary and they could terminate their involvement at any 
time. They were randomly selected for one of the treatment groups. Subjects were 
instructed to read a scenario describing an information systems project and then to 
make a decision as to whether to move the project into production (i.e., deployment) or 
delay the deployment to allow time for further testing and then answer several questions 
about their decision. Following their completion of the survey, they returned the materials 
to the administrator and left the classroom. Subjects had approximately 20-30 minutes to 
complete the experiment. The subjects were not time constrained in responding to the 
instrument, the time constraint arose from the text, which indicated that there was no 
time to test prior to the implementation date.  
3.3.4 Subjects 
This experiment was conducted using undergraduate student subjects. The scenario 
was constructed so as to place the subject in the role of a recent graduate, which 
provides a decision making context that is close to what might be experienced by the 
subject shortly after entering the work force.  While the appropriateness of student 
subjects has been debated, there is ample precedent for using student subjects in 
studies with organizational decision making tasks (Sitkin and Weingart 1995) and, 
specifically, decisions associated with project management (Harrison and Harrell 1993; 
Smith, et al. 2001). From a philosophic perspective, the question comes down to the 
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issue of how much emphasis to place on external validity: should the subjects of the 
experiment function as exact surrogates for practitioners? While some scholars insist on 
having external validity for every study (Lynch 1982; 1983), Calder, Phillips and Tybout 
(1981; 1982; 1983) argue that external validity is not a requirement for a rigorous theory 
test. Based on what the study is designed to demonstrate, the requirement for external 
validity varies. If the study is to show how the theory can be applied to real world 
situations, then there is a requirement for the subjects, testing and variables to be 
analogous to the real world. If, however, the study is designed to be a test of theory, 
then the requirement is to produce the strongest possible test in an attempt to falsify the 
theory. External validity is not required and may be sacrificed to achieve internal and 
construct validity. In this case homogenous samples such as student subjects and 
laboratory experiments are stronger. For theory testing, external validity is best 
addressed during theory development. After internal validity is achieved, external validity 
is addressed by testing across multiple contexts. Cook and Campbell (1979) also make 
this point saying: 
The priority among validity types varies with the kind of research being 
conducted. For persons interested in theory testing, it is almost as important to 
show that the variables involved in the research are construct A and B (construct 
validity) as it is to show that the relationship is causal and goes from one 
variable to the other (internal validity). Few theories specify crucial target 
settings, populations, or times to or across which generalization is desired. 
Consequently, external validity is of relatively little importance. In practice, it is 
often sacrificed for the greater statistical power that comes through having 
isolated settings, standardized procedures and homogenous respondent 
populations. For investigators with theoretical interests our estimate is that the 
types of validity, in order of importance, are probably internal, construct, 
statistical conclusion, and external validity (p. 83) 
Therefore in this situation, the question is whether student surrogates act similarly 
enough to actual practitioners to provide internal validity. Ashton and Kramer (1980) 
citing Zelditch and Evan (1962), indicate that students are to the behavioral researcher 
what the fruit fly is to the geneticist, a being that is different from the one desired to be 
studied but has a mechanism that operates in fundamentally the same manner as the 
target being. The question is therefore, whether the decision making processes of 
students are sufficiently similar to that of experienced professionals to enable a similar 
set of responses to be received in a decision situation. This question is an empirical one 
(Liyanarachchi and Milne 2005). 
Looking at the empirical literature, Birnberg and Nath (1968) indicate that student 
subjects are likely to differ from real world subjects in terms of skills, experience and 
personality traits. The effects of experience are manifested in terms of enhanced facility 
with and development of job related skills, routinized patterns of behavior and attitudes 
toward certain situations. Some empirical studies have shown support for using students 
as surrogates for managers in studies that focus on decision making and which do not 
require deep knowledge of particular domain. Ashton and Kramer (1980) in a review of 
the literature to that date found at least moderate support for using student surrogates in 
decision making tasks although not in studies of attitudes.  An example of the disparity in 
attitudes is shown by a study of attitudes toward corporate social responsibility by 
Ibrahim, Howard, and Angelides (2008). In this study, students were found to be more 
attuned to the ethical and philanthropic areas of social responsibility, while practicing 
managers were more attuned to the economic responsibilities. This shows the 
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differences in attitudes between students and managers as an effect of experience. 
Having been subject to the pressures of the marketplace, managers are necessarily 
more attuned to economic reality while students who haven’t had that experience put 
more stress on ethics and philanthropy (Ibrahim, et al. 2008).  
Ashton and Kramer report that psychological studies show that students and real world 
decision makers show “extremely similar information processing characteristics and 
biases” (p.3). In an experiment to test students as surrogates for experienced auditors in 
decision tasks, they found that students matched the auditors’ decisions 67% of the time 
and only 7-13% of the difference was attributable to experience. Further, they found that 
students and auditors responded similarly in a number of different situations. They argue 
that students can act as surrogates in terms of theoretical studies as opposed to 
application studies, a conclusion similar to that described by Calder, et al.   In more 
recent work, Remus (1986), reported no differences in decision making between 
students and managers in the context of production scheduling. Locke (1986,p. 6) notes 
that “both college students and employees appear to respond similarly to goals, 
feedback, incentives, participation, and so forth, perhaps because the similarities among 
these subjects (such as in values) are more crucial than their differences.” Liyanarachchi 
and Milne (2005) found that accounting students making experimental investment 
decisions  react similarly to practitioners with respect to environmental disclosures.  
In this discussion, an important recent study that must be considered is that of Chang 
and Ho (2004). Chang and Ho ran an experiment comparing student and manager 
escalation behavior when project completion and market information was manipulated. 
Their results show that managers and students had statistically the same likelihood to 
continue projects on 60% of the tests with managers having a higher likelihood on the 
remainder. More importantly, the direction of the responses was similar between the 
managers and students. Both tended to have lower likelihood of completion when the 
project was less complete than when it was more complete. The managers and students 
had different responses and response patterns for the funds allocation issues. These 
patterns are highly influenced by attitudes developed by managers’ experience in the 
business world in which they learn that meeting profitability targets is a key to success. 
Students, however, without that experience, have not been so conditioned and therefore 
have different attitudes towards allocation of funds. The results of the Chang and Ho 
study are therefore consistent with the Ibrahim study. Thus we see that in an escalation 
situation, students responded similarly to practitioners in the escalation decision where 
experience was not a factor. In the funds allocation issues, where experience is a factor, 
their choices were different.  
Based on the literature, it would appear that student subjects can stand as surrogates for 
managers in decision making studies where economic issues are not involved. The 
studies surveyed show that students are in statistical agreement with the responses 
provided by managers approximately 60% of the time and the rest of the time while 
statistically different follow the general trend of the response pattern.  
3.3.5 Operationalization of Variables 
With two exceptions, the constructs in the research model were operationalized using 
multi-item measures with Likert-type or semantic differential scales. Decision and Role 
Prescription were measured with single item measures. Relevance was measured with 
four items taken from paper 1. Credibility was measured with three items from paper 1 
with two new items designed by the authors. Risk perception and Risk Propensity were 
measured using items adapted from Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Details of the 
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operationalization of the items are found in Appendix F.  
 
3.4 RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
In this section, I present the methodology followed in assessing the data, the 
assessment of the measurement model, the results of the manipulation checks and then 
the evaluation of the structural model. 
3.4.1 Methodology 
In performing the analysis of the data I utilized the Partial Least Squares methodology as 
implemented in the SmartPLS tool (Ringle, et al. 2005). PLS is a second generation data 
analysis technique (Gefen, Straub and Boudreau 2000) which tests not only the 
structural model but also the measurement model in a single analysis rather than two 
separate analyses as in the first generation techniques. Additionally, PLS is able to 
identify path loadings across the entire model in a single run as opposed to multiple runs 
required using regression techniques. This results in a more rigorous analysis than using 
factor analysis and regression alone (Gefen, et al. 2000, p. 24). As regression analysis 
does, PLS seeks to show rejection of a null hypothesis of independent variables having 
no effect on the dependent variable while accounting for a significant amount of the 
variance in the dependent variable (Gefen, et al. 2000, p.27). 
PLS techniques perform the analysis by iterating between factor analysis and path 
analysis until the change in variance explained is not significant. It then uses 
bootstrapping to estimate the significance of the paths. “Neither of these PLS 
significance estimation methods require parametric assumptions. PLS is thus especially 
suited for the analysis of small data samples and for data that doesn’t necessarily exhibit 
. . . multivariate normal distribution . . .” (Gefen, et al. 2000). 
In our use of PLS, I performed the PLS calculation to generate the basic PLS values and 
then used bootstrapping to compute the T-statistics for significance.  
3.4.2 Demographics 
Table 3.1 shows the demographic distribution of our subjects.  
Table 3.1: Subject Demographics 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Gender 56 Male / 49 Female 
Age 21.73 (4.6) 
Years of Work Exp. 3.52 (4.48) 
Years of IS Exp. 0.73 (1.48) 
N 105 
 
3.4.3 Measurement Model Assessment 
Straub, Boudreau and Gefen (2004) reviewed the existing literature on instrument 
validation and have provided guidelines for the assessment of the measurement model 
of studies in the positivist tradition such as this study. They prescribe the following 
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validation steps:  
1) Construct Validity 
a. Convergent Validity 
b. Discriminant Validity 
c. Factorial Validity 
d. Reliability 
2) Manipulation Validity 
They further recommend that content validity, nomological validity and common methods 
bias be evaluated.  
In the following two sections, I review these validities for the study reported here. 
3.4.3.1. Examining the Reflective Measures 
Convergent Validity. Convergent validity, how the items converge to measure a 
particular construct, is assessed by examining the individual item validity, construct 
reliability and average variance extracted (AVE) (Chin 1998). I examined convergent 
validity for the reflective constructs by using confirmatory factor analysis, composite 
reliability and Cronbach’s alpha and AVE to assess construct reliability. PLS performs a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) rather than an exploratory one as done in principal 
components analysis. This means that it does not seek for the proper factors, but rather 
confirms that the factor structure specified in the model is correct. In this study, the CFA 
in Table 3.2 shows the following: 
Table 3.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Results 
 
Construct 
 
Item 
Item-to-
Construct 
Loading 
Relevance Relev 1         .9203 
 Relev 2 .9605 
 Relev 3 .9419 
 Relev 4 .8927 
Risk Propensity Risk Prop 1 .8923 
 Risk Prop 2 .8333 
 Risk Prop 3 .8184 
Risk 
Perception 
Risk Percept 1 .8399 
 Risk Percept 2 .8330 
 Risk Percept 3 .8249 
 Risk Percept 4 .8215 
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Chin (1998) provides the guideline that the standardized loadings should exceed .707. 
We see that the loadings here are all over .81 meeting this standard, providing evidence 
of convergent validity 
To assess construct reliability of the reflective constructs, the composite reliability, the 
Cronbach’s alpha and the AVE for each construct is examined. As shown in table 3.3, 
 
Table 3.3: Construct Reliability 
 
Construct 
 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
 
Cronbach’s
Alpha 
Relevance .9621 .8639 .9472 
Risk 
Propensity 
.8892 .7282 .8143 
Risk 
Perception 
.8988 .6895 .8508 
 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability measure the internal consistency of the 
constructs items. Cronbach’s alpha provides a lower bound on the reliability 
measurement (Cortina 1993). Composite reliability without the assumption of equally 
weighted indicators provides a closer estimate to the reliability figures given accurate 
parameter estimates (Chin 1998). In all cases the values exceed the recommended 0.7 
threshold for high reliability (Straub, et al. 2004). AVE measures the amount of variance 
of the construct that comes from the indicators vs. that which comes from measurement 
error (Chin 1998). The baseline guideline is 0.5 (Chin 1998), which was exceeded by all 
our constructs.  
Discriminant Validity. Discriminant validity, can be examined by examining the cross 
loadings between items and constructs and examining the AVEs of the latent constructs 
to ensure that they are greater than the square of the correlations among the latent 
constructs (Chin 1998; Henseler, Hubona and Ringle 2008). Cross loading analysis in 
PLS is conducted by computing the outer loadings of the items on the constructs in a 
confirmatory factor analysis and then comparing the loadings of the items on constructs 
other than its intended construct with its loading on its intended construct. This is shown 
in table 3.4. Chin (1998) provides the guideline that a block of indicators should load 
higher on the construct that it is intended to measure rather than others. Here, this 
condition exists providing evidence of discriminant validity. 
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Table 3.4: Cross Loadings 
Construct Item Relevance      RiskPerc RiskProp 
Relevance Rel1    0.9207         -0.3800         -0.2307 
 Rel2    0.9603         -0.4129         -0.2816 
 Rel3           0.9416         -0.3941         -0.2476 
 Rel4    0.8939         -0.4748         -0.1759 
Risk 
Perception 
RPrc1   -0.2730          0.8388          0.0923 
 RPrc2   -0.2703          0.8324          0.0868 
 RPrc3   -0.4809          0.8269          0.1681 
 RPrc4   -0.4173          0.8232          0.0899 
Risk 
Propensity 
RPrp1   -0.2644          0.1854          0.8956 
 RPrp2   -0.1831          0.0817          0.8341 
 RPrp3   -0.1886          0.0583          0.8287 
 
Additionally, the AVEs of the latent constructs were examined. The test here is to verify 
that the square root of the AVE is greater than correlations among the constructs (Chin 
1998).  
Table 3.5: AVE vs. Correlations2 
 Relevance     Risk 
Perception  
Risk 
Propensity 
        
Relevance .9294   
  Risk 
Perception -0.4466 .8304  
  Risk 
Propensity -0.2529 0.1346 .8533 
 
The AVEs here are all greater than the correlations between the constructs showing that 
good discriminant validity exists (Table 3-5).  
3.4.3.2. Evaluating the Formative Credibility Construct 
Petter, Straub and Rai (2007) provide guidance on how to validate formative constructs 
such as Credibility. They argue that the following steps should be taken to validate the 
construct: 1) Examine the weightings of the items to ensure that they are all significant; 
2) Examine the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the items to ensure that there is not 
an excessive amount of destabilizing multi-collinearity. VIF values should not exceed 
3.3.  
The outer weights for the Credibility construct are reported table 3.6. 
 
                                                
2 The square root of the AVE has been inserted on the diagonal. 
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Table 3.6: Outer Weights of the Credibility Construct 
Item Weight 
Cred1 1.9725 
Cred2 1.9879 
Cred3 3.9287 
Cred4 0.8829 
Cred5 1.1374 
 
The items are all significant or near significant except for Cred4 and Cred5. These items 
were dropped in the subsequent analyses. 
Next, a regression analysis was conducted testing the three remaining items against the 
decision construct to calculate the VIF. The results of the regression are shown in table 
3.7. 
Table 3.7: Variance Inflation Factors of the Credibility 
Items 
Item Weight 
Cred1 2.178 
Cred2 2.621 
Cred3 2.328 
 
These items all score below the 3.3 level suggested by Petter, Straub and Rai and 
therefore indicate low levels of collinearity. 
3.4.4 Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation checks were performed to ensure that Credibility and Role prescription 
were effectively manipulated and that the Deaf Effect was induced. In Table 3.8, I report 
the mean values of the variables for each of the four treatment conditions3. As expected, 
the Credibility and Role Prescription variables move in the expected directions from cell 
to cell indicating that the manipulations were successful.  
                                                
3 For the reflective constructs, this was calculated as a simple average. For the formative 
construct, credibility, this was calculated by using the outer weights for each item on the credibility 
construct from the PLS analysis and multiplying those by the items’ responses and then 
averaging.  
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Table 3.8: Effects of Manipulations4 
 Variable Low Credibility High Credibility 
 
Role 
Prescribed 
Decision 
Credibility 
Role 
Prescribed 
N 
4.12 (2.44) 
2.55 (1.47) 
5.31 (0.88) 
 
26 
2.96 (2.21) 
5.06 (1.49) 
5.42 (1.27) 
 
26 
 
Not Role 
Prescribed 
Decision 
Credibility 
Role 
Prescribed 
N 
5.30 (1.96) 
1.95 (1.24) 
2.19 (1.57) 
 
27 
3.15 (2.24) 
4.59 (1.48) 
3.12 (1.97) 
 
26 
 
Next I see, that the Deaf Effect was induced by our manipulations. When the bad news 
reporter (BNR) was not credible and not role prescribed, the mean of the decision 
variable was over five (5) indicating a decision to put the system into production. This is 
in marked contrast to when the Credibility of the bad news reporter was high. In that 
situation, there was a pronounced tendency to hold for further testing. A 2x2 multiple 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with interaction was conducted with perceived 
Credibility and perceived Role Prescription as the dependent variables and the 
manipulations as the independent variables. Table 3.9 shows the results of this analysis. 
                                                
4 Mean (Standard Deviation). 
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Table 3.9: Results of MANOVA Analysis 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Role 
Prescription 
Dependent Variable: Credibility 
 Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) 
Main Effect: 
Role 
Prescription 
Manipulation 
193.457 88.568 (.000) 5.041 3.396 (.068) 
Main Effect: 
Credibility 
Manipulation 
7.173 3.284 (.073) 81.888 55.174 (.000) 
Interaction: 
(Role 
Prescription) X 
(Credibility 
Manipulation) 
4.356 1.994 (.161) 0.033 0.022(.881) 
 
For the manipulations to be considered to be effective, the main effects for each 
manipulated variable should be strongly significant on its dependent variable and have 
no significant relationship with the other variables. This is the case for both variables. 
There are also no interaction effects. I conclude that the manipulations were successful.   
3.4.5 Structural Model 
With an adequate measurement model, I can now assess the hypotheses by examining 
the structural model. Table 3.10 shows the R2values associated with each variable. For 
the decision variable, this is .625. This is a very high amount of variance in the decision 
explained by this model.  
Table 3.10: R2 values for Latent 
Variables 
Latent Variable R2 
Decision .625 
Relevance .530 
Credibility .230 
Risk Perception .217 
Risk Propensity .043 
 
 
 
 
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 3 – The Effect of Gender, Risk and Role Prescription 57 
Table 3.11: Summary of Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis Path Path 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic5 
Effect 
Size 
Power6 
 Credibility -> Relevance .594 7.73* .697 .996 
 Credibility -> Decision -.208 1.78* .013 .060 
 Relevance -> Decision -.398 3.45* .258 .587 
H1a: Role 
Prescription of a bad 
news reporter is 
negatively associated 
with continuance of 
the current failing 
course of action 
Role 
Prescription 
–> 
Relevance 
.222 2.55* .111 .200 
H1b: Role 
Prescription of a bad 
news reporter is 
positively associated 
with the reporter’s 
Relevance. 
Role 
Prescription 
–> Credibility 
.500 4.75* .215 .463 
H1c: Role 
Prescription of a bad 
news reporter is 
positively associated 
with as the relevance 
of the report of bad 
news. 
Role 
Prescription 
–> Decision 
-.017 0.22 0  .050 
H2a: The level of 
Risk Propensity is 
inversely related with 
Risk Perception. 
Risk 
Propensity –
> Risk 
Perception 
-.039 0.43 .007 .055 
H2b: The level of 
perceived risk is 
positively related with 
discontinuance of the 
current course of 
action. 
Risk 
Perception –
> Decision 
-.251 2.93* .100 .177 
H2c: The effect of 
Risk Propensity on 
Risk 
Propensity – .132 1.94* .048 .098 
                                                
5 * = p < .05 level. One tailed tests were used (Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989) indicating that 
significance was reached at a t-statistic of 0.98 (α=.05). 
6 A post-hoc power analysis was done using G*Power v2.0 (Erfelder, Paul and Buchner 1996) 
for each path tested. The R2 for the dependent variable of the path was calculated with and 
without the path to compute the effect size. The effect size was then used as input to a power 
analysis. For the analysis, α was set to .05 and the N value was set to 105 for both samples. 
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Decision will be 
completely mediated 
by Risk Perception. 
> Decision 
H2d: The Relevance 
of the bad news 
reporter is positively 
associated with the 
perception of risk in 
the situation. 
 
Credibility –> 
Risk 
Perception 
.387 3.63* .154 .296 
H3a: Male gender is 
negatively 
associated with Risk 
Perception.  
Gender –> 
Risk 
Perception 
-.246 2.72* .064 .118 
H3b: Male gender is 
positively associated 
with Risk Propensity. 
Gender –> 
Risk 
Propensity 
.208 2.20* NA7 NA 
H3c: The effect of 
gender on Decision is 
mediated by Risk 
Perception and Risk 
Propensity. 
 
Gender -> 
Decision .002 0.08 .022 .069 
 
Table 3.11 shows the results of the structural path analysis. The paths of interest in this 
study identified in paper 1 as significant were found to be significant in this study with the 
exception of that from Gender to Decision which was not significant suggesting that its 
influence is fully mediated by the effects of Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. The 
power analysis shows that for all paths except for Credibility to Relevance, this 
experiment had low power to bring the significant paths to light.  
Of the Role Prescription hypotheses, Role Prescription was found to have a significant 
effect on Relevance (H1a) and Credibility (H1b). It had no direct effect on the Decision 
(H1c). The effect of Role Prescription is thus fully mediated through the determination of 
Relevance. 
Of the Risk Propensity hypotheses, Risk Propensity was not found to have an effect on 
Risk Perception (H2a), a result which contradicts findings of Sitkin and Weingart (1995), 
Keil and Wallace (2000) and Smith, et al. (2001). It is possible that the low power of this 
experiment resulted in a failure to detect the relationship between Risk Propensity and 
Risk Perception.  It might also be that the addition of Gender changed the relationship 
between Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. It could be that the relationship observed 
between Risk Propensity and Risk Perception is actually the relationship between each 
variable and Gender. It is also possible that the degree to which the relationship 
between Risk Propensity and behavioral intention is mediated by Risk Perception is 
dependent upon the context. More investigation would be warranted to understand what 
                                                
7 Only one path was defined for Risk Propensity thus not allowing calculation of effect size or 
power for this path. 
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it is about this particular context that produced this result. Risk propensity was also 
found to have a significant effect on Decision (H2c). Decision makers with a greater 
propensity for risk tended to continue the current course of action. This is at variance 
with our hypothesis, and that of Sitkin and Weingart (1995), that the effect of Risk 
Propensity would be fully mediated through perception. Again, this may occur because 
the path from Risk Propensity to Risk Perception was not significant or that the addition 
of Gender eliminated the connection. More research is required to understand this effect.  
Of the Risk Perception hypotheses, Risk Perception was found to have a negative effect 
on the decision to continue (H2b). Credibility (H2d) had a significantly positive effect on 
Risk Perception. Thus when a bad news reporter was perceived to be credible the 
decision maker tended to have a higher perception of the risk of the project. This 
perception of risk tended to motivate the decision maker to change the course of action.  
Of the Gender hypotheses, as expected, males tended to have a higher Risk Propensity 
(H3b) and lower Risk Perception (H3a). Additionally, it was shown that the influence of 
Gender was completely mediated by Risk Propensity and Risk Perception. (H3c). 
The results are shown graphically in figure 3.3.  
H3C 
.002 
(T=0.08) 
H2c 
.132 
(T=1.94)* 
 
Credibility 
Message 
Relevance 
Decision 
to 
Continue 
Role 
Prescription 
Risk 
Propensity 
Risk 
Perception 
Gender 
R2=.625 
R2=.230 
R2=.530 
R2=.217 R
2=.043 
H1c 
-.017 
(T=.215) H1a .222 
(T=2.55)* H1b 
.500 
(T=4.75)* 
.594 
(T=7.73)* 
-.208 
(T=1.78)* 
-.398 
(T=3.45)* 
H2a 
-.039 
(T=.43) 
H3b 
.208 
(T=2.20)* 
Figure 3.3: Results of the Experiment 
H2b 
-.251 
(T=2.93)* 
 H2d 
.387 
(T=3.63)* 
 
H3a 
.246 
(T=2.72)* 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
The results of our experiment are in agreement with the results of paper 1 (figure 3). All 
the paths that were significant in that experiment were significant in this study. This 
study provides another confirmation that those relationships exist. These results 
persisted despite the low power of the experiment showing the strength of these 
relationships. 
This study added Role Prescription to the factors that influence the determination of 
message relevance. Role prescribed bad news reporters have enhanced Credibility and 
their messages have increased relevance to the decision maker. Role Prescription’s 
effects are mediated to the decision to continue the current course of action by its action 
on Credibility and Relevance. Once the bad news report is considered relevant, the 
decision maker then assesses it, influenced by their perception of the risk of the project 
and their propensity to accept risk.  
The risk variables seem to mediate the effect of Gender on Decision. This mediation 
suggests that the Gender effect reported in the first study is actually the effect of 
differential Risk Propensity and Risk Perception on the part of men and women; women 
being more risk averse and more sensitive to risk than men. Based on the risk literature 
reviewed here, these differences seem to be based more in how women and men are 
socialized than in any innate biological difference. Women, prior to 1980, had a much 
more pronounced differential than later studies perhaps as a result in the change in 
women’s roles in society. It is perhaps the decision maker’s confidence in their decision 
making capabilities that results in this difference rather than biology. The study also 
suggests that perceived risk and the decision maker’s propensity to accept risk factors 
into the analytical process used that results in the decision. 
The R2 of the Decision variable did not change appreciably compared with study 1 (.625 
vs. .618). This appears to be due to the fact that the addition of the risk variables simply 
mediated the effect of Gender and that Risk Perception did not have a significant effect 
on Decision. The addition of Role Prescription did increase the R2 of the message 
relevance (.192 in paper 1 vs. .230 here) an effect size of .165 indicating that Role 
Prescription has a moderate effect size on the Relevance variable.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
I began this paper by asking the questions about whether the results of paper 1 were 
due to Role Prescription causing the Credibility of the bad news reporter and what 
caused the Gender effect on Decision. I saw that Role Prescription accounted for 
approximately 22% of the change in Credibility and also influenced the assessment of 
the Relevance of the message. Its effect on the Decision was mediated through 
Credibility and Relevance. I also saw that Risk Propensity and Risk Perception mediated 
the effect of Gender on the Decision to continue the current course of action.  
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APPENDIX A: BOTH CREDIBILITY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION 
MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY 
 
Instructions 
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision 
making. 
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to 
the next page. 
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the 
questions in order as the project leader would answer them. 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this 
room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You 
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the 
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low 
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late 
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been 
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you 
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a 
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used 
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of 
the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have 
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to 
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust 
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has 
indicated that the system is ready to go.  
At this stage, one of Blackstone’s other project leaders, Sandy, appeared at your door 
and volunteered to review the project. Sandy is NOT well respected in the field and is 
NOT particularly trustworthy. As a project leader, it is not Sandy’s job to review other 
team leaders’ projects or to report perceived problems that might impact project 
success. 
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was 
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to 
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rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment, 
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t 
understand then wished you luck and left your office 
When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of 
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing 
that, contrary to Sandy’s report, the system was ready to go  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he became angry and 
indicated that Sandy had never successfully lead a project and often talks about things 
without any expertise in the subject. He then pointed out that the VP of Information 
Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by 
next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In which case, you 
had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were going to have to 
explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he would hate to see 
your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told you get with your 
team and figure out what you were going to do. 
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the 
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough 
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to 
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into 
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed 
be fired. 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX B: CREDIBILITY POSITIVELY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION 
MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY 
 
Instructions 
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision 
making. 
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to 
the next page. 
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the 
questions in order as the project leader would answer them. 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this 
room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You 
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the 
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low 
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late 
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been 
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you 
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a 
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used 
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of 
the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have 
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to 
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust 
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has 
indicated that the system is ready to go.  
At this stage, one of Blackstone’s other project leaders, Sandy, appeared at your door 
and volunteered to review the project. Sandy is a well-respected leader in the field and 
is very trustworthy. As a project leader, it is not Sandy’s job to review other team 
leaders’ projects or to report perceived problems that might impact project success. 
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was 
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to 
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment, 
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t 
understand then wished you luck and left your office 
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of 
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing 
that, contrary to the Sandy’s opinion, the system was ready to go  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he pointed out that the VP of 
Information Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be 
implemented by next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In 
which case, you had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were 
going to have to explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he 
would hate to see your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told 
you get with your team and figure out what you were going to do. 
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the 
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough 
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to 
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into 
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed 
be fired. 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX C: CREDIBILITY MANIPULATED NEGATIVELY AND ROLE 
PRESCRIPTION MANIPULATED POSITIVELY 
 
Instructions 
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision 
making. 
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to 
the next page. 
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the 
questions in order as the project leader would answer them. 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this 
room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You 
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the 
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low 
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late 
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been 
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you 
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a 
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used 
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of 
the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have 
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to 
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust 
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has 
indicated that the system is ready to go.  
At this stage, it is Blackstone’s policy to have its own internal auditor, Sandy, review 
the project. Sandy is NOT well respected in the field and is NOT particularly 
trustworthy. The role of the internal auditor is to report any perceived problems that 
might impact the success of the project. 
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was 
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to 
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment, 
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t 
understand then wished you luck and left your office. 
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of 
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing 
that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he became angry and 
indicated that Sandy had never identified a serious problem and often talks about things 
without any expertise in the subject. He then pointed out that the VP of Information 
Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be implemented by 
next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In which case, you 
had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were going to have to 
explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he would hate to see 
your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told you get with your 
team and figure out what you were going to do. 
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the 
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough 
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to 
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into 
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed 
be fired. 
 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX D: BOTH CREDIBILITY AND ROLE PRESCRIPTION 
MANIPULATED POSITIVELY 
 
Instructions 
1. The following scenario is part of a study in business decision 
making. 
2. Read the scenario completely and thoroughly before you go to 
the next page. 
3. Adopt the role of the project leader and then answer each of the 
questions in order as the project leader would answer them. 
This is not a test. 
There are no right answers or wrong answers. 
4. Please, do not discuss this study with anyone outside of this 
room. 
 
Blackstone Bank is one of the top ten banks in the southeastern United States. You 
joined the bank in their IT department soon after you finished school. You consider the 
IT department a “tough but fair” place to work. The management team has a low 
tolerance for poor performance. Project managers have been fired or demoted for late 
delivery or poor product quality. On the other hand, significant bonuses have been 
known to be awarded for on-time, high quality deliveries. 
Six months ago, you were named to lead your first project. With this assignment, you 
became responsible for development of a new system with the opportunity to earn a 
significant bonus for on-time implementation of the system. The technology being used 
is unfamiliar to you so you are dependent upon your team members to track the status of 
the project. 
Your team has impressed you with their competence and work ethic. They have 
cooperated with you at every turn and you’ve not had to supervise them closely to 
ensure that work gets done. Your experience with them suggests that you can trust 
what the team is telling you. Development has now been completed. Your team has 
indicated that the system is ready to go.  
At this stage, it is Blackstone’s policy to have its own internal auditor, Sandy, review 
the project. Sandy is a well-respected leader in the field and is very trustworthy. The 
role of the internal auditor is to report any perceived problems that might impact the 
success of the project. 
After a review of your project’s documentation, Sandy told you that your system was 
effectively untested, a “disaster waiting to happen” and that you needed to 
rigorously test everything. When you asked for an explanation for this assessment, 
Sandy talked a lot about decision trees, regression testing and other things you didn’t 
understand then wished you luck and left your office. 
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When you reviewed the report with your programming team, they cited their years of 
experience in the profession, with this technology and success on other projects arguing 
that, contrary to the auditor’s report, the system was ready to go.  
When you tried to discuss the situation with your manager, he pointed out that the VP of 
Information Systems had promised the VP of Operations that the system would be 
implemented by next month and would be extremely displeased if that didn’t occur. In 
which case, you had better have a good justification for your actions because YOU were 
going to have to explain it to him. Bad project managers had been fired before and he 
would hate to see your career ruined before it had really begun. At which point he told 
you get with your team and figure out what you were going to do. 
As you left his office, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to delay the 
project for further testing. This additional testing could not be completed soon enough 
for an on time implementation in which case you would have to justify your decision to 
the VP of Information Systems. The second option is to move the system into 
production as scheduled and collect your bonus if it went well or ... if the system failed 
be fired. 
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take. 
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APPENDIX E:  QUESTIONNAIRE 
The latent variable associated with the item is listed in parentheses following the item 
text. 
 Test Further  Move to Production 
Definitely Strongly Some-what Slightly 
 Slightly Some-what Strongly Definitely 
| | | |  | | | | 
1. Please indicate what you will 
decide, and how strong that 
decision will be. 
(Mark only one of the eight 
boxes) 
         
 
2. Please explain the reasoning behind your decision. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3. Your gender (please circle one choice only):     
 Male  Female 
4. Your age (whole numbers only):       
 ____ Years 
5. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience you have in any 
capacity (whole numbers only):       
 ____ Years 
6. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience in information systems  
(whole numbers only):        
 ____ Years 
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Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree Neutral 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree  
| | | | | | | 
7. Sandy’s assessment was highly 
relevant in forming my decision. 
(Relevance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Sandy’s assessment was very 
important in forming my decision. 
(Decision) 
       
9. My decision was most influenced 
by Sandy’s assessment. 
(Decision) 
       
10. My decision was more influenced 
by  Sandy’s assessment than any 
of the other views expressed. 
(Decision) 
       
11. This project has a high 
probability of success. (Risk 
Perception) 
       
12. This project is in a positive 
situation. (Risk Perception) 
       
13. I believe that there is very little 
risk in moving this project into 
production. (Risk Perception) 
       
14. I believe that there is high 
potential for a positive result in 
putting this project into production. 
(Risk Perception) 
       
15. Sandy is the most credible 
person in the scenario. 
(Credibility) 
       
16. Sandy is well respected within 
the company. (Credibility) 
       
17. Sandy is motivated by a desire to 
see things done correctly for the 
bank. (Credibility) 
       
18. Sandy is very trustworthy. 
(Credibility) 
       
19. Sandy has a lot of expertise in 
this area. (Credibility) 
       
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 Strongly Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Neutral Slightly Agree Agree Strongly Agree 
20. Part of Sandy’s job is to review 
projects and report on 
perceived problems that might 
affect project success. (Role 
Prescription) 
       
21. I would choose a risky 
alternative based on the 
assessment of others on 
whom I must rely (Risk 
Propensity) 
       
22. I would choose a risky 
alternative relying on an 
assessment that is high in 
technical complexity. (Risk 
Propensity) 
       
23. I would choose a risky 
alternative which could have a 
major impact on the strategic 
direction of my organization. 
(Risk Propensity) 
       
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APPENDIX F: DETAILS OF THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE 
VARIABLES 
Decision 
As in chapter 2, Decision was operationalized as a single, eight (8) point semantic 
differential scale question in which the subject was asked to choose to “Test Further” or 
“Move to Production”. Anchor points for the variable were “Definitely Test Further” and 
“Definitely Move to Production.” Intermediate points were “strongly”, “somewhat” and 
“slightly” on each side of the scale. I used an eight-point scale to force the subject to 
select one of the two alternatives presented. A lower value indicated a stronger desire to 
change the course of action (i.e., to delay for testing). A higher value indicated a 
stronger desire to continue the existing course of action (i.e. move into production). See 
Appendix E, item 1, for the item that collected the Decision data. 
Relevance  
Here, I utilized the same scales employed in chapter 2. Relevance was operationalized 
as a set of four, seven (7) point Likert scale questions anchored with “Strongly Agree” 
and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral” in the mid-point. A lower value 
indicated that the subject held the bad news reporter’s message to be of lower relevance 
to the decision. The items used to elicit these responses are listed below. See also 
Appendix E, items 7-10. 
24. Sandy’s assessment was highly relevant in forming my decision. 
25. Sandy’s assessment was very important in forming my decision.  
26. My decision was most influenced by the Sandy’s assessment.  
27. My decision was more influenced by the Sandy’s assessment than 
any of the other views expressed.  
 
Bad News Reporter Credibility  
I utilized the three item measures developed in chapter 2 as a starting point and added 
two additional questions to improve the scale reliability. As described above, I improved  
the measurement of this construct  by replacing one question, revising one and adding 
two more items measuring Credibility. I did this to improve the reliability of the construct 
over that reported in Cuellar, et al. (2006) which was somewhat low at 0.745, although 
acceptable. I drew on the source credibility literature (Pornpitakpan 2004) to add two 
questions dealing with the key dimension of Credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. 
Additionally, I revised a question to reflect the effect of organizational power on 
Credibility by asking about the bad news reporter’s perception in the organization. Bad 
news reporter credibility was operationalized as a set of five, seven (7) point Likert scale 
questions anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and 
“neutral” in the mid-point. A lower value indicated that the subject believed the bad news 
reporter to have lower Credibility. The items used to elicit this information are listed 
below. See also Appendix E, items 15-19. 
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This construct was previously operationalized at a reflective construct. However, in 
examining the items in the light of the new advice in Petter, Straub and Rai(2007), I find 
that I must reclassify this construct as a formative construct. Following their decision 
rules in table 2 of their paper, I recognize the following: 1) the direction of causality for 
most of the items is from the item to the construct.  Trustworthiness and expertise are 
dimensions that define the perception of Credibility (Pornpitakpan 2004). Similarly, a 
perception of a proper motivation and respect are causal factors of Credibility (Near and 
Miceli 1995). However, the direct question about Credibility is reflective of Credibility 
existing.  2) the indicators are not interchangeable or separable. To lose one would be to 
underspecify the construct. 3) These indicators will not necessarily covary with each 
other. Expertise and trustworthiness may vary separately from each other. The other 
indicators are similar. 4) Antecedents of the indicators are different from each other. 
Trustworthiness and expertise arise from two different sets of factors. Similarly, respect 
and perceived desire will have different antecedents. I therefore conclude that this is a 
formative construct which I are measuring with four formative indicators and a reflective 
indicator.  
Risk Propensity  
I adapted the Risk Propensity measures used in Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Risk 
propensity was operationalized as a set of three, seven (7) point Likert scale questions 
anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral” 
in the mid-point. A lower value indicated increasing reluctance to agree to a risky course 
of action. The items used to elicit this information are listed below. See also Appendix E, 
items 21-23. 
6. I would choose a risky alternative based on the 
assessment of others on whom I must rely 
7. I would choose a risky alternative relying on an 
assessment that is high in technical complexity. 
8. I would choose a risky alternative which could have a 
major impact on the strategic direction of my 
organization  
 
Risk Perception 
For Risk Perception, I adapted the measures used in Sitkin and Weingart (1995). Risk 
perception was operationalized as a set of four, seven (7) point Likert scale questions 
anchored with “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree” on the end points and “neutral” 
1. Sandy is the most credible person in the scenario.  
2. Sandy is well respected within the company.  
3. Sandy is motivated by a desire to see things done correctly for the bank.  
4. Sandy is very trustworthy.  
5. Sandy has a lot of expertise in this area.  
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as the mid-point.  A higher value indicated that the subject believed the project was more 
likely to be successful, and therefore of lower risk.  The items used to elicit this data are 
listed below. See also Appendix E, items 11-14. 
9. This project has a high probability of success.  
10. This project is in a positive situation.  
11. I believe that there is very little risk in moving this 
project into production.  
12. I believe that there is high potential for a positive 
result in putting this project into production.  
 
Role Prescription 
Role Prescription was measured by a single Likert scale item created for this study, with 
higher values indicating that the bad news reporter was role prescribed to report bad 
news.  This variable was used as a manipulation check. See Appendix E, item 20. 
Control Variables 
The following constructs were entered into the analysis as control variables.  
Gender. Gender was dummy coded (female = 0 and male =1).  
Age related information. Age and Years of Full Time Work Experience were entered in 
chronological years reported by the subjects.  
Class. The class from which the data was collected were dummy coded.  
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4 EFFECTS OF SOCIETAL COLLECTIVISM ON THE DEAF 
EFFECT 
The previous studies have developed a model at the individual level of how the Deaf 
Effect occurs (figure 4.1). At base, the Deaf Effect occurs when the decision maker 
considers the report of bad news to be not important or irrelevant to be considered in 
their understanding of the project. When the report of bad news is considered to be not 
relevant the decision maker tends to decide not to change the course of the project. Also 
involved in the decision are the decision maker’s propensity to assume risk and the 
perceived level of risk in the project. The Credibility and Role Prescription of the bad 
news reporter have been shown to strongly affect the perceived Relevance of the bad 
news reporter’s message. 
 
    
Figure 4.1:  Results of the Experiment from Chapter 3 
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In this chapter, I examine another concept that might affect the occurrence of the Deaf 
Effect, the decision maker’s view of societal culture. Decision makers have a view of the 
societal culture: what it values and what it expects of them. These concepts might have 
an effect upon their behavior by causing restraints on one form of behavior or enabling 
another form (Archer 1995). In fact, It has been noted that cultural forces influence many 
aspects of organizational leadership including such areas as behaviors expected of 
leaders in particular situations (Hofstede 2001; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and 
Gupta 2004). Thus it seems that examining the impact of societal culture on decision 
makers would be of interest in the study of the Deaf Effect. 
The previous studies reported in this dissertation were conducted with American 
undergraduate students at a university in the southeastern part of that country.  In terms 
of cultural values, people in the United States are believed to be among the most 
individualistic people in the world (Hofstede 2001; House, et al. 2004). In other societies 
that are less individualistic, the effects of the independent variables on the decision to 
continue or discontinue a course of action might be different. The collectivist 
identification of self with the group might influence the decision maker to view bad news 
reporters and their report differently than in more individualistic cultures. Similarly, an 
unwillingness to decide against the consensus of their work group may cause decision 
makers to decide in one direction although they might hold an alternative opinion. 
Therefore, studying the effect of societal individualism-collectivism may shed additional 
light on how the Deaf Effect occurs. In this study, therefore, I focus on the effects of 
individualism-collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The research question is 
therefore: 
What is the effect of societal individualism-collectivism on the occurrence of 
the Deaf Effect? 
4.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In this section, I provide a definition of culture based on that of Leidner and Kayworth 
(2006). Then I discuss why I select the GLOBE framework of cultural values for use in 
this study. Following that I discuss my selection of the values of institutional and in-group 
collectivism showing why I chose them and how they affect the research model of the 
Deaf Effect. I then propose several hypotheses regarding the effects of societal 
collectivism. 
4.1.1 Definition of Culture 
As Straub, et al. (2002) and Leidner and Kayworth (2006) have pointed out, culture is a 
term that has received a multitude of definitions. In this dissertation, I will be using the 
term as  Leidner and Kayworth use it: a consistent and uniform set of values that 
underlies a society or organization. They indicate that while culture is manifested in 
artifacts as well as values, it is more easily studied as values since artifacts require 
interpretation and therefore are subject to interpretation bias. This has been the 
dominant approach to culture (Leidner and Kayworth 2006) and is the approach followed 
in this study. 
This definition does not imply that culture is so uniform that all members of the society 
hold all the values of that society in common. It is rather as Archer (1988) argues, there 
is a set of cultural values that are dominant in the society and inform cultural practices. 
These values became dominant as the result of interactions between social groups that 
hold these values and others that espouse differing values. As a result of the action of 
social power, these values are adopted by consensus. Even after the establishment of 
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the consensus values, there are still other groups that seek to modify or abolish those 
values in favor of a set of values that they hold. Thus members of a society may not hold 
the values that inform cultural practices but to some extent they abide by them in order 
to participate in the society. 
Studies have shown that the societal influences loom large in the formation of the other 
influences and on the creation of individual values. For example, House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta (2004) cited ‘a wealth of literature’ that shows that 
organizational values reflect a “variety of the aspects of the societies in which they exist” 
(p. 76). Similarly, Smith (1992) suggests that even when similar organizational structures 
are used, different national cultures give them substantially different meanings. Also, 
Earley and Gibson (1998) found that congruence between national culture and 
organization culture lead to higher job satisfaction and cooperative behavior. 
Additionally, the level of individual-collectivism and leadership style is related to 
organization effectiveness. These examples seem to suggest that societal values may 
be important determinants of the values used in a decision making context. In this study, 
therefore, I focus on the effects of the societal values on decision making. 
4.2 CULTURAL VALUES FRAMEWORK 
Accepting the importance of societal values in influencing a decision maker’s thought 
processes, I now consider what framework of cultural values should be used. A 
threshold consideration must first be discussed. The entire concept of studying national 
culture has been criticized. Myers and Tan (2002) have criticized the entire enterprise. 
The concept of “national culture” is problematic they argue. The concept of “nation state” 
is recent; changes in form and makeup; and is perhaps being made obsolete by 
globalization. It is also not true that each nation has its own culture; there are 
subcultures to be found within any geographic boundary. The concept of national culture 
is not that accepted by anthropologists who find that the relationship between national 
culture values and work-related issues and attitude is not well explained by Hofstede’s 
model.  Baskerville (2003) places similar criticisms in the context of Hofstede’s work. 
She contends that Hofstede’s definition of culture is outmoded and therefore his work 
has had little uptake in the fields of sociology or anthropology and is not well cited in 
those fields. Similar to Myers and Tan, she criticizes the concept of national culture. 
Finally, she argues that the concept of using scales and outside observer status has 
been rejected by the anthropological discipline and therefore is questionable. Hofstede 
(2003) in a response to Baskerville, defending this approach, argues that his work has 
been cited widely in organizational sociological literature, but has not been cited in the 
anthropological literature due to little interest in that field in business related activities 
and general antipathy to the business management field. This led to an ignorance of his 
work in the social anthropology field. In terms of the national culture argument, he 
agrees that the national level is perhaps not the best level of analysis for culture and that 
nation states cannot be identified with national culture, but he finds that empirically his 
scales correlate well with data from other sources. Baskerville, however, remains 
unconvinced and argues that further examination of the replications that Hofstede claims 
as validating his scales needs to be done (Baskerville-Morley 2005). Given that I am 
undertaking a replication of a positivist study and that Hofstede style scales have been 
replicated, I will adopt the use of this type of methodology for this study. The question 
then is which set of scales to use. 
The most prominent cultural values framework is that proposed by Hofstede (2001). 
Based on a factorial analysis of internal survey results of IBM employees in 50 countries 
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conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he derived four cultural values: 
Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity. Later, after 
additional research in Asian cultures, he added another dimension: Confucian 
Dynamism or Long-Term Orientation. The Hofstede measures have been extensively 
used within the IS literature including a study of IS project escalation (Keil et al., 2000) 
and a study of the Mum Effect (Tan, et al. 2003). However, the Hofstede measures have 
been criticized as lacking construct validity and other psychometric properties (Spector, 
Cooper and Sparks 2001), and as being US/European or IBM centric (Baskerville 2003; 
McSweeney 2002; Myers and Tan 2002). They have also been criticized as atheoretical 
(House, et al. 2004). Also, the items used in the Hofstede measures mix organizational 
and societal values with values of the individual and the collective. Since, in this study, I 
am interested in investigating the effect of societal cultural values on the occurrence of 
the Deaf Effect, Hofstede’s framework; with its items mixing organizational and societal 
levels does not meet these requirements.  
Recently, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research 
Program (GLOBE) collaboration (House, et al. 2004) has proposed a framework of nine 
cultural values that overcomes most of the criticisms of the Hofstede framework. This 
framework appears to improve on that of Hofstede by, first, being theoretically based 
versus simply being empirically derived. The GLOBE framework is based on a 
conceptual model that reflects an integration of implicit leadership theory, value-belief 
theory of culture, implicit motivation theory and structural contingency theory of 
organizational form. Second, it seeks to eliminate societal and organizational centrism 
by being developed by an international team of 170 researchers in 62 different countries 
with middle manager subjects in those countries within 951 organizations in three 
different industries. Thirdly, they employed a rigorous validation process that conforms to 
the prescription of Karahanna, Evaristo and Srite (2002) for establishing cross-cultural 
equivalence of measures. To avoid construct bias, Karahanna, et al. first suggest 
informants in each culture “should be asked to describe the construct and associated 
behaviors” (p. 49). For each construct, items were derived through interviews and focus 
groups in several countries (Hanges and Dickson 2004, p. 124). These items were first 
reviewed for appropriateness through the use of Q-sorting, item evaluation, and 
translation and back translation by U.S. PhD students and then by Country Co-
Investigators (CCI) in 38 countries. Item evaluation reports were provided by the CCIs to 
inform GLOBE as to any words or phrases that were ambiguous or could not be 
adequately translated. Problematic items were rewritten or dropped. Secondly, 
Karahanna, et al. suggest that factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling be used to 
assess internal structural congruence. In two pilot tests involving results from 43 
countries, the GLOBE investigators applied exploratory factor, reliability and aggregation 
(rwg(J), ICC (1) and (2), Muthen multilevel confirmatory factor) analyses to assess the 
validity of the items. To suppress item bias, the GLOBE researchers used the qualitative 
methods described above to eliminate poor translation, and complex or inappropriate 
wording. Fourth, the GLOBE framework presents four scales, two for measuring societal 
values, two for organizational values. Within these, they have a scale for measuring 
existing cultural values and one for measuring how the respondents believe the values 
should be. Thus they remove the concern of cross measurement of society and 
organization and how the society is now versus how it should be.  
I therefore believe that these measures represent an improvement over the Hofstede 
measures and so propose to use them in this study to measure cultural attributes. 
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4.2.1 Selection of the Cultural Values Scale 
As noted above, GLOBE provides four different instruments that measure the constructs 
at two different levels, at the societal/organizational level and at the practices (as-is)/ 
values (should-be) level.  The societal measures ask respondents to rate the society in 
which they live as to the various cultural values. Similarly, the organizational scale 
requests them to evaluate their organizations. The practices scales, of which there is 
one for the society and one for the organization, ask respondents to rate a set of 
practices relating to the surrounding society or organization, as it exists now. The values 
scales, which also exist in a form for the society and one for the organization, requests 
the respondents to assess what the practices ‘should be’ which gives a view of societal 
values. In this study, I will use the societal practices scales to measure culture, as I am 
interested in assessing practices (as-is) at the societal level. In this scale the 
respondents are not providing their own values, but acting as individual raters to provide 
their perception of the society’s practices. This measures precisely what is needed in 
this study. 
4.3 APPLYING THE GLOBE MEASURES TO THE DEAF EFFECT 
4.3.1 Selection of Societal Collectivism 
The nine factors proposed by Globe (House, et al. 2004) for measuring culture include 
Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Assertiveness, Gender Egalitarianism, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, and 
Human Orientation. In this research, I focus on societal collectivism because I believe it 
to be the most appropriate dimension for explaining potential cross-cultural differences in 
the Deaf Effect. Following Zhang, Lowry, Zhou and Fu (2007), I believe that societal 
collectivism (the values of Institutional Collectivism and In-group Collectivism in a 
societal context) is an appropriate choice because: 
1. It allows us to develop a parsimonious model.  Attempting to include all 9 
cultural factors as independent variables would be too unwieldy.  Thus, 
researchers normally consider only one or two dimensions. 
2. Societal collectivism is the most commonly used dimension in cross-cultural 
research and has been shown to be a significant cultural factor in a wide 
variety of studies.  
3. Given the context of my study, it is logical to assume that societal collectivism 
will affect how much credence is afforded to a bad news reporter who is not 
on the project team when his/her report runs counter to the project team’s 
consensus. 
4. Given the nature of the experiment and the treatments used in this study, it 
seems unlikely that differences in gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, and 
humane orientation, would have a significant effect. Gender egalitarianism is 
the degree to which a society minimizes gender role differences and promotes 
gender equality (Javidan, House and Dorfman 2004). High gender egalitarian 
societies have more women in positions of authority than low gender 
egalitarian societies. In terms of the model already advanced, gender was 
seen as affecting only the attitudes toward risk and not the perception of bad 
news reporters or their message relevance. Assertiveness is the degree to 
which individuals are forceful or confrontational with each other (Javidan, et al. 
2004). Societies high in assertiveness value tough, direct behavior and 
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communications. While valuing direct communications would seem to be 
important, this quality is also valued by high performance orientation, which is 
already included in the study. Humane orientation is the degree to which a 
collective rewards individuals for being fair, generous, and caring towards 
others (Javidan, et al. 2004). In high humane orientation societies, individuals 
are other oriented and seek to act for the benefit of those they have 
relationships with. This construct doesn’t appear to have any effect on the 
constructs in the model beyond that of the collectivism variables which 
encourage the decision maker to act in the interests of the collective.. 
4.3.2 The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect 
Historically, collectivism has been considered to be a single construct (e.g. Hofstede, 
2001). However, recently, consideration has been given to different forms of collectivism 
(Triandis, 1995) and the breadth and complexity of that construct (Earley and Gibson, 
1998).  In the development of the GLOBE framework, they recognized during the 
development of the measures that the construct empirically divides into two constructs 
(Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii and Bechtold 2004). Their framework therefore divides societal 
collectivism into two constructs: Institutional Collectivism and In-Group Collectivism. 
These are two separate and uncorrelated constructs within the GLOBE framework. 
Institutional Collectivism is associated with what Triandis referred to as “horizontal 
collectivism” (Triandis 1995). Horizontal collectivism is characterized by a performance 
orientation in which the goal is accomplished in a collective manner without the use of 
aggression or power dominance. It is common in the Confucian Asian culture and the 
Scandinavian cultures. In-Group Collectivism, on the other hand, is associated with the 
concept of “vertical collectivism” (Triandis 1995). In cultures with a high degree of 
vertical collectivism, close ties among family and clan are important, power distance is 
important, but predefined workplace rules are less important (Gelfand, et al. 2004). In-
Group Collectivism is not performance oriented, nor is it future oriented. This form of 
collectivism is commonly found in South America and Africa. 
4.3.2.1. Institutional Collectivism  
According to the GLOBE consortium, Institutional Collectivism is defined as “the degree 
to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward 
collective distribution of resources and collective action.” (Javidan, et al. 2004, p. 30). In 
collectivist cultures, individuals are group oriented. They tend to view themselves as part 
of a group and put group goals before their own. Duties and obligations are very 
important to them.  Institutional Collectivism also tends to be associated with higher 
levels of uncertainty avoidance, which leads to a desire to use rules to resolve 
uncertainty in the environment. I would expect then that decision makers in an 
institutional collectivist culture would perceive that their society encourages them to 
associate themselves with their work team and work on a team basis. They would, 
however also see that they are encouraged to strive to follow workplace conventions. 
Based on this description, in terms of the Deaf Effect, I make the following hypotheses: 
since an institutional collectivist culture encourages decision makers to work with their 
teams and stand with them, I hypothesize that, absent clear indications to the contrary, 
decision makers in institutional collectivist societies will tend to side with the opinions of 
their teams: 
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H1a: Where the surrounding culture is characterized by a high degree of 
Institutional Collectivism, decision makers will tend to side with the 
opinion of the team in terms of whether to continue or discontinue a 
course of action. 
Additionally, since this type of culture encourages the tendency to side with their teams, 
the decision maker would be also be less likely to perceive bad news reported from 
outside their team to be relevant. 
H1b: Institutional Collectivism decreases the relevance of a report of bad 
news by a reporter external to the work team. 
Finally, I note that the Institutional Collectivism construct is highly correlated with 
uncertainty avoidance (Gelfand, et al. 2004). This correlation indicates that in uncertainty 
avoiding cultures, people seek to regulate their activities through the establishment of 
rules rather than making a determination when the situation arises (Gelfand, et al. 2004). 
Thus, workplace conventions such as having an auditor review the project prior to 
implementation and the formal designation of certain persons to be those who review 
and report project status might moderate the effect of Institutional Collectivism to lower 
the Relevance of the report of bad news. The report of a bad news reporter outside the 
organization is hypothesized to receive lower Relevance (H1b). However, if the reporter 
is role prescribed in a high Uncertainty Avoidance organization such as is often found in 
institutional collectivist societies, then the Role Prescription may offset some or all of the 
negative effect of Institutional Collectivism. Therefore, given this effect, I can see that a 
decision maker influenced by Institutional Collectivism might take into consideration the 
Role Prescription of a bad news reporter; giving the reports of those who are role 
prescribed more Relevance. Thus the effects of Role Prescription might mitigate the 
effect of Institutional Collectivism in decreasing Relevance. I therefore hypothesize that 
H1c: Role Prescription moderates the effect of Institutional Collectivism on 
Relevance. 
In terms of the research model, as shown in figure 4.2, Institutional Collectivism operates 
to defeat the bad news reporter’s message. First, by the decision maker siding with the 
team, leading to a direct positive effect to continue the current course of action (H1a) 
(assuming that that is the consensus of the team). Second, Institutional Collectivism 
directly reduces the Decision of the bad news reporter’s message to the decision maker 
regardless of their Credibility or Role Prescription (H1b). Finally, due to their desire to 
follow workplace conventions, Role Prescription moderates the effect of Institutional 
Collectivism on perceived Decision of the message such that the effect of Institutional 
Collectivism is reduced when bad news reporters are role prescribed to report bad news 
than when they are not role prescribed (H1c). 
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 Role Prescription (H1c) - 
 + +         (H1b) -  (H1a) + 
   
- 
Bad News Reporter Relevance  Decision to  
Credibility                       + of the message           continue the  
            current course of action 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Effect of Institutional Collectivism 
(Grayed out terms are from the studies of papers 1 and 2) 
 
4.3.2.2. In-Group Collectivism 
In-Group Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which individuals express pride, 
loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (Javidan, et al. 2004). In 
contrast with Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, is associated with the 
concept of “vertical collectivism” (Triandis 1995). These collectivists are more interested 
in clan groupings than institutions. There are close ties between the clan members and 
they are respectful of authority and have fewer rules than institutional collectivists 
(Gelfand, et al. 2004). In-Group Collectivism is associated with higher power distance 
and humane orientation and inversely with future orientation and uncertainty avoidance 
(Gelfand, et al. 2004). Thus decision makers in high in-group collectivist societies would 
be encouraged by that society to associate with the hierarchy in which they find 
themselves and defer to its leadership. I therefore hypothesize that since in-group 
collectivists tend to follow the leaders of their clan: 
H2a: Where the surrounding culture is characterized by a high degree of in-
Group Collectivism, decision makers will tend to side with the opinion 
of the leadership in terms of whether to continue or discontinue a 
course of action. 
H2b: In-Group Collectivism decreases the Decision of a report of bad news 
when it conflicts with the opinion of the leadership in terms of whether 
to continue or discontinue a course of action. 
Unlike Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism is not rule oriented and thus its 
influence would not be moderated based on a work place rule. However, since in-group 
collectivists tend to be more respectful of authority, this would give the opinions of 
management a stronger weight. This would imply that if a bad news reporter was role 
prescribed by management, it would lend them additional Credibility and Relevance in 
the decision maker’s consideration. I hypothesize that a bad news reporter whose job as 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
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designated by the leadership is to report bad news in projects would tend to have more 
Credibility and Relevance than one who is not role prescribed. Therefore: 
H2c: Role Prescription moderates the effect of In-Group Collectivism on 
Relevance.  
In terms of the research model (figure 4.3), I hypothesize that In-Group Collectivism will 
have a positive direct effect on the decision to continue the current course of action while 
having a negative effect on the Relevance of the bad news reporter’s message. The 
effect on Relevance will be moderated by the Role Prescription of the reporter as shown 
in figure 4. Where the bad news reporter is role prescribed the effect of In-Group 
Collectivism on Relevance will be weakened.  
 
                      Role Prescription       (H2c) - 
 +  + 
  (H2b)-            (H2a) + 
+- 
Bad News Reporter Relevance  Decision 
Credibility of the message             to continue the current 
 course of action 
 
 
 
The entire research model investigated in this study is shown in figure 4.4. I entered the 
paths shown in the first two studies as significant in the model plus paths for the 
hypotheses advanced here.  
In-Group 
Collectivism 
Figure 4.3: Effects of In-Group Collectivism 
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Role 
Prescription 
Decision 
Relevance 
Credibility 
Risk 
Perception 
Gender 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
H2b - 
H1a + 
H1b -  
H2c -  
H1c -  
Figure 4.4: Complete Research Model Showing all Paths Examined 
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4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The hypotheses advanced above were examined by use of a laboratory experiment 
executed in different countries. Role Prescription and bad news reporter Credibility were 
manipulated independently.  The 2x2 factorial design, scenarios, questionnaire and 
methodology developed in paper 2 were reused in this study. The questionnaire was 
augmented by the addition of the GLOBE survey questions for capturing data related to 
Institutional and In-Group Collectivism. Additional questions from the GLOBE survey 
were added to cover the cultural variables used as controls in this study: uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, performance orientation, and future orientation. The cultural 
values of Institutional and In-Group Collectivism are varied by selection of subjects from 
countries determined by the GLOBE consortium study on leadership to possess levels of 
Institutional and In-Group Collectivism that vary from high to low. The effects of culture 
are analyzed by employing the subject’s responses to the cultural values items as an 
indicator of their beliefs about the nature of the surrounding culture. These responses 
were analyzed for cultural response bias, appropriate psychometric properties and 
equivalence across the countries. They were then used in a PLS analysis to assess the 
effects of the societal collectivism on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. 
4.4.1 Subjects 
The subjects for this experiment were undergraduate students in introductory classes 
within the business school or school of information sciences at major universities. This 
population allowed selection of subjects relatively uniform in age, and experience. This 
uniformity is held to reduce methods bias and ensure equivalence in the sample across 
the cultures (Karahanna, et al. 2002), While the use of student subjects is subject to 
debate, it was shown in chapter 3 that the central question to be resolved is that of how 
to deal with the question of external validity. Following Cook and Campbell (1979) and 
Calder, Phillips and Tybout (1981; 1982; 1983), it was argued that external validity can 
be de-emphasized in favor of internal validity as long as the subjects employed respond 
in the same direction as the target population. I also saw there that student populations 
had responded similarly to practitioner populations in decision making studies and 
therefore concluded that student subjects were appropriate for this research. 
In order to insure variance in the cultural values that are of interest to this study, 
countries were selected from the GLOBE survey that reflect Institutional and In-Group 
Collectivism value scores that range from high to low. To make the determination of 
whether the geography was high or low on this value, the GLOBE computed “bands” for 
each cultural value were used. The GLOBE researchers rank ordered the scores for 
each variable and then grouped them by bands that reflect a range in which the 
differences between the scores are not statistically meaningful. The selected 
geographies and GLOBE cultural values results are found in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: GLOBE values for the Selected 
Geographies (House, et al. 2004) 
 Institutional 
Collectivism  
In-Group 
Collectivism 
Country Value8 GLOBE Band9 
 
Value 
GLOBE 
Band 
United 
States 
4.2 B 4.25 C 
Germany 3.56 C 4.02 C 
China 4.77 A 5.8 A 
Average 
Value  
4.25  5.13  
Bands  ABCD10  ABC 
 
Thus the selected countries meet the requirements for manipulation of the collectivism 
variables11. Germany is projected to provide the lowest levels of both types of 
collectivism while China is to provide the highest levels and the USA should provide a 
below average sample on both values.  The USA sample will also allow replication of the 
findings from chapter 3. 
4.4.2 Experimental Methodology 
The study was administered to the subjects as a voluntary activity in their classrooms. 
Various collaborators in the subject countries administered the survey instrument. 
Students were instructed to read the scenario presented to them and then answer the 
questions in the questionnaire. The administrator was a native of the country and 
followed a standard script provided to them. The sampling strategy ensured sample 
equivalency by controlling for demographics, background and role. Administration bias 
was controlled by using similar physical conditions, native language administrators and 
using identical administration procedures. These steps are held to procedurally reduce 
method bias (Karahanna, et al. 2002).  
4.4.2.1. Scenario 
                                                
8 The scale for all variables in the GLOBE framework is 1 to 7. The range of values for 
institutional collectivism is from 3.25 to 5.22. For in-group collectivism it is 3.53 to 6.36. 
9 Band A is the highest range of values. Band B is next highest and so on. Institutional 
collectivism has 4 bands. In-group collectivism has 3.  
10 Greece is the only country in the “D” band at 3.25. 
11 In my dissertation proposal, I included South Africa in the geographies. However, in 
evaluating the data received from the site, it had poor psychometric properties and was unusable. 
South Africa was therefore omitted in reporting the results. 
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In order to independently manipulate Role Prescription and bad news reporter 
Credibility, four different treatment scenarios were used as developed in chapter 3. 
Subjects were asked to assume the role of a project manager responsible for 
development of a new system for a bank and are informed that while they do not have 
the technical knowledge to evaluate the quality of the system themselves, they have 
learned that their team is a reliable source of information about the project status. The 
team reports that the project is ready for implementation. A bad news reporter from 
outside the team reviews the project and then reports to the project manager that the 
project is a “disaster waiting to happen” and must be completely retested. The 
organizational climate is described as one that values meeting deadlines above other 
considerations.  
In the high Credibility manipulation, the bad news reporter is described as trustworthy 
and has expertise; in the low Credibility manipulation, the bad news reporter is described 
as untrustworthy and lacking expertise. In the high Role Prescription manipulation, the 
bad news reporter is described as an internal auditor whose job is to routinely audit IS 
projects and report on project readiness. In the low Role Prescription manipulation, the 
bad news reporter is described as another project leader whose job does not include 
routinely auditing projects and who volunteers, unasked, to review the project. 
In Germany, and China, to reduce item bias, the scenarios were translated from English 
into German, and Chinese, respectively and then back translated by different individuals 
to ensure fidelity in translation (Karahanna, et al. 2002). As part of this effort, names 
were changed to native language names and locations were changed to locations in the 
native countries. The questionnaire contained three different sections. The first part 
requests the subject’s decision, rationale for the decision and demographic information. 
The second part contains the items dealing with the constructs of the model from paper 
2. The third part was composed of items from the GLOBE survey. The questions in 
sections two and three were scrambled separately so that items relating to each of the 
constructs were presented in a random order with the goal of reducing method bias. 
The English versions of the scenarios were reported with study 2 in chapter 3. The 
questionnaire used in this experiment is included in Appendix A.  
4.4.2.2. Constructs 
Table 4.2 lists the constructs that were evaluated in this study and how they were 
measured. All non-cultural value constructs are identical to those used in paper 2. The 
cultural values constructs and measurements are taken from the GLOBE Form Beta 
(societal practices scale) (GLOBE 2006). 
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Table 4.2: Construct Categorization and Measurement Methodology 
Construct Type How Measured Source of the 
Items 
Decision to Continue 
Current Course of 
Action 
Dependent Variable One 8 point 
semantic differential 
scale item. 
Same item as 
used in 
chapters 2 and 
3. 
Perceived Relevance 
of the Bad News 
Reporter’s Message 
Endogenous 
Independent 
Four 7 point Likert 
scale items 
Same items as 
used in chapter 
3. 
Credibility of the Bad 
News Reporter 
Exogenous 
Independent 
Five 7 point Likert 
scale items 
Same items as 
used in chapter 
3. 
Risk Propensity of the 
Decision Maker 
Exogenous 
Independent 
Three 7 point Likert 
scale items 
Same items as 
used in chapter 
3. Derived from 
Sitken and 
Weingart 
(1995). 
Perception of Risk by 
the Decision Maker 
Exogenous 
Independent 
Four 7 point Likert 
scale items 
Same items as 
used in chapter 
3. Derived from 
Sitken and 
Weingart 
(1995). 
Role Prescription of 
the Bad News 
Reporter 
Exogenous 
Independent 
One 7 point Likert 
scale item 
Same item as 
used in 
chapters 2 and 
3. 
Institutional 
Collectivism of the 
Ambient Society 
Exogenous 
Independent 
Two 7 point Likert 
scale items 
Two 7 point 
semantic differential 
scale items 
GLOBE 
Framework 
In-Group Collectivism 
of the Ambient Society 
Exogenous 
Independent 
Four 7 point Likert 
scale items 
GLOBE 
Framework 
Power Distance of the 
Ambient Society 
Exogenous Control Four 7 point 
semantic differential 
items 
One 7 point Likert 
scale item 
GLOBE 
Framework 
Uncertainty Avoidance Exogenous Control Three 7 point Likert GLOBE 
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of the Ambient Society scale item 
One 7 point 
semantic differential 
item 
Framework 
Performance 
Orientation of the 
Ambient Society 
Exogenous Control Two 7 point 
semantic differential 
items 
One 7 point Likert 
scale item 
GLOBE 
Framework 
Future Orientation of 
the Ambient Society 
Exogenous Control Five 7 point 
semantic differential 
items 
GLOBE 
Framework 
 
In addition to the studied cultural values constructs of Institutional Collectivism and In-
Group Collectivism, the constructs of Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Future 
Orientation and Performance Orientation are entered as control variables on the 
decision to continue the current course of action.  
Reflective/Formative Determination. I applied the same reflective/formative 
determinations from chapter 3 in this study. Relevance was treated as a reflective 
variable; Credibility as a formative construct. Below, I discuss the nature of the GLOBE 
constructs.  
The GLOBE Consortium (House, et al. 2004) developed and treated their 9 constructs 
as reflective constructs.  However, in examining the items used in these constructs, it 
appears that they are better treated as formative constructs. 
Petter, Straub and Rai’s (2007) table 3 provides a set of decision rules for evaluation of 
the constructs. They describe four rules for evaluation of constructs to determine 
whether they are formative or reflective. First is the direction of causality. Reflective 
items are manifestations of the underlying construct and therefore causality flows from 
the construct to the measure. For formative constructs, the causality is in the opposite 
direction. The items interact to form the manifestation of the construct. Second, 
measurement interchangeability asks whether the items are interchangeable with each 
other. For reflective measures, the items should be interchangeable with each other and 
elimination of one item does not affect the determination of the construct. For formative 
constructs on the other hand, the measures are not necessarily interchangeable as they 
cause formation of the construct, therefore they cannot be removed without damaging 
the measurement of the construct. Third, measure covariance asks whether the 
measures statistically co-vary with each other. In reflective constructs, the items must 
co-vary with each other. In formative constructs however, since they measure different 
parts of the construct, the items will not necessarily co-vary with each other. In fact, 
some items might vary in opposite directions if they represent countervailing forces on 
the construct. Finally, they ask whether the items have the same antecedents and 
consequences. Do the same causal factors motivate the answers to the items or are 
they different. Items for reflective constructs, since they reflect the same value, will have 
the same antecedents. Items for formative constructs will have different antecedents and 
consequences. 
In the sections that follow, I analyze each of these constructs to determine whether they 
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are reflective or formative. The third factor, measure co-variance, is assessed in the 
findings section. 
Collectivism. The GLOBE consortium divides collectivism into two constructs: 
Institutional (IC) and In-Group (IG) Collectivism. The items that measure these are 
shown in the following table 4.3a: 
Table 4.3a: Collectivism Items 
IC – 1 In this society, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual 
goals suffer. 
IC – 2 The economic system is design to maximize individual interests.  
IC - 3 In this society being accepted by the other members of a group is 
very important. 
IC - 4 In this society individualism is more valued than group cohesion. 
IG - 1 In this society, children take pride in the individual 
accomplishments of their parents. 
IG - 2 In this society, parents take pride in the individual 
accomplishments of their children. 
IG – 3 In this society, aging parents generally live at home with their 
children. 
IG – 4 In this society, children generally live at home with their parents 
until they get married. 
 
In these constructs, these items all tap into different facets of the construct each adding 
a different aspect. The four Institutional Collectivism items assess the respondents’ 
views of what leaders encourage, the goal of the economic system, how people are 
accepted and what is valued more in society. Similarly, the In-Group Collectivism 
questions assess what children and parents take pride in, how the aging are cared for 
and whether children live at home until marriage. They are thus not interchangeable and 
they all have different antecedents. From this qualitative analysis, they are therefore 
considered to be formative constructs.  
Uncertainty Avoidance. The items used to measure uncertainty avoidance are listed in 
table 4.3b.  
Table 4.3b: Uncertainty Avoidance Items 
UA - 1 In this society, orderliness and consistency are stressed, even at 
the expense of experimentation and innovation. 
UA - 2 In this society, people lead highly structured lives with few 
unexpected events. 
UA - 3 In this society, societal requirements and instructions are spelled 
out in detail so citizens know what they are expected to do. 
UA - 4 This society has rules or laws to cover almost all situations. 
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In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: orderliness, 
structure of the lives, and detail of instruction. Therefore I see that they are not 
interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as 
formative. 
Power Distance. The items used to measure power distance are listed in table 4.3c. 
 
Table 4.3c: Power Distance Items 
PD - 1 In this society, a person’s influence is based primarily on the 
authority of one’s position as opposed to their ability and 
contribution. 
PD - 2 In this society, followers are expected to obey their leaders 
without question as opposed to questioning them when in 
disagreement. 
PD - 3 In this society, people in position of power try to increase their 
social distance from less powerful people as opposed to 
decreasing it. 
PD - 4 In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy have special 
privileges. 
PD – 5 In this society, power is concentrated at the top 
 
In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: source of 
influence, obedience to leaders, activities of the powerful, privileges of the powerful, 
concentration of power. Therefore they are not interchangeable and have different 
antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as formative. 
Future Orientation. The items used to measure future orientation are listed in table 
4.3d. 
 
Table 4.3d: Future Orientation Items 
FO - 1 The way to be successful in this society is to plan ahead. 
FO - 2 In this society, the accepted norm is to plan for the future. 
FO - 3 In this society, social gatherings are usually planned well in 
advance. 
FO - 4 In this society, more people live for the future than live for the 
present. 
FO – 5 In this society, people place more emphasis on planning for the 
future. 
 
I see that in each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: path 
to success, and whether life is lived for the future or the past. I see that they are not 
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interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct as 
formative. 
Performance Orientation. Finally, the items used to measure performance orientation 
are listed in table 4.3e. 
 
Table 4.3e: Performance Orientation Items 
PO - 1 In this society, teen-aged students are encouraged to strive for 
continuously improved performance. 
PO - 2 In this society, major rewards are based on only performance 
effectiveness (compared with other factors such as seniority etc.) 
PO - 3 In this society, being innovative to improve performance is 
generally substantially rewarded vs. not rewarded. 
 
In each of the items, different facets of the construct are being measured: what students 
are taught to do, how rewards are bestowed and how innovation is recognized. They are 
not interchangeable and have different antecedents. I therefore consider the construct 
as formative. 
Summary. In the following table 4.4, I summarize the results of my assessment of the 
constructs. I did not include Decision or Role Prescription in the table, as they are single 
measure constructs. In the previous usage of these measures, those studies all reported 
the constructs to have high item covariance (Cuellar, et al. 2006; Hanges and Dickson 
2004). Since I determined that the constructs are formative, I will establish formative 
construct processing within PLS by using the measure to construct connections instead 
of the construct to measure connections.  
Table 4.4: Categorization of Constructs as Formative or Reflective 
Construct Direction 
of 
Causality 
Measure 
interchangability 
Nomological 
Net  
Construct 
Type 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
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Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
Power 
Distance 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
Future 
Orientation 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
Performance 
Orientation 
Measure 
to 
Construct 
Not 
interchangeable, 
measure different 
aspects of the 
construct 
Different 
Antecedents 
Formative 
 
4.5 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Surveys were taken on paper, coded, and then keyed into spreadsheets and analyzed 
using SPSS for descriptive statistics and manipulation checks and SmartPLS (Ringle, et 
al. 2005) for measurement and structural model analysis.  
4.5.1 Handling the Cultural Values. 
I followed Ford, Connelly and Meister (2003) in the handling of the cultural values. They 
make the following five points about how cultural variables should be handled: 
1) Values variables should have a theoretic reason for being incorporated into the 
study. 
In this study, it has been shown how the value of Institutional Collectivism is theoretically 
projected to influence the Deaf Effect. 
2) The dimensions of the framework should be used for the purposes for which 
they are intended. 
The GLOBE framework was developed and operationalized at the societal and 
organizational level. The object is to use the subjects as raters of the values of the 
culture so that on an aggregate basis it provides a value the cultural values as perceived 
by the respondents. Therefore, it yields a single value that can be applied to the entire 
culture. However, there are reasons to not follow this particular approach. As has been 
discussed above, it can be argued that there is a dominant culture to which members of 
the society conform whether or not they agree with the values of the culture. Also, each 
individual’s experience of that society is unique to that individual. For example, some 
individuals may perceive the culture as favoring individual activity while others may 
perceive it as favoring collective activity. These perceptions may have a different impact 
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on the first than on the second.  Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply the same value for 
the cultural values for each member of the society. Therefore, the GLOBE cultural value 
scales are utilized as measures of the individual perceptions of the ambient culture. This 
approach is similar to that of Srite and Karahanna (2002) wherein they argue that to 
apply the same cultural value to each subject in a particular culture is to commit the 
ecological fallacy and argue that culture should be treated as an individual difference 
value.  
The GLOBE framework poses the questions in such a way as to collect the respondent’s 
perceptions of the values of the culture in which they exist. Therefore, this is an 
appropriate framework to use to collect the individual perception values. The instructions 
for use indicate that the GLOBE framework has not been verified at the individual level 
of analysis as they have been at the aggregate level (GLOBE 2006). I will therefore have 
to validate the psychometric properties of the constructs as part of this study.  
3) Cultural values must be measured within the study 
Ford et al. (2003) and other articles (Baskerville 2003; McCoy, Galletta and King 2005) 
indicate that there may have been shifts in the cultural values of some countries from 
those originally gathered by Hofstede or GLOBE. For this reason, it is inappropriate 
simply to use values from prior studies and assume that they apply to our sample. I 
therefore will measure the cultural values for our samples in the course of this study. 
4) When selecting the sample for the study, an effort should be made to select 
populations expected to differ on the cultural variables under study.     
  
As described above, I have selected geographies likely to have subject populations with 
societal values which will have high, low and moderate levels of Institutional and In-
Group Collectivism. 
5) Use the cultural values measures as independent variables, moderating 
variables or control variables within the study. 
Ford et al. (2003) argue that instead of collecting subject groups with differing cultural 
values for the purpose of comparing the results between groups, they should be 
measured and included in the structural model, if not as independent variables, at least 
as control variables. Therefore in this study, I will collect measurements on Institutional 
and In-Group Collectivism and include them in the structural model. Other cultural values 
will be entered into the model as control variables on the decision. The remaining 
cultural variables, power distance uncertainty avoidance, future and power orientation 
will be entered as control variables into the model as having a direct effect on the 
decision to continue an existing course of action. 
4.5.2 Use of PLS. 
SmartPLS (Ringle, et al. 2005) was used to assess the measurement and the structural 
model.  PLS is a second generation statistical analysis tool that provides the ability to 
analyze the measurement model and the structural model in a single analysis. It also 
allows analysis of complex path models, mediation and moderation that allow the 
examination of constructs within its nomological net. This provides an increase in 
functionality as opposed to first generation tools such as OLS regression. PLS is 
appropriate when the model is in a domain where theory is weak or non-existent (Petter, 
et al. 2007). Additionally, PLS is appropriate for studies doing hypothesis testing as is 
being done here as opposed to studies that are testing theories for fit to data. For those, 
covariance based SEM is superior (Henseler, et al. 2008).  
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PLS requires the entry of the structural / measurement model to be entered prior to 
analysis. The structural model used to test the hypotheses defined above is shown in the 
figure 4.5 below: 
 
 
Age* 
Figure 4.5: Structural Model Tested in this Study 
Legend:  
UA – Uncertainty Avoidance          FTE – Full Time Equivalent Work Experience  
PO – Performance Orientation  
FO – Future Orientation  
PD – Power Distance  
FTE – Full Time Equivalent  Years of Work Experience 
R2=.413 
R2=.251 
R2= .121 
Role 
Prescription 
Decision 
Relevance 
Credibility 
UA* 
Risk 
Perception 
FTE* 
Gender 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
PO* FO* PD* 
Age* - Control Variable 
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4.6 RESULTS 
In this section, I report the results of the study. The process that I followed to analyze 
and report the data is as follows: 
1) Test and Correct for Cultural Response Bias 
Different cultures tend to respond to questionnaires of this type by either avoiding or 
accentuating the extremes of the scales. Asian cultures tend to avoid the extremes 
while Mediterranean cultures tend to avoid the middle of the scale (Hanges 2004). It 
is therefore necessary to test for and correct this bias before doing further analysis 
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997).  
2) Report of Demographics 
In this section the demographics of the study are reported.  
3) Measurement Model Assessment 
In this section, the measurement model is assessed to ensure that the psychometric 
properties of the survey are appropriate. 
4) Cross-Cultural Equivalence Testing 
Here the responses are tested to ensure that they are equivalent to each other and 
are unbiased 
5) Manipulation Checks 
Here, the Credibility and Role Prescription manipulations are checked to ensure that 
they worked in all the geographies. 
6) Structural Analysis 
Finally, I report and interpret results of the PLS structural analysis.  
4.6.1 Cultural Response Bias 
As described above, culturally induced biases in how the respondents completed the 
items can cause distortions in the data that would prevent comparisons of the data 
across cultures. It is therefore necessary to test for these effects and if need be 
correct them.  
The classic procedure is described in Hanges (2004). If a subject is asked to 
respond to a large range of constructs, the means and standard deviations of his/her 
responses lose any construct specific content and reflect only the subject’s response 
biases. Therefore the procedure is to create z-scores for each respondent using the 
formula: 
 
Standardization is a linear transformation that neither distorts the distribution of the 
items nor changes their correlations (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003). Scale 
scores for each construct are calculated based on both the original and standardized 
scores. If a large correlation exists between the original items and the standardized 
scores, the items are considered to be relatively free from cultural response bias.  
I performed this test on the cultural variables, calculated as per GLOBE 
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specifications, and obtained a correlation of .919 between the two numbers. The 
results are displayed in table 4.5. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Results of Cultural Response Bias Test 
 Country UA FO IC IG PD PO 
USA -0.016 -0.217 -0.158 0.094 -0.296 -0.198 
Germany -0.237 0.098 -0.060 0.215 -0.204 -0.071 Z Scores 
China 0.239 -0.160 -0.010 -0.403 -0.395 -0.067 
USA 3.535 3.185 3.267 3.751 3.013 3.224 
Germany 3.228 3.820 3.532 4.001 3.280 3.515 
Original  
Scores 
China 3.939 3.163 3.468 2.782 2.805 2.891 
 Correlation 
Coefficient 0.9191      
 
It can be concluded that there is not an issue with cultural response bias in this 
sample and therefore I will use the original scores in this analysis. 
4.6.2 Demographics 
The demographics of the study subjects are reported in figure 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Demographics 
 USA Germany China Total 
N 153 139 171 463 
Gender (F/M) 74/79 63/76 65/106 202/261 
Age (SD) 21.82 (3.571) 21.62 (1.924) 20.28 (1.129) 21.19 (2.503) 
Full Time 
Work 
Experience 
(SD) 
3.98 (3.872) 0.49 (1.093) 0.13 (0.456) 1.51 (2.899) 
IS Exp 0.69 (2.076) 0.10 (0.542) 0.00 (0.00) 0.26 (1.264) 
 
The demographics show that sample sizes are similar and age is statistically the same. 
Gender shows more men to women in all the countries. In China, this excess of men is 
particularly pronounced. Work experience is relatively the same except in the USA 
where there is a significant amount of work experience. IS experience is very close to 
zero across the board and since in China all subjects reported no IS experience, this 
construct will not be used in the analysis. 
4.6.3 Measurement Model Assessment 
Straub, Boudreau and Gefen (2004) reviewed the existing literature on instrument 
validation and have provided guidelines for the assessment of the measurement model 
of studies in the positivist tradition, such as this. They prescribe that the following 
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validation steps be performed:  
1) Construct Validity 
a. Discriminant Validity 
b. Convergent Validity 
c. Factorial Validity 
2) Reliability 
3) Manipulation Validity 
They further recommend that content validity, nomological validity and common methods 
bias be evaluated.  
In the following two sections, I review these validities for the study reported here. 
Factorial validity is assessed by the Confirmatory Factor Analysis tests reported below.  
4.6.3.1. Evaluating the Reflective Measures 
Convergent validity, how the items converge to measure a particular construct, is 
assessed by examining the individual item validity, construct reliability and average 
variance extracted (AVE) (Chin 1998). Discriminant validity, how items differentiate 
between constructs so that one item measures only one construct, can be evaluated by 
examining the cross loadings between items and constructs and examining the AVEs of 
the latent constructs to ensure that they are greater than the square of the correlations 
among the latent constructs (Chin 1998; Henseler, et al. 2008). Factorial validity is 
discussed in the section on cross loadings.  
Convergent Validity. Convergent validity for the reflective constructs was examined by 
using confirmatory factor analysis; PLS performs a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
rather than an exploratory one as done in principal components analysis. This means 
that it does not seek for the proper factors, but rather confirms that the factor structure 
specified in the model is correct. The benchmark value for the loading value is .707 
although in exploratory studies such as this, .5 or .6 is common (Chin 1998). In this 
study, the CFA in Table 4.7a shows the following results for the USA: 
 
Table 4.7a: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - USA 
 
Construct 
 
Item 
Item-to-Construct 
Loading 
Relevance Relev 1 .9102 
 Relev 2 .9478 
 Relev 3 .9435 
Risk 
Perception 
Risk Percept 1 .8619 
 Risk Percept 2 .8656 
 Risk Percept 3 .8541 
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 Risk Percept 4 .6989 
 
All factor loadings are over .69 in the USA sample. These values exceed the .707 
benchmark value except for Risk Percept 4 which was very close. These values provide 
evidence of convergent validity. 
 
Table 4.7b shows the results from Germany.  
 
Table 4.7b: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - 
Germany 
 
Construct 
 
Item 
Item-to-Construct 
Loading 
Relevance Relev 1 .8566 
 Relev 2 .9120 
 Relev 3 .9372 
Risk 
Perception 
Risk Percept 1 .8978 
 Risk Percept 2 .9239 
 Risk Percept 3 .5240 
 Risk Percept 4 .5882 
 
All factor loadings exceed the .707 benchmark value except for Risk Percept 3 and 4 
which exceed the .5 value for exploratory studies(Chin, 1998). These values provide 
evidence of convergent validity. 
Table 4.7c shows the results from China. 
Table 4.7c: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - China 
 
Construct 
 
Item 
Item-to-Construct 
Loading 
Relevance Relev 1 .8374 
 Relev 2 .7892 
 Relev 3 .8559 
Risk 
Perception 
Risk Percept 1 .8573 
 Risk Percept 2 .8530 
 Risk Percept 3 .7205 
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 Risk Percept 4 .7196 
All factor loadings exceed the .707 benchmark value providing evidence of convergent 
validity. 
Reliability. To assess the reliability of the measures, the composite reliability, the 
Cronbach’s alpha and the AVE were calculated for reach construct. Cronbach’s alpha 
and composite reliability both measure the internal consistency of the construct’s items. 
Cronbach’s alpha provides a lower bound on the reliability measurement (Cortina 1993). 
Composite reliability without the assumption of equally weighted indicators provides a 
closer estimate to the reliability figures given accurate parameter estimates (Chin 1998). 
AVE measures the amount of variance of the construct that comes from the indicators 
vs. that which comes from measurement error (Chin 1998). Table 4.8 illustrates the 
values of these indicators for all three geographies.  
 
Table 4.8a: Construct Reliability - USA 
 
Construct 
 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
 
Cronbach’s
Alpha 
Relevance .9528 .8707 .9256 
Risk 
Propensity 
.7846 .5497 .5904 
Risk 
Perception 
.8951 .6823 .8467 
 
 
Table 4.8b: Construct Reliability - Germany 
 
Construct 
 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
 
Cronbach’s
Alpha 
Relevance .9309 .8101 .8881 
Risk 
Propensity 
.7558 .5104 .5259 
Risk 
Perception 
.8349 .5722 .7347 
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Table 4.8c: Construct Reliability - China 
 
Construct 
 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
 
Cronbach’s
Alpha 
Relevance .8652 .6817 .7667 
Risk 
Propensity 
.7281 .4952 .5772 
Risk 
Perception 
.8711 .6397 .8062 
 
As shown in table 4.8, in all geographies, for Relevance and Risk Perception, 
Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite all exceed the threshold values of .7 standard for 
construct reliability suggested by Straub, et al. (2004). The AVE exceeds the baseline 
guideline of 0.5 (Chin 1998) for both of those constructs in all three countries. Risk 
Propensity failed to achieve the requisite level of Cronbach’s alpha and therefore this 
construct was omitted from subsequent analysis. 
Discriminant Validity. To assess the discriminant validity of the measurement model, 
the cross loadings of the items were examined. Cross loading analysis in PLS is 
conducted by computing the outer loadings of the items on the constructs in a 
confirmatory factor analysis and then comparing the loadings of the items on constructs 
other than its intended construct with its loading on its intended construct. This is shown 
in table 4.9.  
Table 4.9a: Construct Cross Loading 
Table - USA 
 Relevance 
Risk 
Perception 
    REL1 0.908 -0.481 
    REL2 0.947 -0.524 
    REL3 0.943 -0.484 
  RPerc1 -0.492 0.863 
  RPerc2 -0.411 0.872 
  RPerc3 -0.525 0.850 
  RPerc4 -0.285 0.707 
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Table 4.9b: Construct Cross Loading 
Table - Germany 
 Relevance 
Risk 
Perception 
    REL1 0.861 -0.481 
    REL2 0.913 -0.524 
    REL3 0.937 -0.484 
  RPerc1 -0.492 0.899 
  RPerc2 -0.411 0.923 
  RPerc3 -0.525 0.535 
  RPerc4 -0.285 0.583 
 
Table 4.9c: Construct Cross Loading 
Table – China 
 Relevance 
Risk 
Perception 
    REL1 0.836 -0.481 
    REL2 0.782 -0.524 
    REL3 0.856 -0.484 
  RPerc1 -0.492 0.856 
  RPerc2 -0.411 0.853 
  RPerc3 -0.525 0.727 
  RPerc4 -0.285 0.727 
 
Chin (1998) recommends that the loading on factors other than the target factor be less 
than that of the posited latent variable. An exploratory factor analysis found that the 
items in all geographies factored cleanly with a loading of over .698 for all items to their 
constructs with negative loadings for the other construct (see appendix B for details).  
Additionally, the AVEs of the latent constructs were compared against the correlations 
with other constructs. The test here is to verify that the square root of the AVE is greater 
than correlations with the other reflective constructs (Chin 1998). This test is shown in 
table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10a: AVE - USA 
 Relevance     Risk 
Perception 
        
Relevance 
0.933 0.536 
  Risk 
Perception 
0.499 0.827 
 
Table 4.10b: AVE - Germany 
 Relevance     Risk 
Perc 
        
Relevance 
0.904 0.519 
  Risk 
Perception 
0.239 0.757 
 
Table 4.10c: AVE - China 
 Relevance     Risk 
Perc 
        
Relevance 
0.825 0.510 
  Risk 
Perception 
0.339 0.794 
 
The AVEs here are all greater than the correlations between the constructs showing that 
we have good discriminant validity (Chin 1998).  
4.6.3.2. Evaluating the Formative Measures 
Petter, Straub and Rai (2007) provide guidance on how to validate formative constructs 
such as Credibility. They argue that the following steps should be taken to validate the 
construct: 1) Examine the weightings of the items to ensure that they are all significant; 
2) Examine the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the items to ensure that there is not 
an excessive amount of destabilizing multi-collinearity. VIF values should not exceed 
3.3.  
In assessing the PLS outer weights, as shown in table 4.11, most of the weights for the 
items were not significant on a two-tailed basis. Only one item was significant in all three 
geographies, Cred – 3. Following the guidance in Petter, Straub and Rai (2007),  I 
determined to retain all of the items in order to maintain content validity.  The VIF 
analysis of the construct showed that all items have VIF values less than the 3.3 value 
recommended by Petter Straub and Rai (2007).  
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Table 4.11: T-Statistics of Outer Weights of Formative 
Items 
Item USA Germany China 
Cred – 1 1.7088 1.2871 4.8202* 
Cred – 2 .0926 2.5815* 2.5728* 
Cred – 3 2.6001* 6.4637* 5.0522* 
Cred – 4 .3067 1.2387 2.1249* 
Cred – 5 .3911 1.2398 .3193 
IC – 1 1.1012 1.5306 .5371 
IC – 2 .6440 .9472 .3445 
IC – 3 1.2345 .8805 1.5462 
IC – 4 1.2018 .9119 .9094 
IG – 1 1.1723 1.6994 1.6061 
IG – 2 1.0488 .3630 .2190 
IG – 3 1.5618 .6195 .4687 
IG – 4 .5543 .5959 1.3579 
UA – 1 1.5153 1.3067 1.0530 
UA – 2 .6893 1.1253 .0946 
UA – 3 .0509 .9203 1.1586 
UA – 4 1.1044 .8294 1.2201 
PD – 1 1.1200 1.2585 1.2245 
PD – 2 .8630 1.1145 1.3986 
PD – 3 .7698 .4226 1.1736 
PD – 4 1.0572 1.1630 .7497 
PD – 5 .8305 .2461 .8839 
FO – 1 .0475 1.2840 .8762 
FO – 2 .8241 .2747 .0412 
FO – 3 .5388 1.1154 1.3806 
FO – 4 1.3604 1.5498 .3149 
FO – 5 1.2233 1.3966 .7689 
PO – 1 1.8498 .2461 .1484 
PO – 2 .4483 .6021 1.8229 
PO – 3 .7559 1.9303 1.0085 
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4.6.4 Equivalence Checking 
In conducting cross-cultural research, there are unique challenges that are not found in 
research conducted within a single culture. Cultural differences extend to differences in 
conception and response. These differences can manifest themselves in biases in 
response to the items on a survey such as the one under consideration here. Thus 
difference in response to a survey between different cultural groups can be due to other 
factors besides the examined constructs. Procedural activities and post-administration 
analysis must be done to establish that the responses of the different cultures are 
equivalent prior to drawing any conclusions (Karahanna, et al. 2002).  
The concepts of equivalence and bias are two aspects of the same idea (van de Vijver 
and Leung 1997). A survey that has equivalence across cultures has few biases. 
Similarly, a survey that has few biases is held to be equivalent. Karahanna, et al. (2002) 
describe three types of bias: construct, method and item. This section describes how 
each of these has been handled in this study. This analysis is done after the examination 
of the measurement model as these techniques assume good psychometric properties 
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997). 
4.6.4.1. Construct Bias 
Construct bias exists when a construct measured is not equivalent across the different 
geographies. This has to do with differences in conception and measurement of the 
constructs across geographies. One of the approaches mentioned by Karahanna, et al. 
(2002) is that of assessing internal structural congruence through techniques such as 
factor analysis, multidimensional scaling and comparison of covariance matrices. The 
most powerful method of detecting the presences of construct bias has been multi-group 
confirmatory factor analysis (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). While I am not aware 
of any procedure that has yet been advanced for formative constructs, Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner (1998) have advanced a method for assessing measurement invariance in 
reflective constructs based on confirmatory factor analysis.  
Steenkamp and Baumgartner suggest that by examining first, configural invariance then 
metric invariance and finally scalar invariance, one can assess measurement 
equivalence. Configural invariance indicates that the same pattern of salient and non-
salient loadings should be found across cultures. Metric invariance indicates that the 
loadings of the items on the construct are the same. Scalar invariance indicates that the 
intercept of the regression equation is equivalent across cultures. For this study, since 
the hypotheses are tests of path significance and there will be no comparison of mean 
values across geographies, invariance only needs to be demonstrated up to metric 
invariance (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).  
These test were executed using Lisrel 8.71. Each construct was tested in separate runs. 
Configural Invariance. Table 4.12 shows the results of the test for configurational 
invariance. In this test, the factor loadings, variances, co-variances and error variance 
were set free to test the fit of the loadings. (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). The 
results show a perfect fit on the Decision variable and an acceptable fit on Risk 
Perception (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). 
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Table 4.12 – Configural Invariance Results 
Construct Chi-square 
Value 
Chi-square 
Significance 
RMSEA CAIC 
Relevance 0.0 1.00   
Risk Perception 4.80 0.57 0.00 176.08 
 
Metric invariance. Metric invariance refers to the concept that the loadings for the items 
must be the same across the countries. Table 4.13 shows the results of a test for full 
metric invariance. In this test, the factor loadings were constrained to equality in all 
geographies. The results show that this model is not a good fit for the Risk Perception 
variable while it is for Relevance. This situation does not pose a fatal problem to the 
study. Steenkamp and Baumgartner indicate that as a practical matter, achieving full 
metric invariance frequently does not occur for various reasons. They suggest, following 
Byrne, Shavelson and Muthen (1989) that partial metric invariance be employed. If a set 
of items has configural invariance, and if at least one item is metrically invariant, then 
analysis may proceed. In this study, we see that in the Relevance construct, two items 
are metrically invariant and in the Risk Perception construct, one item is metrically 
invariant. With partial metric invariance, this allows us to associate the focal construct to 
other constructs in a nomological net (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).  
Table 4.13: Metric Invariance Results  
Construct Chi-Square 
Value 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
RMSEA CAIC 
Relevance 2.94 0.570 0.00 102.87 
Risk 
Perception 
30.45 0.0024 0.099 158.54 
 
A series of partial metric equivalence test for Risk Perception was run by freeing 
individual items across the geographies to attempt to find a model that fits the data. 
Freeing the Perc-3 variable resulting in a Chi-Square value of 10.8 (significance of 0.37), 
an RMSEA of .024 and a CAIC of 153.52. Thus this model shows that we have partial 
metric equivalence. 
4.6.4.2. Method Bias 
Karahanna, et al. (2002) indicate that method bias arises from issues with the instrument 
or its administration so that subjects do not respond to the scales in the same way. As 
discussed above, method bias can arise from differences in the subjects, differences in 
administration of the survey (Karahanna, et al. 2002) or common rater effects, item 
characteristics, item context, and measurement context (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and 
Podsakoff 2003). In this study, I addressed this bias procedurally by using student 
subjects who provide a consistent group in terms of age and by administering the 
instrument in similar locations (classrooms), having native proctors administer the 
experiment in the native language of the students using a standard script. Additionally, I 
used different scale anchors and formats, and intermixed the items on the questionnaire 
so that items relating to a single construct would not be located together. However other 
sources of this bias could not be addressed such as measuring the dependent and 
independent variables at the same point in time at the location and using the same 
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medium.  
I also used a statistical test for method bias. While Harmon’s single factor test is 
currently the most widely used, Podsakoff, et al. (2003) point out that there are several 
limitations to this procedure. First, it is only an indication, but doesn’t control for method 
effects. Second, it is also limited in that it assumes there is only one method factor when 
there could be in fact multiple factors. They provide a number of different remedies they 
consider to be superior to Harmon’s test that could be used to test and remedy method 
bias depending on the characteristics of the study. In this study, the predictor and 
criterion variables were obtained from the same source, and measured in the same 
context. The sources of method bias cannot be identified, nor can they be measured at 
this point in time. In this situation, they recommend a single method factor approach be 
used in which a method variance latent variable be introduced into the model that 
provides a measuring point for potential methods variance. This variable acts as a 
predictor for the individual indicators of the model. When the methods variance variable 
accounts for a significant amount of the variance of the indicator, a method bias problem 
exists. 
Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue (2007) have pioneered this approach in the IS literature. In 
this study, I followed their approach to testing for method bias in PLS. I created a 
separate methods variance latent variable to which all the indicators were attached as 
reflective indicators. Then in order to create paths from both the methods variance 
construct to the indicators, each indicator was created as a separate latent variable to 
which the reflective indicator was attached as a reflective indicator. The original 
substantive construct was then connected via a causal path to the indicator variable. The 
indicator was then modeled as being caused by both the methods variance and 
substantive indicators. The model was then bootstrapped and the path coefficients and t-
statistics extracted. These results are shown in table 14a-14c for each geography. The 
path coefficients act as loading factors. The test for method variance is to identify the 
preponderance of significant paths where the substantive path is significant and exceeds 
the method variance path. Where this occurs, method bias is held not be an issue. 
Liang, et al, (2007) used an average loading and count of significant paths as the test. In 
the following table 4.14, this information is provided. The details are provided in table 
4.15. 
Table 4.14: Summary of Findings from the Methods Variance Test 
 Average 
Loading – 
Substantive 
Average 
Loading – 
Method Var. 
Ratio of 
averages 
Percent 
signif. 
Substant. 
Paths 
Percent 
signif. 
Method Var. 
Paths 
USA .411 .015 27.26 90 27.3 
Germany .453 .021 21.24 97 39.4 
China .453 .007 67.63 97 33.3 
 
Given the much larger loadings of the substantive paths, the relatively insignificant 
method variance path loadings and the three times larger number of significant paths for 
the substantive paths vs. the methods variance paths, I conclude that there is a low risk 
of methods bias in this study. 
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Table 4.15a: Results of USA Test for Methods Bias 
Construct Indicator Substantive 
Factor 
Loading 
(R1) 
R12 Method 
Loading 
Factor (R2) 
R22 
Credibility Cred - 1 0.8369* 0.7004 0.0675 0.0046 
 Cred - 2 0.8468* 0.7171 -0.0613 0.0038 
 Cred - 3 0.6811* 0.4639 0.1447* 0.0209 
 Cred - 4 0.9306* 0.8660 -0.0721 0.0052 
 Cred - 5 0.9607* 0.9229 -0.0841 0.0071 
Relevance Rel – 1 0.7983* 0.6373 0.1177* 0.0139 
 Rel – 2 1.0086* 1.0173 -0.0685* 0.0047 
 Rel - 3 0.9866* 0.9734 -0.468 0.2190 
Risk 
Perception 
RPerc – 1 
0.7429* 0.5519 -0.1368* 0.0187 
 RPerc – 2 0.8478* 0.7188 -0.0335 0.0011 
 RPerc – 3 0.7772* 0.6040 -0.0913* 0.0083 
 RPerc – 4 0.9707* 0.9423 0.3036* 0.0922 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
IC – 1 
0.0321 0.0010 0.1327* 0.0176 
 IC – 2 0.2276* 0.0518 0.0295 0.0009 
 IC – 3 0.304* 0.0924 0.0579 0.0034 
 IC – 4 -0.0149* 0.0002 -0.0426 0.0018 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
IG – 1 
0.6236* 0.3889 -0.0126 0.0002 
 IG – 2 0.3707* 0.1374 0.065 0.0042 
 IG – 3 0.6218* 0.3866 -0.0623 0.0039 
 IG – 4 0.4144* 0.1717 0.0242 0.0006 
Power 
Distance 
PD – 1 
-0.5566* 0.3098 0.011 0.0001 
 PD – 2 0.5142* 0.2644 -0.1239* 0.0154 
 PD – 3 0.5301* 0.2810 0.0166 0.0003 
 PD – 4 0.7647* 0.5848 0.0668 0.0045 
 PD – 5 0.7359* 0.5415 0.0078 0.0001 
Future 
Orientation 
FO -1 
0.1571* 0.0247 -0.0151 0.0002 
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 FO – 2 0.0064* 0.0000 0.0911 0.0083 
 FO – 3 0.0806* 0.0065 -0.0565 0.0032 
 FO – 4 0.0277* 0.0008 0.128 0.0164 
 FO – 5 0.0369 0.0014 -0.1049* 0.0110 
Performance 
Orientation 
PO – 1 
0.5367 0.2880 -0.0638 0.0041 
 PO – 2 0.6074* 0.3689 0.0191 0.0004 
 PO – 3 0.7353* 0.5407 0.0344 0.0012 
 
Table 4.15b: Results of Germany Test for Methods Bias 
Construct Indicator Substantive 
Factor 
Loading 
(R1) 
R12 Method 
Loading 
Factor (R2) 
R22 
Credibility Cred - 1 0.9897* 0.9795 -0.124* 0.0154 
 Cred - 2 0.6788* 0.4608 -0.0008 0.0000 
 Cred - 3 0.324* 0.1050 0.5575* 0.3108 
 Cred - 4 1.2481* 1.5578 -0.404* 0.1632 
 Cred - 5 0.9376* 0.8791 -0.0219 0.0005 
Relevance Rel – 1 0.6583* 0.4334 0.2286* 0.0523 
 Rel – 2 1.0887* 1.1853 -0.2003* 0.0401 
 Rel - 3 0.9584* 0.9185 -0.0236 0.0006 
Risk 
Perception 
RPerc – 1 
0.812* 0.6593 -0.0923* 0.0085 
 RPerc – 2 0.8969* 0.8044 -0.0309 0.0010 
 RPerc – 3 0.5558* 0.3089 0.0512 0.0026 
 RPerc – 4 0.729* 0.5314 0.1375* 0.0189 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
IC – 1 
0.5093* 0.2594 -0.0779 0.0061 
 IC – 2 -0.563* 0.3170 0.0281 0.0008 
 IC – 3 0.0171 0.0003 -0.133* 0.0177 
 IC – 4 0.5899* 0.3480 0.0783* 0.0061 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
IG – 1 
0.1758 0.0309 -0.1007* 0.0101 
 IG – 2 0.0811* 0.0066 -0.0129 0.0002 
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 IG – 3 0.3727* 0.1389 -0.0386* 0.0015 
 IG – 4 0.3513* 0.1234 -0.006 0.0000 
Power 
Distance 
PD – 1 
-0.4131* 0.1707 -0.11 0.0121 
 PD – 2 0.4976* 0.2476 0.1176* 0.0138 
 PD – 3 0.6513* 0.4242 -0.0023 0.0000 
 PD – 4 0.7974* 0.6358 -0.1172* 0.0137 
 PD – 5 0.7071* 0.5000 0.0131 0.0002 
Future 
Orientation 
FO -1 
-0.154* 0.0237 -0.0479 0.0023 
 FO – 2 -0.2568* 0.0659 0.0267 0.0007 
 FO – 3 -0.4736* 0.2243 -0.0076 0.0001 
 FO – 4 0.8428* 0.7103 0.0088 0.0001 
 FO – 5 0.7827* 0.6126 -0.0274 0.0008 
Performance 
Orientation 
PO – 1 
0.6207* 0.3853 0.0307 0.0009 
 PO – 2 0.4764* 0.2270 0.0371 0.0014 
 PO – 3 0.823* 0.6773 -0.0393 0.0015 
 
Table 4.15c: Results of China Test for Methods Bias 
Construct Indicator Substantive 
Factor 
Loading 
(R1) 
R12 Method 
Loading 
Factor (R2) 
R22 
Credibility Cred - 1 0.6741* 0.4544 0.0343 0.0012 
 Cred - 2 0.5577* 0.3110 0.0569 0.0032 
 Cred - 3 0.4359* 0.1900 0.2054* 0.0422 
 Cred - 4 0.9514* 0.9052 0.1674* 0.0280 
 Cred - 5 0.9097* 0.8276 -0.07* 0.0049 
Relevance Rel – 1 0.6871* 0.4721 0.1323* 0.0175 
 Rel – 2 0.8484* 0.7198 -0.0514 0.0026 
 Rel - 3 0.9397* 0.8830 -0.0844* 0.0071 
Risk 
Perception 
RPerc – 1 0.7074* 
0.5004 
-0.1419* 
0.0201 
 RPerc – 2 0.8835* 0.7806 0.0228 0.0005 
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 RPerc – 3 0.6628* 0.4393 -0.0615* 0.0038 
 RPerc – 4 0.9330* 0.8705 0.1956* 0.0383 
Institutional 
Collectivism 
IC – 1 0.4380* 
0.1918 
-0.0216 
0.0005 
 IC – 2 -0.7331* 0.5374 0.01 0.0001 
 IC – 3 0.3715* 0.1380 0.0265 0.0007 
 IC – 4 0.7514* 0.5646 -0.00001 0.0000 
In-Group 
Collectivism 
IG – 1 0.6472* 
0.4189 
-0.0388 
0.0015 
 IG – 2 0.6804* 0.4629 -0.0056 0.0000 
 IG – 3 0.5124* 0.2626 -0.0401 0.0016 
 IG – 4 0.6423* 0.4125 0.0730* 0.0053 
Power 
Distance 
PD – 1 -0.5645* 
0.3187 
0.1259* 
0.0159 
 PD – 2 0.4479* 0.2006 0.0264 0.0007 
 PD – 3 0.6338* 0.4017 0.0550 0.0030 
 PD – 4 0.6989* 0.4885 0.0110 0.0001 
 PD – 5 0.7209* 0.5197 0.0190 0.0004 
Future 
Orientation 
FO -1 0.1913* 
0.0366 
-0.026 
0.0007 
 FO – 2 -0.1746* 0.0305 0.0404 0.0016 
 FO – 3 -0.1584 0.0251 0.1260 0.0159 
 FO – 4 0.8440* 0.7123 0.0376* 0.0014 
 FO – 5 0.7741* 0.5992 -0.0050 0.0000 
Performance 
Orientation 
PO – 1 0.6270* 
0.3931 
0.0325 
0.0011 
 PO – 2 0.5373* 0.2887 0.0019 0.0000 
 PO – 3 0.7635* 0.5829 -0.0313 0.0010 
 
4.6.4.3. Item Bias 
Item bias is said to exist if respondents to an item of the same standing in different 
cultural groups do not respond to the item in the same manner. Respondents in one 
culture may give uniformly higher or lower scores on an item than those in another 
culture or they might give a differential response, e.g. scoring lower on responses in the 
lower part of the scale and higher on the higher part of the scale (van de Vijver and 
Leung 1997). To prevent item bias, I used the cultural value measures from the GLOBE 
consortium, which were developed by a multi-national group of investigators who 
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reviewed the wording for complexity and cultural appropriateness. The other variables 
did not have the advantage of that preparation. The items were translated by native 
language speakers and back translated by native language speakers and reviewed until 
the forward and back translations resulted in a correct transmission of meaning.  
Following the recommendation of van de Vijver and Leung (1997), I used the analysis of 
variance with score level as an independent variable to test for item bias. A linear 
method such as ANOVA is appropriate for interval data such as is used in this study. 
Nonlinear methods such as Item Response Theory are best for nominal data. 
Additionally, it is superior to use conditional methods as opposed to unconditional tests. 
Unconditional methods compute bias statistics on the whole sample while conditional 
groups split the sample into score groups. Unconditional methods have been known to 
fail to identify biased items. The ANOVA method described below is a conditional 
method (van de Vijver and Leung 1997). 
In this method, each culture is assigned a value and then the scores for each 
respondent are summed and divided into groups of approximately size 50 or greater. 
These groups are then analyzed under ANOVA to identify significance of the cultural, 
score level variables and their interactions. 
To perform the analysis, the following procedure was utilized: 
1) Each geographic region was assigned a different value (USA=1, Germany = 2, 
China = 3).  
2) The sum of the all item scores was computed for each respondent. Similar to the 
treatment of item response bias, by summing the scores of the items, the 
substantive content is eliminated and only the respondent scoring remains as 
described above for the response bias analysis. Therefore no different treatment 
is required for formative constructs as opposed to reflective constructs. 
3) Score cutoffs for 9 groups to ensure groups of 50 or more (462/50) were 
calculated by using a Frequency command in SPSS.  
4) A score level variable for each respondent was computed by recoding the item 
scores based on the group cutoffs calculated in (3) (Score level = 1 for those in 
the smallest group; 2 for those in the next group, etc.). 
5) An ANOVA was then run against each of the items with the item as the 
dependent variable and the score level and culture as independent variables. 
The results of the Item Bias tests are reported in table 4.16. 
Table 4.16: Results of Item Bias Test 
Item Culture 
Significance12 
Score Level 
Significance 
Interation 
Significance 
Decision .187 .000* .012* 
Role Prescript .004* .000* .090 
Rel-1 .000* .000* .004* 
                                                
12 * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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Rel-2 .000* .000* .039* 
Rel-3 .000* .000* .003* 
Cred-1 .001* .000* .007* 
Cred-2 .000* .000* .178 
Cred-3 .048* .000* .114 
Cred-4 .000* .000* .322 
Cred-5 .000* .000* .061 
Risk Percept -1 .574 .023* .205 
Risk Percept -2 .417 .104 .391 
Risk Percept -3 .192 .007* .017* 
Risk Percept -4 .000* .209 .414 
Instit. Coll. - 1 .075 .000 .023* 
Instit. Coll. - 2 .000* .041* .892 
Instit. Coll. - 3 .041* .000* .167 
Instit. Coll. - 4 .000* .071 .967 
In-Group Coll. - 1 .000* .000* .001* 
In-Group Coll. - 2 .001* .000* .604 
In-Group Coll. - 3 .000* .034* .541 
In-Group Coll. - 4 .000* .001* .019* 
Uncert. Avoid -1 .000* .008* .336 
Uncert. Avoid -2 .000* .053 .335 
Uncert. Avoid -3 .219 .016 .345 
Uncert. Avoid -4 .000* .020* .394 
Power Dist - 1 .000* .174 .763 
Power Dist - 2 .220 .000* .017* 
Power Dist - 3 .000* .004* .556 
Power Dist - 4 .336 .000* .293 
Power Dist - 5 .008* .000* .360 
Future Orient - 1  .000* .002* .498 
Future Orient - 2 .010* .001* .235 
Future Orient - 3 .354 .000* .291 
Future Orient - 4 .000* .658 .662 
Future Orient - 5 .001* .947 .642 
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Perf. Orient - 1 .000* .000* .703 
Perf. Orient - 2 .000* .005* .760 
Perf. Orient - 3 .000* .004* .811 
 
The meaning of the significance scores is as follows. The score level indicates, if 
significant, that individuals at lower score levels have lower scores than those at higher 
levels. This test is not relevant to item bias (van de Vijver and Leung 1997). When the 
culture and interaction terms are not significant, the item is considered unbiased. When 
the culture variable is significant, this indicates that members of a culture are uniformly 
biased to score either higher or lower than those in a different culture. This indicates that 
scores from the culture with uniform bias will differ from scores in another by a constant 
amount. When the interaction term is significant, the difference in cultural groups is not 
invariant across score levels. The item discriminates better in one geography than 
another (van de Vijver and Leung 1997). This is a form of non-uniform bias.  
In this sample, we have a significant amount of bias in the items related to culture (74%) 
and related to the interaction of culture with score level (26%). This would indicate that 
for a large number of items there exists a uniform bias, while a smaller number have a 
non-uniform bias. The source of the uniform bias can be due either to true cultural 
differences which are the effects we are trying to study or to a systematic difference in 
understanding of the item. In this study, I was expecting that the responses should be 
systematically different across culture. So this result is not unexpected. 
The effect of this non-uniform bias is very small. Table 4.16b shows the R2 value of a 
regression of the item on the score level, culture and the interaction of score level and 
culture for those items where the interaction term was significant. Note that the effect 
size is at best weak for all of those items.  
 
Table 4.16b: Effect Sizes of the Interactions 
Item 
R2 Without 
Interaction 
R2 with 
Interaction 
Effect 
Size 
Rel - 1 0.232 0.259 0.036 
Rel - 2 0.177 0.191 0.017 
Rel - 3 0.171 0.198 0.034 
Cred - 1 0.228 0.245 0.023 
RPerc - 3 0.017 0.034 0.018 
IC - 1 0.06 0.069 0.010 
IG - 1 0.085 0.097 0.013 
IG - 4 0.36 0.376 0.026 
PD - 2 0.086 0.099 0.014 
 
I conclude from this analysis that the non-uniform bias affects relatively few items and 
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has only a weak effect so that I can disregard this impact in substantive analysis. 
4.6.4.4. Summary 
To summarize the findings of this section, I found the following equivalence/bias existing 
in this study: 
1) No cultural response bias 
2) Full configuration equivalence 
3) Partial metric equivalence 
4) No methods bias was detected 
5) Found significant uniform cultural bias in 75% of the items and non-uniform 
bias in 25% of the items. The non-uniform bias is a weak to non-existent 
effect. 
The implications for these findings for the study follow. No cultural response bias was 
found in the data indicating that the data was not skewed by cultural factors. This study 
also has configural equivalence and partial metric equivalence and therefore provides us 
with the basic foundation of performing comparison across societies (Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1998; van de Vijver and Leung 1997) and allows us to examine structural 
relationships cross nationally (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). The finding of lack of 
methods bias confirms this position. The uniform bias across the items is held to be a 
result of cultural differences rather than item bias. The weak non-uniform item bias can 
be ignored in the substantive analysis without grossly affecting our study, as I am not 
attempting to compare values across geographies but only direction of effects and 
structural positioning. 
4.7 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
In this section, I report on the analysis of the manipulations to ensure that they were 
effective in all geographies. The desired results are a significant difference in the values 
of Role Prescription and Credibility across the manipulations. I was also looking for a 
significant difference in Decision score where Decision was high in the situation where 
both manipulations were in the low condition and high where the manipulations were in 
the high condition to show that the Deaf Effect was induced in this study. 
Table 4.17a: Full Factorial Display of USA results 
  Credibility 
  Low High 
Role 
Prescription High 
Decision                    3.79 (2.06) 
Relevance                  3.46 (1.45) 
Role Prescription      5.95 (0.93) 
Credibility                 2.95 (1.02) 
Age                          22.26 (3.75) 
FTE                           4.25 (4.03) 
IS Exp                       0.26 (0.89) 
Decision                    2.97 (2.10) 
Relevance                  5.22 (1.41) 
Role Prescription      6.24 (0.82) 
Credibility                 5.74 (1.19) 
Age                          21.11 (2.92) 
FTE                           3.26 (2.92) 
IS Exp                       0.58 (1.27) 
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N                              38 N                              38 
Low  
Decision                    6.05 (1.99) 
Relevance                  2.38 (1.59) 
Role Prescription      2.22 (1.87) 
Credibility                 2.62 (1.44) 
Age                          22.50 (3.96) 
FTE                           4.48 (4.51) 
IS Exp                       1.22 (3.27) 
N                              40 
Decision                    4.19 (2.37) 
Relevance                  3.79 (1.56) 
Role Prescription      2.86 (1.99) 
Credibility                 4.80 (1.26) 
Age                          21.38 (3.49) 
FTE                           3.89 (3.87) 
IS Exp                       0.65 (1.90) 
N                              37 
 
The USA results (Table 4.17a) show that Role Prescription varies over three points 
across the treatments and Credibility over two points across the Credibility manipulation. 
However, Credibility is also affected by the Role Prescription manipulation. Credibility 
increases 0.3 points across Role Prescription manipulation in the low Credibility 
condition and .9 across the high Credibility condition manipulation. Decision varies 3 
points from the high Role Prescription, high Credibility to its opposite, low-low condition. 
This indicates that the Deaf Effect was induced in this geography.  
 
Table 4.17b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Role 
Prescription 
Dependent Variable: 
Credibility 
 Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) 
Main Effect: 
Role 
Prescription 
Manipulation 
480.894 213.214 (.000) 15.864 10.079 (.002) 
Main Effect: 
Credibility 
Manipulation 
8.252 3.659 (.058) 253.556 161.093 (.000) 
Interaction: 
(Role 
Prescription) X 
(Credibility 
Manipulation) 
1.173 0.520 (.472) 3.389 2.153 (.144) 
 
It would be expected that the main effects manipulations would have a significant 
relationship on the targeted variables (i.e. the Role Prescription manipulation on Role 
Prescription and the Credibility manipulation on Credibility) but not on the other 
dependent variable. We see this for the Credibility manipulation (Table 4.17b). However, 
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for the Role Prescription manipulation, we see the effect on Credibility is also significant. 
There is no interaction effect. While statistically significant at p <.05, the F-value and 
sum of squares are quite small compared to the very strong Role Prescription variable. I 
conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that Role Prescription 
causes a small effect on Credibility. 
Table 4.18a: Germany 
  Credibility 
  Low High 
High 
Decision                    5.75 (2.06) 
Relevance                  2.79 (1.44) 
Role Prescription      5.78 (1.21) 
Credibility                 2.92 (1.32) 
Age                          21.66 (1.70) 
FTE                           0.38 (0.98) 
IS Exp                       0.06 (0.35) 
N                              32 
Decision                    4.19 (2.20) 
Relevance                  4.02 (1.43) 
Role Prescription      6.19 (0.48) 
Credibility                 5.06 (1.21) 
Age                          21.35 (1.05) 
FTE                           0.35 (1.05) 
IS Exp                       0.19 (0.79) 
N                              31 Role 
Prescription 
Low  
Decision                    5.97 (1.99) 
Relevance                  2.18 (1.16) 
Role Prescription      1.76 (1.23) 
Credibility                 2.14 (0.90) 
Age                          21.70 (2.40) 
FTE                           0.65 (1.38) 
IS Exp                       0.16 (0.69) 
N                              37 
Decision                    4.24 (2.48) 
Relevance                  3.56 (1.71) 
Role Prescription      2.49 (1.87) 
Credibility                 4.05 (1.43) 
Age                          21.73 (1.39) 
FTE                           0.51 (0,90) 
IS Exp                       0.00 (0.00) 
N                              37 
 
The German results show that Role Prescription varies over 3 points across the 
treatments and Credibility over 1.9 points across the Credibility manipulation (Table 
4.18a). However, Credibility is also affected by the Role Prescription manipulation and 
Role Prescription is affected by the Credibility manipulation. Credibility increases 0.8 
point across the Role Prescription manipulation in the low Credibility condition and one 
point across the high Credibility manipulation. Role Prescription increases 0.4 points 
across the Credibility manipulation in the high Role Prescription situation and .73 points 
in the low Role Prescription situation. The Decision variable increased 1.8 points from 
the high Role Prescription, high Credibility scenario to the low-low condition indicating 
that the Deaf Effect had been induced. 
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Table 4.18b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - Germany 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Role 
Prescription 
Dependent Variable: Credibility 
 Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) 
Main Effect: 
Role 
Prescription 
Manipulation 
512.753 295.854 (.000) 12.848 17.251 (.000) 
Main Effect: 
Credibility 
Manipulation 
10.292 5.939 (.016) 42.819 57.492 (.000) 
Interaction: 
(Role 
Prescription) X 
(Credibility 
Manipulation) 
1.009 0.582 (.447) 0.006 0.008 (.928) 
 
As in the USA analysis, it would be expected that the main effects manipulations would 
have a significant relationship on the targeted variables (i.e. the Role Prescription 
manipulation on Role Prescription and the Credibility manipulation on Credibility) but not 
on the other dependent variable. However, for the main effects manipulations, we see 
that while the intended manipulations occurred, the effect on the untargeted dependent 
variable is also significant (Table 4.18b). However, there is no interaction effect. While 
statistically significant at p <.05, the effects are quite small compared to the very strong 
intended main effects. I conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that 
the manipulations cause a small effect on the other manipulation. 
Table 4.19a: China 
  Credibility 
  Low High 
High 
Decision                    4.60 (2.75) 
Relevance                  3.39 (1.19) 
Role Prescription      5.26 (1.11) 
Credibility                 4.56 (1.29) 
Age                          20.14 (1.28) 
FTE                           0.03 (0.17) 
IS Exp                       0.00 (0.00) 
N                              43 
Decision                    3.80 (2.63) 
Relevance                  4.08 (1.16) 
Role Prescription      5.38 (1.32) 
Credibility                 5.38 (1.32) 
Age                          20.40 (1.07) 
FTE                           0.11 (0.32) 
IS Exp                       0.00 (0.00) 
N                              45 
Role 
Prescription 
Low  
Decision                    5.33 (2.56) 
Relevance                  2.84 (1.04) 
Decision                    4.40 (2.56) 
Relevance                  3.06 (1.10) 
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 Role Prescription      3.05 (3.05) 
Credibility                 4.22 (1.24) 
Age                          20.15 (1.12) 
FTE                           0.32 (0.83) 
IS Exp                       0.00 (0.00) 
N                              40 
Role Prescription      3.14 (1.86) 
Credibility                 4.40 (1.32) 
Age                          20.42 (1.03) 
FTE                           0.07 (0.23) 
IS Exp                       0.00 (0.00) 
N                              43 
 
The Chinese results show that Role Prescription varies over two points across the 
treatments, however, Credibility varies only 0.82 and 0.18 across the Credibility 
manipulation (Table 4.19a). Also, Credibility is affected by the Role Prescription 
manipulation. Credibility increases 0.3 across Role Prescription manipulation in the low 
Credibility condition and .98 across the high Credibility manipulation. The Decision 
variable increased approximately 1.5 points from the high Role Prescription, high 
Credibility scenario to its low-low opposite indicating that the Deaf Effect had been 
induced.  
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Table 4.19b: Results of MANOVA Analysis - China 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Role 
Prescription 
Dependent Variable: Credibility 
 Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) Sum of 
Squares 
F-value (sig) 
Main Effect: 
Role 
Prescription 
Manipulation 
210.6999 92.154 (.000) 19.314 12.021(.001) 
Main Effect: 
Credibility 
Manipulation 
0.477 0.209 (.648) 10.651 6.629 (.011) 
Interaction: 
(Role 
Prescription) X 
(Credibility 
Manipulation) 
0,011 0.005 (.944) 4.638 2.887 (.091) 
 
As in the previous analyses for the USA and Germany, it would be expected that the 
main effects manipulations would have a significant relationship on the targeted 
variables (i.e. the Role Prescription manipulation on Role Prescription and the Credibility 
manipulation on Credibility) but not on the other dependent variable. However, for the 
Role Prescription manipulation we see the effect on Credibility is also significant (Table 
4.19b). There is no interaction effect. As shown in the table above, this results in a 
significantly higher level of Credibility in the high Role Prescription manipulation but 
there is still a significant variation in Credibility across the Credibility manipulation. I 
conclude from this that the manipulations were effective, but that in China, as 
hypothesized, Role Prescription has a large effect on Credibility.  
4.7.1 Structural Analysis 
In this section, I address first the main effects and then the moderation effects of the 
cultural variables.  
4.7.1.1. Main Effects 
The results of the analysis of my hypotheses are reported in table 4.20.  
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Table 4.20: Results of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis Path Coefficient T-
Statistic13 
Effect Size Power14 
H1a: Where the 
surrounding culture is 
characterized by a high 
degree of Institutional 
Collectivism, decision 
makers will tend to side 
with the opinion of the 
team in terms of 
whether to continue or 
discontinue a course of 
action 
In the scenario, the 
team was indicating to 
the subject that the 
project was complete 
and ready to be 
implemented.  
Institutional 
Collectivism to 
Decision 
   
      USA -.0048 .7520 .0164 .074 
      Germany .0511 .9323 .0076 .060 
      China .03139 .3873 .0055 .058 
H1b: Institutional 
Collectivism decreases 
the Decision of a report 
of bad news by a 
reporter external to the 
work team. 
Institutional 
Collectivism to 
Relevance 
   
     USA -.0024 .5614 .0002 .050 
     Germany -.0477 .6161 .0074 .060 
     China -.0421 .4690 .0025 .053 
H2a: Where the 
surrounding culture is 
In-Group 
Collectivism to 
   
                                                
13 A T-statistic greater than 1.96 indicates a two-tailed significance less than .05. Since the 
hypotheses presented in this research are unidirectional hypotheses, we can use a one-tailed 
significance test. Therefore a t-statistic greater than .98 indicates a significance less than .05 
(Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989). A “*” indicates a significance greater that .05 level.  
14 A post-hoc power analysis was done using G*Power v2.0 (Erfelder, et al. 1996) for each 
path tested. The R2 for the dependent variable of the path was calculated with and without the 
path to compute the effect size. The effect size was then used as input to a power analysis. For 
the analysis, α was set to .05 and the N value was set to the sample size of the geography for 
both samples. 
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characterized by a high 
degree of In-Group 
Collectivism, decision 
makers will tend to side 
with the opinion of the 
leadership in terms of 
whether to continue or 
discontinue a course of 
action 
In the scenario used 
here, leadership 
indicated that they 
would be disappointed if 
the project was not 
implemented as 
scheduled. 
 
Decision 
      USA -.0408 .6413 .0125 .395 
      Germany -.0189 .8015 .0026 .090 
      China -.0038 .5014 .0011 .052 
H2b: In-Group 
Collectivism decreases 
the Decision of a report 
of bad news when it 
conflicts with the opinion 
of the leadership in 
terms of whether to 
continue or discontinue 
a course of action. 
 
In-Group 
Collectivism to 
Relevance 
   
USA .0090 .5961 .0000 .050 
Germany -.0051 .5092 .0195 .078 
China -.0365 .8730 .0387 .123 
As can be seen, none of the hypotheses were confirmed. The effect size of each of the 
cultural variables is very low with the exception of In-Group Collectivism to Relevance, 
which has a moderate effect size. The statistical power of each of the links is also 
extremely low. However, some interesting relationships can be derived from the results. 
First, all the models provide confirmation that the basic model as demonstrated in paper 
2 applies in all geographies. 1) Credibility of the bad news reporter is positively 
associated with the Relevance of the report of bad news to the decision maker, which is 
2) negatively associated with a decision to continue the current course of action. 3) Role 
Prescription of the bad news reporter is positively associated with his/her Credibility and 
the Relevance of the report of bad news (except in Germany). 4) Perception of risk in the 
project is negatively associated with a decision to continue the current course of action.  
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In attempting to account for the lack of significance, the study was rerun taking each of 
the control cultural variables to the Credibility and Relevance variables in addition to the 
Decision variable. As recorded above, all of the hypothesized paths were non-significant 
except that for hypothesis H2b, the effect of In-Group Collectivism on Relevance. Below, 
I examine the results for each geography and suggest some explanation for the unique 
results obtained. 
USA Main Effects Results 
 
In the USA, the cultural values are insignificant except for the power distance control 
variable. In high power distance societies, power is differentiated into several classes, 
each with a different amount of power and involvement in the society (Carl, Gupta and 
Javidan 2004). The negative path coefficient indicates that when the decision maker 
views the ambient culture as being a higher power distance culture that he/she tends to 
discontinue the current course of action. This seems to indicate that when the decision 
maker views his/her society as being high in power distance, they are more likely to de-
escalate. The reason for the failure of the collectivism hypotheses to be confirmed is not 
obvious from the data. The In-Group Collectivism construct may be insignificant due to 
.4454 
(T=6.4756) Role 
Prescr. 
Decision Relev 
Cred 
PD 
Risk 
Percep
t. 
Figure 4.6: Significant Paths in USA Structural Model (only significant paths 
shown) 
-.076 
(T=1.022) 
.6091 
(T=9.034) 
.2699 
(T=4.858) 
.3201 
(T=4.889) 
-.5475 
(T=5.342) 
-.3603 
(T=5.549) 
R2=.588 
R2=.215 
R2=.190 
R2=.641 
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the action of the power distance control variable. According to the GLOBE consortium, 
the power distance and In-Group Collectivism constructs are highly correlated (ρ=.55) 
(Carl, et al. 2004). It may be that power distance is obscuring the effect of In-Group 
Collectivism (figure 4.6).  
 
Table 4.21a – Effect Sizes of  the Variables in the USA 
Model 
 Decision Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance .204   
Risk Perception .134   
Credibility .003 0.503 .963 
Role Prescription  0.111  
 
In the USA model (Table 4.21a), we see that Relevance and Risk Perception have large 
effect sizes on Decision while Credibility has very small one. This indicates that in the 
USA Relevance has the largest effect on the Decision. Relevance is influenced largely 
by Credibility with Role Prescription having a small effect. 
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Germany Main Effects Results 
 
The German subjects also did not have the collectivism variables as significant factors in 
their results. Moreover, the path from Role Prescription to Relevance of the message 
was not significant as it was in the other societies. In discussing this finding with our 
German colleagues, I understand that in Germany, internal auditors have a bad 
reputation as being “time bandits”, in other words, they do not add value to a project but 
rather simply audit projects after all work has been done and look to see if the right 
boxes on the report are checked. In this view, any concern that they raise has little claim 
to the decision maker’s attention and hence little relevance (Beck 2008). Since this is 
based on discussions with practitioners, it is uncertain if students would have a similar 
reaction to the report of bad news. This question deserves further research. 
Also, uncertainty avoidance featured positively in the decision. High uncertainty 
avoidance is associated with seeking more orderliness, consistency and structure within 
a society. Thus high uncertainty avoidance societies tend to rely on policies and 
procedures, formalized interactions, and show less tolerance for breaking rules (De 
Luque and Javidan 2004). In this case it appears that when the German subjects view 
Role 
Prescr. 
Decision 
Relev 
Cred 
FTE UA Age 
Risk 
Percep
t. 
.0594 
(T=1.100) 
-.139 
(T=1.808
) 
-.081 
(T=1.509) 
-.5201 
(T=5.682) .2941 
(T=3.396) 
.7028 
(T=13.811) 
-.2490 
(T=2.958) 
R2=. 587 
R2=. 296 
R2=.181 
R2=.661
8 
.5434 
(T=8.5048) 
Figure 4.7: Significant Paths in Germany Structural Model (only significant 
paths shown) 
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the society as being high in uncertainty avoidance, they view bad news reporting as a 
deviation from workplace convention that creates uncertainty. This assessment weakens 
the argument for de-escalation in the decision maker’s analysis and leads to a higher 
tendency to reject the bad news reporter’s message and continue the current course of 
action. It doesn’t cause the bad news reporter to lose credibility or their message 
Relevance. 
 
Table 4.21b – Effect Sizes of of the Variables in the 
Germany Model 
 Decision Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance .180   
Risk Perception .070   
Credibility .003 .727 .997 
Role Prescription  .000  
 
In the Germany model, similar to the USA model, we see that Relevance and Risk 
Perception have large effect sizes on Decision while Credibility has very small one. This 
indicates that in Germany, as in the USA, Relevance has the largest effect on the 
Decision. Relevance is influenced solely by Credibility with Role Prescription having no 
effect. 
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Main Effects Results for China. Figure 4.8 graphically shows the significant paths in 
the main effects model for China. As hypothesized, In-Group Collectivism results in a 
decreased Relevance of the message. An out of group bad news reporter is viewed as 
being outside of the hierarchy and thus breaking the chain of command. Since in the 
scenario used in this experiment, the management team was very interested in putting 
the system into production, and in an in-group collectivist society there is pressure to 
defer to management, it seems that the Chinese decision maker considers the report of 
bad news less relevant to his/her decision process than in a non-in-group collectivist 
society. Institutional Collectivism has no significant effect on the Deaf Effect decision 
process. 
The control variable uncertainty avoidance appears as significant in the model with a 
negative influence on Credibility. It may be that when the Chinese decision maker views 
the society as being high in uncertainty avoidance, he/she sees the bad news reporter 
as one who introduces uncertainty into the environment. The report of bad news 
contravenes the received wisdom from the team and therefore is cause to lower their 
trust in the bad news reporter, which results in decreasing his Credibility.  
.3761 
(T=6.7461) 
Figure 4.8: Significant Paths in the China Structural Model (only significant paths 
shown) 
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Table 4.21c – Effect Sizes of the Variables in the China 
Model 
 Decision Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance .060   
Risk Perception .330   
Credibility .009 .590 .851 
Role Prescription  .027  
 
In the China model, contrary to the USA and Germany models, we see that Risk 
Perception has the largest effect size on decision while Relevance and Credibility have 
very small ones. This indicates that the Deaf Effect operates differently in China. It is not 
a function of the report of bad news but rather of the perception of risk. Credibility, in 
China, unlike in the USA or Germany, does not have a large effect size on Risk 
Perception indicating that there are other factors that the Chinese use to evaluate risk. 
Relevance, similar to the USA and Germany, is influenced for the most part by 
Credibility with Role Prescription having a small effect. 
4.7.1.2. Evaluation of the Moderation Effects  
In this section, I evaluate hypotheses H1c and H2c, dealing with the moderating effects 
of Role Prescription. At this time there is a controversy regarding the proper method to 
use to evaluate moderation effects in PLS. Chin, Marcolin and Newstead (2003) have 
advocated using the product indicator approach in which the indicator values of the main 
effects and moderator variables are cross multiplied to compute the interaction value 
indicators. They argue that this approach produces path coefficients for the interaction 
effect that are closer to the true value of the parameter. In a subsequent article, 
Goodhue, Lewis and Thompson (2007) have argued that this approach while increasing 
accuracy of the parameter estimate also reduces statistical power; an effect that 
increases with indicator count and sample size. They argue instead that the product of 
sums approach be used. Under this approach, the indicators of the variables are 
summed to produce latent variable scores, which are then centered and multiplied to 
produce interaction term indicator values. Neither of these approaches can be used in 
the current study as they both assume reflective constructs. Since Credibility is modeled 
as a formative construct, a different approach is needed. Henseler, Hubona and Ringle 
(2008) have proposed a two step approach which works with both reflective and 
formative variables. The process is as follows: 
1) A main effects model is run in PLS. 
2) The latent variable scores (unstandardized) are extracted for the moderator 
and the exogenous variable. 
3) These scores are centered and element-wise multiplied to create the 
interaction term. 
4) The extracted latent variable scores and interaction term are loaded into the 
PLS model and the model is rerun. 
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5) The significance and effect size of the terms is evaluated. 
6) Each interaction effect is modeled separately from all others.  
7) In interpreting the path coefficients, the original paths are no longer main 
effects but “single effects”, the effect that the variable has when the 
moderator is zero.  
 
Table 4.22: Summary of Moderating Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis Path Path 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic15 
Effect 
Size16 
H1c: Role Prescription 
dampens the effects of 
Institutional Collectivism.  
Role Prescription X 
Institutional 
Collectivism to 
Relevance 
   
     USA  .0657 1.1497* .025 
     Germany  -.0172 .2159 -.009 
     China  -.0021 .1204 -.009 
H2c: Role Prescription 
moderates the effects of In-
Group Collectivism 
Role Prescription X 
In-Group 
Collectivism to 
Relevance 
   
USA  -.0117 .1331 .017 
Germany  .0563 1.2668* .000 
China  -.0322 .7170 -.008 
 
In evaluating hypothesis H1c, I found that the path is positive and significant only in the 
USA. It is not significant in Germany or China. In the USA, the single effect of 
Institutional Collectivism on Relevance was not significant and assumed to be zero. The 
single effect of Role Prescription on Relevance was positive. This indicates that the 
interaction between Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription is one in which 
Institutional Collectivism weakens the effect of Role Prescription (Cohen, et al. 2003). 
The effect size is very low and is considered to be weak to non-existent so I conclude 
that this weakening effect is very small.  
For hypothesis H2c, we found that the interaction between In-Group Collectivism and 
Role Prescription was significant only in Germany. However, in this case, the effect size 
is zero which indicates that Role Prescription has no moderating effect on the operation 
of In-Group Collectivism. 
                                                
15 * = p < .05 level, one –tailed test 
16 The effect size is calculated as  per Henseler, et al. 
(2008).  
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Carte and Russell (2003) suggest guidelines to prevent errors in the assessment of 
moderation effects. I report the results of these guidelines to show that moderation has 
been reported correctly. 
1) Report effect size – This was done in table 20. The effect size was weak to non-
existent for the moderating variables. 
2) Interpret main effects with moderating effects – This was done. I included the 
main effects variables with the moderating variables. 
3) Check for curvilinear effects – I found that there was a very low correlation 
between Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription in the USA (-.0112) and 
between In-Group Collectivism and Role Prescription in Germany (.1043). Since 
the correlations were low, the risk of confounding curvilinear effects with 
mediation is low.  
4) Clearly establish the causal ordering – This was done in the insights from 
whistle-blowing literature section. 
5) Report power analysis and sample size requirements – Following Cohen, Cohen, 
West and Aiken (2003) we find for the USA Role Prescription and Institutional 
Collectivism interaction effect that L=f2(n-k-1) = .025(157-3-1) = 3.825 which 
yields a power close to .3, a low level. The N required to achieve a power of .8 is 
n*=(10.8/.025+3+1) = 440. This indicates that there is a possibility that interaction 
effect might be understated in this study. Replication with a large sample size is 
needed. Similarly for the German In-Group Collectivism, Role Prescription 
interaction, we find that since the interaction effect size is zero that the power is 
zero and the number required to achieve a power of .8 is undefined. 
6) Examine scale coarseness – In this study, respondents replied to Relevance, In-
Group and Institutional Collectivism and Role Prescription on seven point scales 
creating a potential 49 point interaction variable compared with a seven point 
dependent score. Carte and Russell indicate that this exhibits a potential 50% 
reduction in effect size due to this feature. 
7) Report all transformations – no transformations were performed on the data prior 
to analysis. In calculation of the moderator variables, the predictor variables were 
centered, a linear transformation which does not affect R2 or path coefficient 
values. 
8) Report scale reliabilities – Being formative constructs, In-Group and Institutional 
Collectivism don’t have reported scale reliabilities. Role Prescription was a single 
item variable, so its reliability is 1.0. Thus the reliability of the interaction cannot 
be reported. 
9) When moderation is tested in PLS by separating samples in groups with different 
memberships, different factor loadings and weights are computed for each group 
for each latent variable. It is therefore necessary to test that the inter-item 
covariance matrices with scales are equal using Box’s M to determine if the 
construct contents as determined by item loadings within scales are the same 
(Carte and Russell 2003). In this study, by using the two step approach 
advocated by Henseler et al. (2008), this problem is avoided using the calculated 
unstandardized latent variable scores for each of the indicator and dependent 
variables in the analysis thus fixing the values so they are not recalculated. This 
not only avoids this problem, but also assures correspondence with the main 
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effects analysis done.  
The end result of this analysis is that the sample sizes used in this analysis are too small 
which results in low power in testing for the moderation effect. Additionally, the 
coarseness of the dependent variable results in a reduction of effect size as well. This 
indicates that to overcome this downward bias the interaction effect detected must be a 
strong one in order to be detected in such a low power experiment and we have a 
potential type II error on the moderation analyses.  
4.8 DISCUSSION 
This study replicated the study reported in Chapter 2 in the USA, Germany and China. 
The results of this study have shown that the pattern of association in the structural 
model demonstrated in previous studies in the USA is found within Germany and China. 
An exception to this is that in Germany, Role Prescription was not significant on 
Relevance. While this might be due to German attitudes toward internal auditors, 
additional research is required to understand why this should occur. However, while the 
structural model is similar, this study shows that the effect sizes of Relevance of the 
report of bad news and Risk Perception are different in the western cultures from that of 
China. In China, the effect size of Relevance of the message was much smaller than 
that of Risk Perception, indicating that the Chinese subjects consider the report of bad 
news less important than their perception of the risk in the project.  
The reason for this exchange in effect size is not evident from this study, however, I can 
speculate that it might have to do with the difference in political cultures. In the western 
societies with many individual freedoms, no history of government oppression in the 
subjects’ lifetimes and no fear of serious personal retaliation for defying authority, 
perceived risk may be held as less important than in China where the opposite 
conditions hold. In this study, since we did not achieve complete metric invariance 
between the subjects, we cannot make any comparison between the Risk Perception 
measures between the cultures. Given that, I am left to hypothesize that in the mental 
model of the Chinese students, they must be more risk averse or attach more 
importance to perceived risk in their decision processes than western students as a 
result of their political environment.  
This study also showed that the decision maker’s perceptions of ambient culture have 
little to no effect on the Deaf Effect. This is contrary to the deductions based on the 
definitions of the cultural values described in House, et. al. (2004). In the USA, power 
distance showed a negative effect on willingness to continue the current course of 
action. In Germany, perceived uncertainty avoidance in the culture caused a willingness 
to discontinue the current course of action. In China, perceived uncertainty avoidance 
reduced the Credibility of the bad news reporter while In-Group Collectivism reduced the 
Relevance of the report of project problems. The effect sizes of all of these effects were 
small to non-existent. It is possible that the generally low power for all of the paths of this 
experiment resulted in failure to achieve significance for these hypotheses. In which 
case, a larger sample size might generate significance for the cultural values. 
Alternatively, there might be a substantive reason for the failure of these hypotheses. 
Per our model, I would argue that there are other aspects of the mental model that drive 
the reactions to perceived cultural values.  
What these aspects are is uncertain at this point, however, I can speculate several 
reasons as to why this study achieved no significant different in response based on 
perceived national culture. First, it is possible that the subjects were composed of 
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several different cultural subgroups that resulted in a “cancelling out” of their differences. 
Following Archer (1988, 1995), I recognize that while a society may have a dominant 
culture, it is composed of several agencies (groups of actors sharing a similar 
experience that have a similar viewpoint) which based on their positions in society can 
have different perspectives of the ambient society. Thus it may be that the members of 
the different agencies have divergent viewpoints of the culture and this has resulted in a 
“regression to the mean” when their responses are aggregated together resulting in a 
similarity of response across the different geographies. To resolve this issue would 
require separation of the different geographies into the different agencies, which would 
have differing responses. The instrument used here did not contain sufficient information 
on which to make such segregation. 
An alternative explanation is that other aspects of the cultural environment are more 
important to the individual’s values makeup than the ambient national culture. One 
possibility here is that the professional culture of information systems is the same across 
the world resulting in a commonality of response. There is some evidence for this. 
Couger (1986) in a study of Singaporean and American programmers and analysts 
found that the two different cultural groups had substantial similarities in motivational 
characteristics despite the different geographies and significant demographic 
differences. While the level of professional enculturation to be found in students at the 
sophomore level is likely to be low, another form of cultural homogeneity can perhaps be 
found in the common experiences as young people. Given the spread of western ideas 
via the internet and popular culture, it may be that college sophomores of the US and 
China may share a great deal in terms of values.  
A third reason may have to do with nature of measures themselves. The GLOBE 
framework, while it appears superior to that of the Hofstede framework in terms of 
content validity, appears to need additional work on cross-country validation. The 
constructs they have identified are clearly formative as opposed to reflective as they 
have described them. The items, in this study, are beset by a systematic uniform item 
bias in different cultures leading to an inability to compare across countries. This creates 
a concern about the validity of the framework the validity of the framework and results 
reported when using the framework as described by the GLOBE consortium unless 
rigorous equivalence testing has been done to prove the equivalence of the metrics 
across countries. Similarly, the constructs used to measure the Deaf Effect also possess 
uniform item bias. It might be that the bias found or other deficiencies in the measures 
has resulted in a suppression of the cultural differences between the cultures. 
4.9 CONCLUSIONS 
I began this chapter with the question as to whether societal collectivism would change 
the causal linkages in the model of the Deaf Effect or whether in fact the Deaf Effect 
occurs. In a replication of the study in chapter 3 across the USA, Germany and China, I 
found that the respondents’ perspective of societal practices as operationalized by the 
GLOBE framework had very little effect on the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The Deaf 
Effect model was shown to replicate in Germany and China much as it is in the United 
States. The implication of this is that the mental models associated with evaluating 
reports of bad news within projects are similar in the three geographies examined.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THIS STUDY 
 
 Test Further  Move to Production 
Definitely Strongly Some-what Slightly 
 Slightly Some-what Strongly Definitely 
| | | |  | | | | 
1. Please indicate what you will 
decide, and how strong that 
decision will be. 
(Mark only one of the eight 
boxes) 
         
 
2. Please explain the reasoning behind your decision. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3. Your gender (please circle one choice only): Male  Female 
4. Your age (whole numbers only)         ____ Years 
5. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience you have in any 
capacity (whole numbers only):        ____ Years 
6. The total number of years, full-time, paid work experience in information 
systems  (whole numbers only):        ____ Years 
7. My native country is: ________________________________________ 
8. In what country have you been living the longest?  ____________          
For how many years?____ 
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Very Far   Neutral   Very Near 
 
| | | | | | | 
9. Regardless of your nationality, 
how far are you from a strict 
adherence to the values and 
culture of the country you are 
living in? 
       
10. How far are your own culture 
and values from the culture and 
values of the country you are 
living in? 
 
       
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Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree Neutral 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree  
| | | | | | | 
11. Sandy has a lot of expertise in 
this area. (Credibility)        
12. Part of Sandy’s job is to review 
projects and report on 
perceived problems that might 
affect project success. (Role 
Prescription) 
       
13. Sandy’s assessment was very 
important in forming my 
decision. (Relevance) 
       
14. I would choose a risky 
alternative based on the 
assessment of others on 
whom I must rely. (Risk 
Propensity) 
       
15. Sandy is motivated by a desire 
to see things done correctly 
for the bank. (Credibility) 
       
16. I believe that there is high 
potential for a positive result 
in putting this project into 
production. (Risk Perception) 
       
17. My decision was more 
influenced by the Sandy’s 
assessment than any of the 
other views expressed. 
(Relevance) 
       
18. Sandy is the most credible 
person in the scenario. 
(Credible) 
       
19. This project has a high 
probability of success. (Risk 
Perception) 
       
20. I would choose a risky 
alternative relying on an 
assessment that is high in 
technical complexity. (Risk 
Propensity) 
       
21. My decision was most 
influenced by the Sandy’s 
assessment. (Relevence) 
       
21. My decision was most 
influenced by the Sandy’s 
assessment. (Relevence) 
       
22. I believe that there is very little 
risk in moving this project into 
production. (Risk Perception) 
       
23. Sandy is well respected 
within the company. 
(Credibility) 
       
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24. I would choose a risky 
alternative which could have a 
major impact on the strategic 
direction of my organization. 
(Risk Propensity) 
       
25. Sandy is very trustworthy. 
(Credibility)        
26. This project is in a positive 
situation. (Risk Perception)        
27. Sandy’s assessment was 
highly relevant in forming my 
decision. (Relevance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 Strongly Disagree Disagree Slightly Disagree Neutral Slightly Agree Agree Strongly Agree 
In this section, we are interested in your beliefs about the norms, values and practices in your society. 
In other words, we are interested in the way your society is – not the way you think it should be. 
There are no right or wrong answers, and answers don’t indicate goodness or badness of the society. 
Please respond to the questions by checking the box that most closely represents your observations 
about your society. 
 
28. In this society, orderliness and 
consistency are stressed, even 
at the expense of 
experimentation and 
innovation. (Uncertainty 
Avoidance) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
  Strongly Agree 
        
29. The way to be successful in 
this society is to (Future 
Orientation) 
Take 
Events as 
They 
Occur 
  
 
 
  Plan 
Ahead 
        
30. In this society, the accepted 
norm is to: (Future Orientation) 
Accept the 
Status Quo      
Plan for 
the Future  
        
31. In this society, a person’s 
influence is based primarily on: 
(Power Distance) 
One’s Ability and 
Contribution to the 
Society 
   The Authority of One’s Position 
        
32. In this society, leaders 
encourage group loyalty even if 
individual goals suffer. 
(Institutional Collectivism) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
  Strongly Agree 
        
33. In this society, social 
gatherings are usually: (Future 
Orientation) 
Spontaneous 
(planned less than 
an hour in advance) 
   
Planned well in 
advance  
(2 or more weeks in 
advance) 
        
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34. In this society, children take 
pride in the individual 
accomplishments of their 
parents.  (In-Group 
Collectivism) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
35. The economic system in this 
society is designed to 
maximize: (Institutional 
Collectivism) 
Individual 
interests 
     Collective 
Interests 
        
36. In this society, followers are 
expected to: (Power Distance) 
Question their 
leaders when in 
disagreement 
   Obey their leaders 
without question 
        
37. In this society, teen-aged 
students are encouraged to 
strive for continuously improved 
performance (Performance 
Orientation) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
38. In this society, people lead 
highly structured lives with few 
unexpected events. 
(Uncertainty Avoidance) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
39. In this society, major rewards 
are based on: (Performance 
Orientation) 
Only factors other 
than performance 
effectiveness (for 
example, seniority or 
political connections 
 Performance 
Effectiveness 
and other 
factors (for 
example 
seniority or 
political 
connections) 
 Only Performance 
Effectiveness 
        
40. In this society, societal 
requirements and instructions 
are spelled out in detail so 
citizens know what they are 
expected to do. (Uncertainty 
Avoidance) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
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41. In this society, being innovative 
to improve performance is 
generally:  (Performance 
Orientation) 
Not Rewarded  Somewhat 
Rewarded 
 Substantially 
Rewarded 
 
        
42. In this society, parents take 
pride in the individual 
accomplishments of their 
children. (In-Group 
Collectivism) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
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43. This society has rules or laws 
to cover: (Uncertainty 
Avoidance) 
Very Few 
Situations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some 
Situations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost all 
Situations 
 
 
        
44. In this society, people in 
position of power try to (Power 
Distance) 
Decrease their social 
distance from less 
powerful people 
   
Increase their social 
distance from less 
powerful people 
        
45. In this society, rank and 
position in the hierarchy have 
special privileges (Power 
Distance) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
46. In this society, aging parents 
generally live at home with their 
children (In-Group Collectivism) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
47. In this society, being accepted 
by the other members of a 
group is very important 
(Institutional Collectivism) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
48. In this society, more people 
(Future Orientation) 
Live for the 
present 
than live 
for the 
future 
     
Live for 
the future 
than live 
for the 
present 
        
49. In this society, people place 
more emphasis on: (Future 
Orientation) 
Solving 
current 
problems 
     
Planning 
for the 
future 
        
50. In this society, power is (Power 
Distance) 
Shared throughout 
the society 
 
   
Concentrated at the 
top 
 
        
51. In this society: (Institutional 
Collectivism) 
Individualism is 
more valued than 
group cohesion 
 
Group 
cohesion and 
individualism 
are equally 
valued 
 
Group cohesion is 
more valued than 
individualism 
51. In this society: (Institutional 
Collectivism) 
Individualism is 
more valued than 
group cohesion 
 
Group 
cohesion and 
individualism 
are equally 
valued 
 
Group cohesion is 
more valued than 
individualism 
        
52. I  t i  i t , childr n 
generally live at home with their 
parents until they get married. 
(In-Group Collectivism) 
S rongly 
Disagree   
Neither Agree 
or Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
        
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect 141 
 
Cuellar – An Examination of the Deaf Effect 
Chapter 4 – The Effect of Societal Collectivism on the Deaf Effect 142 
 
APPENDIX B: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANCE AND RISK 
PERCEPTION CONSTRUCTS 
 
Table B.1: Factor Analysis in the USA Sample 
Item Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance – 1 .865 -.229 
Relevance – 2 .892 -.271 
Relevance – 3 .921 -.206 
Relevance – 4 .896 -.229 
Risk Perception - 1 -.337 .757 
Risk Perception - 2 -.206 .846 
Risk Perception - 3 -.357 .761 
Risk Perception - 4 -.061 .802 
 
Table B.2: Factor Analysis in the Germany Sample 
Item Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance – 1 .832 -.181 
Relevance – 2 .860 -.232 
Relevance – 3 .892 -.279 
Relevance – 4 .906 -.182 
Risk Perception - 1 -.317 .797 
Risk Perception - 2 -.311 .854 
Risk Perception - 3 -.118 .503 
Risk Perception - 4 -.064 .703 
 
Table B.3: Factor Analysis in the China Sample 
Item Relevance Risk Perception 
Relevance – 1 .748 -.295 
Relevance – 2 .716 -.152 
Relevance – 3 .837 -.196 
Relevance – 4 .837 -.113 
Risk Perception - 1 -.391 .707 
Risk Perception - 2 -.194 .838 
Risk Perception - 3 -.251 .698 
Risk Perception - 4 -.018 .814 
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5 A CASE STUDY OF THE DEAF EFFECT OCCURRING IN AN 
IS PROJECT STATUS REPORTING SYSTEM 
5.1 MOTIVATION 
In the previous chapters, the Deaf Effect was studied at the individual level of analysis. 
In chapter 2, a basic model of the Deaf Effect was created and an examination was 
made as to whether this model could explain why a decision maker would not respond to 
a report of bad news by changing the current course of action. It was seen that the 
perceived Relevance or importance of the report of bad news was strongly related to the 
willingness to change the course of action. In chapter 3, I expanded this model by 
examining the decision maker’s individual perceptions of the Role Prescription of the bad 
news reporter and risk involved in the project combined with his Risk Propensity. In 
chapter 4, I expanded that research to include the effects of the social environment in 
terms of individuals’ perceptions of national culture variables. In this paper, I move from 
the individual level effects to examine organizational effects on the occurrence of the 
deaf effect.  
When we move to the organizational level, we shift our attention from the psychology of 
the individual social actors to the actions of the role-positions that are occupied by social 
actors and the institutional structures that condition their action. We are not so much 
interested in what occurs within the minds of the role incumbents as we are with the 
effects of organizational structures and culture upon them that impel them toward certain 
actions. Thus we want to analyze the structures and culture with a view toward 
understanding how they affect the behavior of role occupiers. 
To illustrate this point, at the individual level, I defined the Deaf Effect as when an 
individual decision maker doesn’t hear, ignores or overrules a report of bad news to 
continue a failing course of action. We consider the psychological factors that might 
cause this such as the perceived Credibility and Role Prescription of the bad news 
reporter and the Risk Propensity and Risk Perception of the decision maker. At the 
organizational level, we ask what organizational factors might cause the report of bad 
news to be ignored or overruled by decision makers.  I therefore look at several 
organizational level situations that might cause the phenomenon to occur. For example: 
as various literature (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Near and Miceli 1995; Tourish and 
Robson 2006) points out, decision makers may surround themselves with those who 
agree with them, the organizational culture may impel them toward a particular decision, 
or managers’ actions may cause bad news reporters to suppress or distort their 
message so that it does not have the impact that it should have. Thus, at the 
organizational level, the Deaf Effect manifests itself in actions by organizational actors 
that  
1) Attenuate the salience of the message so that it does not reach the 
decision maker or 
2) Distort the message so that it loses its status as a report of bad news by 
the time it reaches the decision maker or  
3) Obscure the message by raising the level of “background noise” in the 
environment so that upon reaching the decision maker, it is not heard or 
understood as a report of bad news.  
Examples of these effects are numerous in the literature. For example, messages of bad 
news may be attenuated by “yes men” who filter out messages that they believe 
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management does not want hear (Dunbar and Goldberg 1978). Similarly, overwork and 
stress or an excess of information can create “background noise” that prevents the 
decision maker from hearing bad news (Wissema 2002). Likewise, managerial systems 
and behaviors might cause the reporters of bad news or those who are responsible for 
passing the message along to distort the message in an effort to curry favor or avoid 
retributive behavior (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, Iacovou and Thompson 2007; Snow 
and Keil 2002) 
This definition is distinct from the Mum Effect in that when the Mum Effect occurs, the 
bad news reporter is prevented or dissuaded from transmitting the bad news whereas 
when the Deaf Effect occurs, the report of bad news is transmitted, but either its salience 
is attenuated, the level of background noise rises so that it loses salience or the 
message is distorted so that it is no longer recognized as a report of bad news.  Thus 
organizational forces that suppress the generation of the bad news report are proper 
subjects of Mum Effect analysis. When that message is transmitted, but attenuated, 
obscured or distorted by organizational forces between the transmitter of the report and 
the decision making receiver, this is the Deaf Effect. 
Since I am examining an organizational phenomenon, it is necessary to examine the 
organizational environment in which it occurs. The research questions explored by this 
study are: 
1) What organization structures and forces might cause attenuation, distortion, 
or obscuring of a report of bad news 
Additionally, in the previous chapters, the research was conducted with laboratory 
experiments using student subjects. In laboratory experimentation, the experimenter 
attempts to “close” the field of research to isolate the mechanisms being studied 
(Bhaskar 1998). While this allows the experimenter to focus on the object of study it 
presents an artificial situation that may or may not represent how an effect may occur in 
the “wild”. Omission or inclusion of a “boundary variable” can affect the generalizability of 
the results of the study (Fromkin and Streufert 1976). Additionally, as discussed in 
chapter 3, while student subjects can serve as a proxy for professionals in theory testing 
studies, to test the external validity of the resultant theory it is necessary to use 
professional subjects in a real life setting. Thus while the previous chapters have 
demonstrated the internal validity of the model, this chapter moves to investigate the 
external validity of the model. Thus the questions that are investigated here are  
2) How well does the model of the Deaf Effect examined in the laboratory fit the 
real world occurrences of the Deaf Effect?  
3) What additional variables could be included in the model? 
Therefore, in this chapter, the investigation moves from the laboratory to the field. This 
chapter reports on a study of a project in which there were a series of bad news reports 
within the project that were ignored or overruled and the project went on to fail. 
This chapter first reports on background literature that might have explanatory value for 
the organizational effect; then, the methodology that I used to collect and analyze the 
data. Next, it reports the findings of the study. Following that is a discussion of results 
The final section reports on the conclusions reached. 
5.2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
In this section, I review literature that shed light on organizational factors that might lead 
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to the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.  
The decision maker does not operate in a vacuum. There are organizational forces 
surrounding the decision maker that have an effect on whether he/she receives the 
message or that cause him/her to act differently that he/she would otherwise choose to 
act. I organize these forces into three categories: attenuation, distortion and obscuration.  
5.2.1 Attenuation 
In this situation, organizational factors may cause the salience of a report of bad news to 
be lowered (attenuated) within the organization. For example, managers may establish 
systems to ensure that they only receive a certain kind of information (Tourish and 
Robson 2006). They may not establish formal upward feedback mechanisms and 
encourage, consciously or unconsciously, subordinates to filter out unwelcome 
messages before they reach the leaders (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Manager reaction 
to bad news reports can lead to the occurrence of the Mum Effect, but it can also cause 
reporters of bad news to “turn down the volume” on a report of bad news to the extent 
that it loses salience. 
In other literatures, we see that the existence of groupthink, when a group of people 
share opinions and assess situations in the same manner (Wissema 2002), can be an 
organizational characteristic that could cause organizational deafness. Groupthink forms 
when a homogenous team is unchanged for a long period (Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Wissema 2002).  Groupthink tends to cause rigidity of response which is acceptable for 
routine problems but leads to difficulties when the decision making team encounter novel 
or ill-defined problems (Filley, et al. 1976; Janis 1972). Groupthink may also be 
exacerbated by the presence of “yes-men.” Managers might surround themselves with 
those who agree with them. The “yes-men” filter out messages that disagree with the 
situation as perceived by the managers thus preventing the message from reaching the 
decision makers with the consequence that bad news reports are not acted on (Dunbar 
and Goldberg 1978). This not only reinforces the groupthink, but also leads to the 
situation in which management perceives the situation much differently from those at a 
lower level in the organization. 
Additionally, appropriate information may not be available to identify whether a crisis is 
occurring either through lack of information systems or organizational silence (Tourish 
and Robson 2006; Wissema 2002). Bureaucratic organizations in general suppress the 
effectiveness of whistle-blowing unless there are formal mechanisms to encourage 
internal whistle-blowing that operate as described. Thus a low bureaucracy organization 
or a bureaucratic organization with a formal whistle blowing mechanism will tend to 
respond more favorably to whistle blowing than a bureaucratic organization with no 
formal mechanism (Near and Miceli 1995).  
Similarly, Near and Miceli’s(1995) model of whistle-blowing effectiveness describes the 
effect of organizational structure and values on the ability of the whistle-blower to effect 
change in organizational behavior. They argue that the organizational characteristics 
that affect the organization’s willingness to change direction or behavior in response to 
whistle-blowing include the perceived appropriateness of whistle-blowing; the climate of 
support/non-support of whistle blowing; and the level of bureaucracy in the organization 
structure. Appropriateness refers to the situation that arises when the organization views 
whistle blowing as a legitimate response to problems. Where whistle blowing is viewed 
as a legitimate function, the organization is more likely to change its behavior; whistle 
blowing is part of the ethical culture of the organization.  
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The organizational climate refers to whether an organization encourages or discourages 
either the wrongdoing or blowing the whistle. In terms of the Deaf Effect, it refers to 
whether the organization encourages or discourages maintenance of the current course 
of action. Where the current course of action is held to be the approved method of 
operation, whistle blowing is held to be less effective in changing the current course of 
action.  
5.2.2 Distortion 
By distortion, I refer to a change in the content of the message to make the message 
more acceptable to the recipient. It can also add linguistic cues designed to make the 
decision maker perceive the report of bad news as less serious than it actually is. Snow 
and Keil (2002) and Snow, Keil and Wallace (2007) have indicated that the true status of 
a project to be reported is distorted by first, errors in understanding of the actual status 
and then by bias. The direction of this bias is held to be twice as likely to be in an 
optimistic direction as a pessimistic one (Snow, et al. 2007). This positive distortion of 
the report of bad news results in a softening of the impact or a reduction in the 
perception of the seriousness of the problem to the decision maker causing it to appear 
less serious to the decision maker.  
Even when formal feedback seeking mechanisms are implemented, management may 
create a climate for distortion of bad news messages through their reaction to the bad 
news (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Similarly when management attempts to force 
upward feedback by intrusive supervision, distortion of reports of bad news is likely to 
occur (Athanassiades 1973; Smith, et al. 2005). 
Smith, Iacovou and Thompson (2007) have reported on a multiple case study of 9 
projects reporting to an IT oversight board (ITOB).  Utilizing regulatory theory (Scholz 
1984; Scholz 1991), they found that auditors and reporters assess each other’s signals 
in their dealings with each other and based on their perception of the meaning of the 
signals adopted a certain strategy. The auditors could adopt a “conciliatory” or “ 
adversarial” strategy and the reporters could adopt a “full reporting” or “misreporting” 
strategy. These signals can be distorted by “noise pollution” caused by ineffective 
signaling. These studies illustrates that the signals used by auditors can affect the 
reporting strategy of the bad news reporter resulting in distortion of the message into 
one which does not communicate a serious problem to the decision maker which could 
cause the Deaf Effect. 
5.2.3 Obscuring 
An unclear organizational structure or weak culture could also lead to occurrence of the 
Deaf Effect (Wissema 2002). Where there is an unclear division of responsibilities, 
signals indicating problems in a project can be missed as managers assume that others 
are attending to those signals. A weak culture does not provide guidance to the bad 
news reporter as to how or to whom to report bad news. This could result in the signal 
being lost in wrangling over how to respond or who is to respond to the signal, a 
misdirection of the bad news report or even its suppression (Mum Effect). 
Alternately, one manager may be overwhelmed and ignore the signal or may have so 
many things to attend to that the report may be lost or ignored in the clutter (Wissema 
2002). Similar effects may result from stress and exhaustion. 
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5.3 METHODOLOGY 
To address my proposed research questions, I performed a case study of a project 
status reporting process employed by a State Government IS organization (SISO) in the 
southeastern USA. This project status reporting system requires “critical” IT projects, 
projects with budgets over $1 million, to report status to an executive panel on a periodic 
basis to ensure that these projects progress satisfactorily. The process also requires 
agencies with projects over $5 million to hire an Independent Verification and Validation 
(IV&V) Vendor who audits their project processes. The project report and the IV&V 
report are then reviewed at an Executive Critical Panel Review (ECPR) meeting with the 
state’s COO, CFO, CIO and Director of the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB).  
My relationship with the subject organization limited the choice of methodologies that 
could be employed. As part of the nature of our study agreement, I did not have access 
to become a participant or participant observer into the process. Thus ethnographic 
studies were not available as a method for this research as they require immersion of 
the researcher in the environment to gain a “native” understanding of the cultural context 
in order to translate the meaning of the culture to those reading his/her account (Prasad 
1997). I therefore performed a case study of this process.  Case study is appropriate in 
situations where the phenomenon is “broad and complex” and where the phenomenon 
cannot be examined outside of its context (Dube and Pare 2003). In this situation, the 
project status reporting process as described below is a multi-step process and could 
not be examined outside of its context.  
5.3.1 Site Selection 
To research the influence of organizational structures on the Deaf Effect, I needed to 
have a research site in which there would be 1) reports of project problems; and 2) a 
series of organizational interactions before the report of bad news reaches the decision 
maker in order to surface organization message attenuation, distortion or obscuring. The 
SISO project reporting process described below satisfied both of those requirements. It 
was instituted in order to surface project problems so that they can be identified and 
corrected to ensure that projects successfully complete. It also satisfies the second 
condition by the sequential process of reviews. Within the context of reviews there are a 
number of opportunities for the messages of bad news to be attenuated, distorted or 
obscured. I gained access to the site based on SISO’s desire to have the process 
audited. SISO had invested significant resources in developing the process and it 
consumed substantial resources in operating. They desired to have the process 
reviewed to ensure that it was effective and to understand how to make it more effective. 
They were also concerned about “surprises” that occurred in the process; where 
progress was reported to be good but the ultimate results were less than that reported.  
I examined three projects that were tracked in that process. In two projects, Alpha and 
Beta, there were no occurrences of the Deaf Effect nor were there adverse surprises in 
the reporting project status to the ECPR panel. In the third project I examined, Gamma, 
there were occurrences of the Deaf Effect and there was a major surprise. Project Alpha 
is an in-progress project; a major effort by the state Health Services department to 
implement a new outsourced health care claims processing system that will result in the 
replacement of one outsourced vendor with another. The vendor was to provide the 
software and operate the service for the state. It is anticipated that the vendor will go 
through a two-year period of developing modifications to their standard system to meet 
the state requirements prior to implementation in 2010. During the time of my analysis, it 
went through an extended RFP process and the beginning of the design and 
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development process. Project Beta was also an in-progress project to develop and 
implement a new system to track the progress of children under supervision by the state 
Department of Human Services. In this project, a vendor team had modified packaged 
software and worked with an Agency project team to implement the software in each of 
the school districts in the state. This project was in the final implementation stages when 
I observed its status reporting process. Project Beta had experienced a serious problem 
with vendor performance subsequent to its first pilot installation that resulted in action by 
members of the ECPR panel.  The third project, Gamma, was a completed project, a 
turn-key student information system development project for the state education 
department which sought to extract information from information systems in the school 
districts to build a student information database. In this project, an RFP was issued for 
the turn-key development project, a vendor team was selected, commercial software 
was customized and development completed. The project team and IV&V reported this 
project as being on track until the first production rollout at which point it was found to be 
seriously defective. Following a year-long remediation effort, this project was complete at 
the time of the data collection. 
In the discussion that follows, I analyze the third project, Gamma, as it is the project that 
exhibited the Deaf Effect. The other two projects, Alpha and Beta are included to project 
contrasting examples of projects in the same environment in which the Deaf Effect did 
not occur.  
5.3.2 Data Collection 
Data collection took place from April, 2007 to July, 2008 and was accomplished by use 
of interviews and observation. I interviewed all the ECPR critical panel members, all 
SISO attendees of the ECPR meetings, the project managers and the IV&V personnel 
as well as other stakeholders in SISO and the agencies. The interviews with the critical 
panel members were arranged by the SISO director and lasted 30-40 minutes each. I 
directly arranged the interviews with the SISO, project and IV&V personnel. Table 5.1 
shows the interviewees and their roles (pseudonyms are used for all names to ensure 
anonymity). All formal interviews were recorded. Due to sensitivity of the conversations, 
two interviewees requested that the recorder be turned off part way through the 
interview. For these and for informal interviews that occurred ad hoc during the course of 
the study, notes were taken as soon as possible during the interview and these 
summaries of the interviews were made as quickly as possible after the occurrence. I 
used snowball sampling to acquire interview subjects. When it was discovered that the 
Deaf Effect had occurred in project Gamma, additional interviews were scheduled to get 
a more in depth perspective of the project events. A total of 19 people were interviewed 
in 24 interviews resulting in18 hours and 35 minutes of recordings across all three 
projects. I interviewed the SISO personnel, key members of the project teams and the 
ECPR members.  
Table 5.1: Interviewee types and Number of Interviews 
Code Role Number of 
Interviews 
Alan State COO, ECPR Panel member 1 
Waylon State CFO, ECPR Panel Member 1 
Toby Director, Office of Planning and 
Budget, ECPR Panel Member 
1 
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Phillip SISO Director, State CIO, ECPR 
Critical Panel 
1 
Patsy Deputy CFO, ECPR Member 1 
Sherman SISO Critical Panel Facilitator 2 
Harvey CIO, County 1 School District 1 
Oswald CIO, County 2 School District 1 
Robert Project Alpha Executive Project 
Director 
1 
Lee Project Beta Executive Project 
Director 
1 
Forrest Project Gamma Executive Project 
Director 
1 
Jackson Project Gamma, Technical Project 
Manager 
1 
Thomas CIO Project Gamma 1 
Braxton Contractor Project Manager 1 
Dolores IV&V Project Gamma 3 
Joaquin IV&V Project Gamma 3 
Frederick CIO, Project Alpha 1 
Ambrose SISO Critical Panel 1 
Isabella SISO Critical Panel Member 1 
 
I used a semi-structured interview approach using a set of questions developed for each 
interview. The initial questions were formed around the theories that informed the 
background investigation of the original study and organizational factors that affect the 
formation of the Deaf Effect. For example, from the organizational communication 
literature I sought to identify how the reports of bad news were received within the 
projects or the status reporting process (Tourish and Robson 2006). From the whistle-
blowing effectiveness literature, I examined the organizational climate regarding bad 
news reporting and willingness to respond to bad news (Near and Miceli 1995). I 
examined the nature of the interactions in the status reporting process to see if there 
were conditions that might cause distortion of the message (Athanassiades 1973; Scholz 
1991; Smith, et al. 2005).  
Observation was accomplished by attendance at the regularly scheduled meetings. I sat 
in an inconspicuous location and observed the subjects discussed, seating 
arrangements and style of interaction. I was an observer, not a participant in the 
meeting. Careful notes were taken during the meetings. I did not focus on any particular 
area but simply recorded the events, topics and tone of the conversation as it occurred. 
The meetings observed are listed in table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Data Collection Meetings 
Type of Data Collection Number of Interviews or 
Observations Made 
ECPR Meetings Observed 9 
SISO Critical Panel meetings 
Observed 10 
Dashboard Creation Cycles 
Observed 1 
 
A total of 20 meetings were observed. 
During the various observation and interview sessions various documents were collected 
such as copies of the dashboards, meeting agendas, project descriptions, and reports. 
Observation and interview notes, transcripts and documents collected were stored in 
notebooks in chronological order forming a project database.  
5.3.3 Data Analysis Phases 
In analyzing the data, I employed the following process. For the interview data, I listened 
carefully to the recordings and made transcripts of them. I then carefully read through 
the transcript data. I extracted sections of each transcript and placed them in word 
documents under a category title corresponding to the concept describing their contents. 
I then reviewed the text sections under each category to ensure consistency by 
rearranging them and creating new categories as necessary. For the observational data, 
I reviewed the notes taken at each meeting to identify common patterns and events. 
These data were incorporated into the analysis of the transcript data.  
I examined the data for the structure of each project in terms of governance and, method 
of reporting for the SISO project status reporting process. For each project, I constructed 
the actual method by which the dashboard was created for submission to the SISO staff. 
I also reviewed the data on the background of the project managers and the conduct of 
the various review meetings that occurred during the process.  
I then created a history of each of the projects constructed from comments made by all 
interviewees. Recognizing that project Gamma had several occurrences of the Deaf 
Effect during its history, I focused on this project to identify the organizational and 
reporting environment around the project to see if any of those conditions might have 
induced the occurrence of the Deaf Effect.  
5.4 FINDINGS 
In this section, I report the findings of the study. First, I discuss the structure of the 
projects including a discussion of the project manager, the project’s relationship with the 
IV&V vendor, and its steering committee structure. Then, the SISO ECPR process as 
designed by SISO and as observed in practice is described including how each project 
constructs the dashboard document. Finally, a history of each project is given with a 
focus on project Gamma.  
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5.4.1 Structure of the Projects 
The state government is headed by the elected Governor, who in this southeastern 
state, appoints a Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). All 
non-constitutional agencies (not headed by an elected official) report to one of these two 
C level executives. The financial agencies report to the CFO, the others to the COO. The 
Governor exerts direct control over these agencies. While the constitutional agencies 
nominally report to the Governor, in practice they run as independently of the Governor 
as possible, especially if the office holder is of the opposite political party. In this study, 
two of the agencies involved report to the COO, the third, project Gamma, is a 
constitutional office holder. In projects Alpha and Beta, the Executive Project Director of 
the project reported to a CIO. In project Gamma, the Executive Project Director 
functioned as a CIO in addition to his other responsibilities. 
5.4.1.1. Project Manager 
Project Alpha. The Executive Project Director (EPD) for project Alpha, Robert, was an 
experienced IT project manager. Formerly the Director of Operations for SISO, he had 
entered the state government in 1997 as a consultant for Keane managing 278 
consultants responsible for all the Y2K activities for the state and eventually became 
director of operations for SISO managing 600 people. Earlier in his career, he had been 
project manager for Unisys implementing similar systems for other states (Interviewee 
Robert, EPD Project Alpha). 
Project Beta. The Executive Project Director, Lee, was a SISO employee. When this 
project was begun, SISO sourced and provided project managers to agencies if they 
needed an experienced trained program manager and did not have or could not recruit 
one on their own. SISO would provide a project manager on a chargeback basis to the 
agencies. This process has now been discontinued as a cost saving measure 
(interviewee Phillip, SISO Director). This project director was hired from Deloitte and had 
experience with five other similar projects (Interviewee Lee,EPD, Project Beta). 
Project Gamma. The Executive Project Director of project Gamma, Forrest, was an 
academic with some previous IT consulting experience. While his IT experience was 
primarily in the banking arena, he held an M.S. in CIS and an Ed.D. in Educational 
Information Systems. He had worked with the Agency Commissioner in other roles and 
after the Commissioner assumed her current position, he was recruited to be the 
executive director while an assistant professor at a state college.  
Forrest was considered to be supremely confident in his ability and power. In his 
interactions with the project steering committee, he was considered to be arrogant and 
condescending to them (Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project 
Manager). As the project went along he was viewed as promoting himself more than the 
project (Interviewees Jackson,Project Gamma Technical Project Manager and Harvey, 
CIO, County 1 School district). Forrest was considered to be very knowledgeable but 
control oriented, as Sherman (SISO ECPR facilitator) indicated 
… he was a guy who liked to be in control, he was a guy who thought he knew 
everything that was going on, that he could control all those pieces on the board 
and there was a big scene that he was going to come out the victor in.  I don’t 
think there was any necessarily deceit on his part.  … I think he knew what he 
was doing.  I think Forrest understood, definitely understood education, definitely 
understood the laws, definitely understood what they had to do from a 
requirements perspective, knew a lot of the policy so he had a very good 
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understanding of the environment.  I don’t know how well, … he understood the 
technology … (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR facilitator). 
5.4.1.2. Steering Committee Structure and Commissioner Involvement 
Each project maintained a steering committee to provide advice and direction to the 
project. Those of projects Alpha and Beta were similar in composition and role, while 
that of Gamma varied significantly. 
Project Alpha. The Project Alpha Project Governance body was composed of very high 
ranking people from the Agency and SISO. It included the Agency Chief of Staff, CIO, 
the Medical Policy Chief, CFO, Chief Legal Officer, Inspector General, and the state 
CIO. This committee meets monthly and receives a more detailed project review than 
the ECPR (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha). The Commissioner or her 
representative attended all meetings of the ECPR. 
Project Beta. Project Beta’s Executive Steering Committee was also composed of very 
high-ranking people from the Agency and SISO. The Commissioner and two Deputy 
Commissioners of the Agency, the Agency CIO, the state CIO and Director of SISO 
Project Management Office and the policy analyst from the Office of Planning and 
Budget were members of the committee. This committee met monthly and received a 
status report from the Executive Project Director. The IV&V and the Executive Project 
Director briefed the Commissioner on project status each month. 
Project Gamma. This steering committee was substantially different from that of the 
other projects studied. In those projects, it was a high-ranking policy making and 
involved decision body for the project. In project Gamma, while it had 29 members and 
the Chief Deputy, the Agency head responsible for policy, the Education Policy Advisor 
from the Governor’s office, and a Deputy Director of SISO as members, it was largely 
populated with subordinates of district CIOs and other district employees. The steering 
committee was a therefore relatively informal body that was largely used to discuss 
requirements. As the project progressed, the body met more and more infrequently. 
(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District) The Commissioner and deputy 
Commissioners received their information about the project from the executive project 
director (Interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma, and Delores, IV&V Projects Alpha 
and Gamma) and did not attend the ECPR meetings on a regular basis (Interviewee 
Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). Unlike other projects the IV&V contractor did not 
have access to the Commissioner (Interviewee Delores, IV&V Projects Alpha and 
Gamma).  
5.4.1.3. Relationship Between the Project and  the Independent Verification 
and Validation Vendor (IV&V) 
IV&V was a contracted relationship between the agency and an independent consulting 
firm. SISO contracted with the IV&V consultancy and then billed the charges back to the 
agency. IV&V is perceived by the agencies to be very expensive. (Interviewee Phillip, 
SISO Director). The process that the IV&V followed to collect the data that they used for 
their analysis was to attend major project management meetings in which project status 
was discussed. They also collected appropriate documents and met with the project 
managers independently of the meetings in order to collect additional data where there 
were gaps in their understanding of the project status or plans. As part of their 
attendance at the meetings, they would offer feedback on the project management 
practices and suggestions for improvement. The focus of the analysis of the IV&V was 
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based on the internal practices of the project and on meeting both work and budget 
related milestones, organizational readiness for implementation and risk and issue 
management (Interviewees Dolores, IV&V Project Gamma and Joaquin, IV&V Project 
Gamma). They did not collect any data from users as to the level of fit of the system with 
their requirements (Interviewee Dolores, IV&V Project Gamma). Nor did they include any 
review of project outputs for fit with implementation. Thus they sought to monitor project 
behaviors rather than outcomes. The implicit theory employed is that if the behaviors are 
correct then the results will be correct. This focus resulted in at least three projects 
where requirements definition errors were uncovered in the ECPR meetings. In project 
Epsilon, a fixed asset tracking system, at an ECPR meeting it was discovered that as the 
system was about to be implemented, there was a requirement to track several 
thousand vehicles that had not been considered before. Similarly, in project Beta, the 
conversion program specification inaccuracies were only discovered in a pilot test. 
Finally, in project Gamma, the system developed was totally inadequate for the needs of 
the users. This was only discovered after a pilot had been completed. 
The project managers had a uniformly positive view of the IV&V vendor (Interviewees 
Forrest, EPD Project Gamma,Robert, EPD Project Alpha, Lee,EPD, Project 
Beta,Thomas, CIO Project Gamma, and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). Instead 
of being a simple auditor, the IV&V functioned additionally as a consultant that provided 
value to the project. The project directors looked for the IV&V to be an active participant 
in the project:  
You know almost every time the IV&V vendor takes a position of such independence 
that they become not a team member, OK? And so, what I counsel them on is 
look guys, you know,... your input is valuable to us but you can't just sit back and 
point fingers and then write a document a week later. You know, what you've got 
to do is bring these issues up in meetings and become part of an active 
communicator within the team meetings that we're having. You're one of the 
team. Your view is independent, but consider yourself to be one of the team with 
the rest of the team members seeing that you're making a contribution. What 
we've done is we've run all our processes that we've defined for managing the 
project, … by IV&V for input before we finalize them. Especially, [Dolores], I 
mean she has great ideas. … [You] get a lot farther if the IV&V person is on the 
team and just contributing you know. So that’s the relationship that we built with 
all of our IV&V. (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha).  
There was some concern about “going native” in the projects: 
Well, there are some going native …  It actually happened in a couple of cases.  I 
could see it in the Paris project, where the IV&V was more …[an] agency-aligned 
person.  And then we even had one, on the AMP project, where the agency head 
actually changed our contract without us knowing about it to tell the IV&V what 
they needed to do in a couple of cases.  So I think it should remain [the way] it is 
now with an IV&V contract with GTA, not with the agency. (SISO Interviewee 
Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator) 
This idea of being part of the team resulted in a motivation to resolve any differences 
between the project and the IV&V vendor. This resulted in construction of dashboards of 
great similarity. 
Well, you know, [having the project dashboard different from the IV&V dashboard] is 
obviously a concern. You don't want that. Now, so you've got to manage that. 
You got to manage that so that doesn't occur. If you don't do that, then you're not 
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doing your job. Once again, its gets back to you know sometimes you get to a 
point where there's just a difference of opinion on something and I've run over 
there with those and Dolores' in the red and I'm …in the yellow and I'll just put my 
position on the table, she puts hers on the table. That’s the way we go. You try 
not to have that be the scenario. (Interviewee Robert, EPD Project Alpha) 
You try not to be too out of sync because then you go in and it's like, "Why is there 
the difference"?  Either IV&V is not talking to the agency and explaining and 
recommending in all of that to the agency or the agency has a reason for them 
not accepting it, but IV&V still feels strongly about it.  Hopefully, you don't have 
that type of an issue.  (Interviewee Dolores, IV&V Projects Alpha and Gamma). 
One ECPR member noticed that there is a “melding” between the dashboards produced 
by the IV&V and the projects. 
…  I'd say what I've noticed is a kind of melding of the grading and the evaluations by 
the IVV and the departments. I think that's positive. I don't think a little 
contention's bad because that's substantially the reason for the IVV. And 
sometimes the IVV can be a little too negative frankly there. That's somewhat 
their job. (Interviewee Alan, State COO, ECPR member).  
The ECPR panelists had a generally good perception of IV&V although they also viewed 
the IV&V as not being perfect.  
I'm not necessarily [going to] take IV&V's word for it. I've worked for plenty of 
consultants and you know, that if you're somewhat detached from the situation, 
you may not have all the information, so I don't take one [It] as gospel. You 
know, it’s probably somewhere in the middle…to me it’s more of a general 
indicator rather than anything that you can really bank on. (Interviewee Toby, 
Director, Office of Planning and Budget, ECPR Member) 
I mean you know sometimes maybe the IVV, they take the other side too strongly 
and maybe they should kind of know where you stand. They're not going to 
come in and tell you everything is hunky dory when it’s not but sometimes they'll 
come and point out all the possible flaws and possibilities of things going wrong 
and then you have to … weigh that [with what] with the agency is telling you 
about all the things they don't think they're doing wrong. (Interviewee Alan, State 
COO, ECPR member) 
5.4.2 The SISO Status Reporting Process 
5.4.2.1. History. 
Under state law, SISO has the mandate to prescribe procedures for procurement of 
technology resources and to provide oversight of program management for all large 
(over $1 million) technology projects. Following a major disaster in 2003 with the 
implementation of a Medicaid Management Information System, the Executive Critical 
panel process was created (Interviewees Alan, State COO, ECPR member and Isabella, 
SISO Critical Panel Member). The panel consisted of the state COO, CFO, CIO, and 
Director of the Office of Planning and Budget (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR 
Facilitator). Acquiescence to the process was achieved because most of the agencies 
reporting to the panel reported to members of the panel (Interviewee Isabella, SISO 
Critical Panel Member). Those who did not report to members of the panel but to other 
constitutional officers participated based on the relationship of the officers to the 
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Governor (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). The object of this panel was to 
inform the panel members of the impact that these projects have on the state 
government, to ensure that business drives the technology decisions and to ensure that 
decisions that go across agencies are made in the Governor’s office (SISO 2006).  In 
2004, the state legislature passed a resolution encouraging the departments and 
agencies of the state to engage the services of an IV&V vendor for their information 
technology projects over $1 million and for all procurement activities over $5 million 
(Balfour, Stephens and Johnson 2004). This led to the basic structure of the ECPR. 
Following the project Gamma disaster in 2006, the SISO review meeting was added to 
the process (Interviewee Isabella, SISO Critical Panel Member).  
5.4.2.2. The SIS Project Reporting Process: As Described 
The SISO project reporting process was a multi-stage process centered on the 
development of a “dashboard” reporting document. This document is developed in a 
dialogic process between a project team and the IV&V vendor and then refined through 
a series of reviews with increasingly senior levels of management until it is finally 
reviewed by a C-level executive committee (figure 5.1). The normal time span for one 
cycle of this activity is approximately one month (Interviewee Ambrose, SISO Critical 
Panel).  
As shown in figure 5.1, the Project Status Report Generation Process was described as 
a multi-stage process in which the report of status (dashboard document) and indication 
of problems goes through potentially five iterations before it is reviewed by the Executive 
Critical Panel Review (ECPR). The first stage is the initial creation of the dashboard 
document. The IV&V vendor and project team simultaneously create versions of this 
document and then through interaction between the IV&V vendor and project team, 
discrepancies between the two versions are resolved. The dashboards are then 
reviewed by the business process owner of the project after which they may be revised 
again. The third stage is a review with the executive sponsor. Following this review, the 
documents may be revised again. The fourth stage is the review with the SISO executive 
leaders, following which the documents may be revised again. The final review is the 
ECPR panel meeting in which state government C-level executives review the project in 
terms of both dashboards to determine the impacts on other projects, ensure that 
business needs are met, and ensure that cross-agency decisions are made by the 
Governor’s office (SISO 2006). 
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the SISO Project Status Report Generation Process 
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5.4.2.3. The SISO Project Reporting Process: As Executed in the Projects 
In the three projects that I examined, I did not find that the process as described in 
5.4.2.2 held. While there were interactions at the project level, I did not observe any 
interaction as described in the process above the project level. In project Alpha, the data 
for the dashboards were developed primarily at regular weekly project team meetings 
held immediately prior to the due date of the dashboards. I observed that the IV&V and 
project personnel created the dashboard document separately and a meeting was held 
to compare the documents. At this meeting minor changes were made to the project 
dashboard. These changes were made because the program manager wished to add 
some detail. No changes were made to the IV&V dashboard. This meeting was held the 
day that the dashboard documents were due to SISO.  
We meet with our IV&V vendor before those meetings with GTA and the Governor's 
panel. And there are sometimes when we're in disagreement. And so we discuss 
that before hand and understand each other's position. We don't make an 
attempt to… [change] to the way that IV&V is perceiving things but we do tell 
them if we disagree with something that they put in there. And they have made 
changes... and so have we, its gone both ways. You know we've come up with a 
yellow and they say no, this is really red and so we'll sit and say you're really 
right and we'll go with them. So we... there's collaboration that takes place 
between us and IV&V (Alpha Program Manager, Robert, EPD Project Alpha).  
IV&V Interviewee Dolores informed me that the documents would be sent over to the 
SISO personnel with a copy sent to the Commissioner. A meeting might be held with the 
Commissioner prior to the Critical Panel meeting if necessary but no revision to the 
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Figure 5.2: The Dashboard Creation and Review Process in Projects Alpha and Beta 
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dashboard was done. Between the SISO review and the ECPR meeting, no revision is 
done unless the SISO meeting and the ECPR meeting occurs in different months (figure 
5.2).  
With regard to project Beta, the process seemed to be almost identical. I observed that 
the IV&V and dashboard was created on the date that it was due and a copy was sent to 
the project manager. I was informed by Lee that he usually got the IV&V dashboard and 
if there were no issues, he would copy it and forward it to the SISO personnel. However, 
the dashboards submitted to the process were not identical and often showed variation 
in the colors. Interviewee Dolores indicated that the project dashboard was usually sent 
over a day or two late.  
In both of those projects, there was a notable drive to not be too “out of sync” with the 
IV&V person on the project: 
You try not to be too out of sync because then you go in and it's like, "Why is there 
the difference"?  Either IV&V is not talking to the agency and explaining and 
recommending in all of that to the agency or the agency has a reason for them 
not accepting it, but IV&V still feels strongly about it.  Hopefully, you don't have 
that type of an issue. (IV&V Interviewee Delores, IV&V Projects  
Alpha and Gamma) 
The development of the “dashboard” document was definitely perceived as a secondary 
activity. The project managers of Alpha and Beta indicated that they had other status 
reporting mechanisms that they used and that the dashboards were constructed from 
those. Additionally, I observed that the dashboard documents were developed at the last 
minute before the due dates and were often delivered slightly late (less than 24 hours).  
In project Gamma, the process was different. At the time that this project was running 
(2004-2006), there was no separate review by the SISO staff (Interviewees Isabella, 
SISO Critical Panel Member and Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator) and the 
Commissioner was not required to attend the ECPR meetings and in fact her attendance 
was spotty (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). There were project team 
meetings similar to those in projects Alpha and Beta. IV&V attended all project 
management meetings. There was a “big meeting” with a large number of people and a 
smaller meeting with just the PMs and IV&V. Following those, the project management 
subcontractor created a dashboard document and sent it to an agency manager who 
used it created an agency version of the dashboard (Interviewees Braxton, Contractor 
Project Manager, and Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager).  IV&V 
created a version and this version and the project version were reviewed in a meeting 
with the IV&V vendor, Agency policy manager, Project Manager and Executive Project 
Director (Interviewees Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager, Dolores, 
IV&V Project Gamma, and Joaquin, IV&V Project Gamma). After this meeting 
adjustments were made in the documents as agreed in the meeting and the Executive 
Project Director would update the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner by himself 
(Interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma, Dolores, IV&V Projects Alpha and Gamma, 
and Joaquin, IV&V Project Gamma).  
During the development timeframe, serious problems became known with the 
functionality of the software provided by the software contractor as well as with their 
performance to schedule (Interviewees Braxton, Contractor Project Manager, and 
Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). Apparently, the schedule 
performance of the subcontractor was discussed in the project team meetings and was 
picked up by the IV&V but the functionality issues were not. These issues were 
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discussed during at least one juncture with the Agency project management including 
the option to stop the project, but no change in direction was made (Interviewee Braxton, 
Contractor Project Manager).  
The reporting process used in project Gamma is shown in figure 5.3.  
 
As a last note on the status reporting, a desire on the part of the Project Directors to 
control the message about the status of the project was observed. At the end of our 
observation period, SISO introduced a one-page status document to be provided to the 
ECPR members to reduce the level of effort required ECPR members to gain an 
understanding of the status. SISO proposed to generate this document based on the 
dashboard documents provided by the projects. Robert, EPD Project Alpha, expressed a 
desire to create the document himself as opposed to reviewing the document generated 
by SISO so that he could ensure that the message he wanted to send was conveyed. 
Similarly, Forrest attempted to control all the messages going out of the Gamma project. 
He was the only team member to communicate to the Commissioner and her deputy. 
Likewise, he controlled the conversation at the ECPR meetings (Interviewee Jackson, 
Project Gamma Technical Project Manager).  
5.4.3 A History of the Projects 
During the timeframe of the study, project Alpha began and project Beta terminated. 
project Gamma had terminated its first phase and was preparing for its second phase. 
5.4.3.1. Project Alpha 
Figure 5.3: The Dashboard Creation and Review Process in Project Gamma 
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At the beginning of our observation of the process, project Alpha was at the close of the 
procurement stage. An RFP had been issued. A decision had been made, the contract 
negotiated and the agency was waiting for a federal government approval on the award 
and contract amount. This approval was withheld until the end of 2007. During that time 
period, the panel was used to discuss how to involve the Governor or the COO to 
resolve the issues. After Notice of Intent to Award was issued at the end of January, 
2008, the losing vendor protested the award, the protest was denied and the project 
finally began in the April, 2008 time period. The plan is for a two year design-
development-implement with an implementation date of July, 2010.  
5.4.3.2. Project Beta 
At the beginning of the study in June, 2007, project Beta had completed development 
and was approaching deployment of the system at a pilot in one county. The biggest 
concern was with the data conversion from an old system to the new system. The 
schedule was very aggressive to implement by mid 2008 with no slack. After the pilot 
implementation, there were over 100 defects in the conversion process noted, and no 
mitigation plan was in place. By October, there were still problems with the conversion 
vendors. A repeatable process was not in place and there was discussion in the ECPR 
meeting that the vendors needed to have a meeting with the Governor or the state COO 
to explain why their performance was so poor. The project director indicated that they 
had taken a driving role with the vendor to get the conversion done. A decision was 
made to give them another chance before bringing the vendors to the Governor. In 
November, the situation had improved; they were preparing for a two county pilot and 
believed that the conversion had been reduced to a repeatable process. By January, the 
conversion issues had been resolved and the two county pilot was successful. At the 
February panel meeting, the first mass rollout of 72 counties was successful and they 
spent time discussing lessons learned from the project. By April the second rollout had 
been successfully accomplished, the last rollout was planned for June, 2008 and the 
handover to the Agency operations staff was being discussed.  
5.4.3.3. Project Gamma 
This was not the first attempt to develop a student information system. Various attempts 
had been made over the past 20 years (Interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). 
The immediate past attempt was in 1998,  
[It was created] with the idea that we would have one student management system 
for every district in the state and that was put through RFP and everything and 
SAP won that. And after 8 months, they hadn't gotten one district working. So [if 
that were] …extrapolated out to 181 districts we were looking at 181 years and 
they took a look at the project and it was shelved. So there had been 
considerable, especially [among] the people in the legislature who had been 
there that long, … expectations placed and expectations not delivered upon so 
when we got to this iteration of the project, it was almost deemed as a failure to 
begin with (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). 
This is amplified by the former Governor: 
… the state spent at least $85 million on unsuccessful earlier efforts, including one 
championed by Gov. [X] when he was Governor. 
"I spent $50 million trying to put together a student information system that would 
work, and it frustrated the heck out of me," said Mr. [X], (Dillon 2006). 
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The Beginning of the Project. This particular effort began in 2003 when $14.5 million 
was set aside to develop the system (Dillon 2006). This system was to be constructed to 
respond more effectively to requirements from the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and 
to replace a set of technologically obsolete legacy systems (Interviewee Thomas, CIO 
Project Gamma). The executive project director, Forrest, was brought in by the new 
agency Commissioner (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District) in July, 2003 
(Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). He was charged to “get the project done” 
within the budget outlined (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma) by December, 
2005 (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). He was given the opportunity to hire a 
staff that was dedicated to this project alone and did not have any other responsibilities 
within the agency. (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The technical project 
manager, Jackson, was hired in November of 2003. The initial steering committee for 
this project was put together by the Governor. It was actually a group of advisors 
including business executives, other state agencies, the school districts and also the 
agency. The committee developed a list of 21 objectives that this project would 
accomplish (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). 
After these goals were established, that steering committee was disbanded and another 
was formed as described in section 5.4.1.2 and at first the project director met often 
with the committee and with the CIO of the state’s largest school district. The exact 
frequency is unknown, however it was described as frequent and very heavy 
(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District). This interaction continued to be 
very heavy until the RFP was issued (interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District). 
Development of the RFP was very rapid. Development started in December 2003 and it 
was released in late February 2004 (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). When 
the bidding process was completed, ContractCo won the contract.  
They were more of the management, [and] oversight and brought in the team. They 
purchased or subcontracted with DatabaseCo, which was at the time the … 
leading database provider for districts’ data warehouses, not state. They were 
getting into the state market. They also contracted with ReportingCo to do the 
reporting piece (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).  
The RFP was very light on technical requirements. It was set at a very high level to allow 
the vendors to supply their knowledge to the project (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project 
Gamma). While the districts had input through the steering committee, most of the 
requirements were provided by Jackson because of his knowledge of data warehousing 
applications (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). Although, the 21 goals of the 
project were included in the RFP they were not stressed to ContractCo and in fact the 
onsite contract personnel did not know what they were until relatively late in the process. 
(Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). 
The RFP was awarded in June, 2004 (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). The 
project used a classical waterfall style software development process (Interviewee 
Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The detailed project plan was submitted in August, 2004 
(Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma).  The requirements statement was 
developed and signed off in the first six months. The design documents were 
developed and signed off in next six months (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project 
Gamma). 
The Development Phase. As development on the new system began, it was recognized 
that the existing legacy systems were “a train wreck”(Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 
School District). While the data collected by the legacy systems was noted for its 
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accuracy (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma), the existing mode of data 
collection from the districts was extremely slow (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 
School District). The legacy systems were placed under the control of Forrest, who 
received the title of CIO for the department, and an effort to improve the performance 
was undertaken as the new system would not be online until 2006 (Interviewee Forrest, 
EPD Project Gamma). Thomas was brought on board the department to be the head of 
legacy applications support and perform this project. This project was very successful. 
The length of time that it took to load the data from the largest district in the state was 
reduced from 15 hours to 35 minutes (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School 
District).  
The development of the new system created strains on the relationship of the project to 
the school districts. The amount of communication between Forrest and the districts 
which at first was very copious (especially Harvey) slowed after the RFP was issued and 
dried up to a trickle. Meetings with the steering committee became less frequent. Also, a 
two-year effort to develop a common data structure for the reporting data was 
abandoned in favor of the data structure provided by the vendor DatabaseCo’s system, 
which caused ill will among the districts (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School 
District). Finally, the new data required by the data warehouse required a revision of the 
files sent from the districts to the central office. This required the districts to work with the 
vendor that provided their student information system to get a new data feed created. 
This was viewed as an “unfunded mandate” placed upon the school districts 
(Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). 
First Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. During 2005, it became obvious that there were 
problems with the product supplied by DatabaseCo. They were missing their due dates, 
often waiting until the last minute to inform ContractCo of the delays (Interviewee 
Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). ContractCo had to provide personnel to 
DatabaseCo in order to try to maintain the project schedule (Interviewee Jackson, 
Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). Additionally, the DatabaseCo system did 
not provide the level of data editing provided by the legacy systems, nor did it have the 
status and error reporting capabilities the legacy systems provided (Interviewees 
Thomas, CIO Project Gamma and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). There were 
several closed-door meetings without the IV&V vendor in which ContractCo pointed out 
to Forrest and Jackson that the DatabaseCo had functional deficiencies such that it 
wouldn’t work as promised. ContractCo management raised the topic of delaying or 
canceling the project (Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager). Forrest chose 
not to respond to these issues. This constitutes an occurrence of the Deaf Effect. 
During this time period, as the project reported to the ECPR panel, the overall project 
was reported as being in “green” status, while the schedule was reported in “yellow” 
status. Serious concerns with the system capabilities were not reported or were 
minimized by Forrest (Interviewees Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager 
and Braxton, Contractor Project Manager).  
Second Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. The project was completed and went to pilot 
test in October 2005. This took the form of partial database loading at a single district. 
While the pilot was successfully completed, Jackson became concerned enough with 
the project performance to raise these concerns to Forrest in an email. The root of his 
concerns was that the project director was over promising and ran the risk of under 
delivering the project. He cited concerns with project communication, the data loading 
process, and operations and maintenance. He felt that more communication was 
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needed with the eventual users to describe the exact features of the system rather than 
simply communicating concepts to the leaders. He was very concerned about the data 
loading routines since the system required 12-20 hours of work to prep the data before 
loading it into the data loading templates. Additionally, the project team was receiving 
push back from the district SIS vendors on preparing the data loading routines for the 
new system. There were additional concerns about the ability to manage the vendor 
relationships in the operational period. Jackson recommended that instead of a full 
rollout that only a small “pilot” group of 20-25 districts be implemented to provide an 
opportunity to identify and correct issues without hurting the project reputation in all the 
districts. (Jackson 2005). Forrest did not accept this advice, saying it was politically 
impossible to back off (interviewees Forrest, EPD Project Gamma and Jackson, Project 
Gamma Technical Project Manager).  This was another occurrence of the Deaf Effect.  
Third Occurrence of the Deaf Effect. Following that pilot, the project was declared 
complete and ready for implementation. The rollout to the districts began in March, 
2006. This took the form of another pilot in which the data loading was done with both 
the legacy and the new system (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma). The 
revamped legacy data loads were much cleaner and much simpler than the new 
system. The lack of edits in the new system and the length of time required to generate 
the data for the loading resulted in significant dissatisfaction at the district level with it. 
At the same time, Jackson wrote a memo to Forrest expressing why he thought that the 
system would fail. Forrest became angry with him and retaliated by cutting him out of 
meetings and information flow (interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project 
Manager). This was the third occurrence of the Deaf Effect.  
Forrest indicated that he did not act on the reports of bad news from Jackson because 
first, it wasn’t politically feasible: 
I think at one time there they wanted to delay the entire process another year and 
[emphasize that this was only a pilot test of the system] and I said, Jackson, you 
have got to understand, politically that is not feasible.  You know because one of 
the things that you learn in government is …first of all any technological system 
has got to be operationally feasible, it has got to be technologically feasible and it 
has got to be economically feasible.  Well when you are dealing in government it 
has got to be political and sometimes political feasibility trumps all and that is just 
a fact of government. [Politically feasible means] you can’t sort of back track 
once you have gotten to a point and said we are at this point, then if you come in 
and back track you don’t back track you fix the problem going forward.  That was 
the point I made (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project Gamma). 
Forrest also believed that Jackson did not see the big picture. He kept Jackson working 
on project Gamma and Thomas working on the legacy systems without any cross project 
communication (Interviewee Forest). So that each never really understood what the 
other was doing. 
 [When Jackson] came on board … we were having tremendous data collection 
problems and he and I were the ones who helped make the decision that …, we 
are going to redo, [not repair the old system].  We just got to make it survive until 
we get this system up.  But then when we brought in Thomas and … they took 
over and started improving it, it [improved] so much … but of course [Jackson 
wasn’t] involved in that, so he had never seen that piece.  Well I had seen both 
sides.  So I felt comfortable with it.  I don’t think [he] ever did (Interviewee 
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Forrest, EPD Project Gamma).  
The “Melt-Down” and De-escalation. The project status changed to red in June, 2006 
due to the fact that there was enough resistance to the system from the users in the 
districts that it was considered to be impossible to hide the poor status from the ECPR 
panel (Interviewee Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager). The ECPR 
took this change in status as an indication of deception (Interviewees Toby, Director, 
Office of Planning and Budget, ECPR Member; Waylon, State CFO, ECPR Member; 
Patsy,Deputy CFO, ECPR Member; Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). They repeatedly 
referenced project Gamma as an example of a project in which they had an unpleasant 
surprise. The following quotes are all responses to a question about whether there were 
any surprises in the reporting to the panel.  
yeah, [project Gamma]. We had been given information all along that project was on 
time and on budget and maybe that’s a little too strong but we had been given 
information that it was OK. It was progressing and turned out that it wasn't OK 
and it wasn't progressing. …We had to escalate it so that [the Commissioner] 
was involved and some of her leadership. That's the one that kind of jumps off 
the page at me that really the information, it wasn't good information basically. 
(Interviewee Alan, State COO, ECPR member) 
Yeah, the one [that] comes to mind [is project Gamma]. There was some scope and 
mission change and creep over time that I'm not quite sure was entirely detected. 
… I didn't discover it, but it coincidentally happened to be about the time that we 
discovered, "whoa, this original concept of student information system and the 
Governor's idea or in the Governor's original vision isn't exactly what we think 
we're seeing." Now it resolved itself and I think we're to a good place. Kind of [a] 
compromise position. But, so that was one.. (Toby, Director, Office of Planning 
and Budget, ECPR Panel Member) 
…[project Gamma] is a good example.  They held back certain pieces of information, 
even during the critical panel, and then when it finally came up, they got blasted. 
(SISO interviewee Sherman, SISO ECPR Facilitator). 
Following the disclosure of the serious problems with project Gamma, a de-escalation 
process was pursued. Forrest decided to change the data loading mechanism from 
using the new method that had proved problematic (Interviewee Forrest, EPD Project 
Gamma). It was determined that they would investigate using the legacy data collection 
mechanism to front end the data warehouse and the state ID system. Over the next two 
months, Thomas planned this activity. Jackson who had led the project effort resigned in 
August, 2006. At about the same time, Forrest stepped down as agency CIO 
(Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).  
Apparently, no communication of this activity was made to the districts, because in 
October, 2006, a delegation went to the deputy Commissioner to protest using the new 
system for the next year’s reporting (Interviewee Harvey, CIO, County 1 School District). 
About the same time, the relationship manager for ContractCo met with the deputy 
Commissioner and reported serious problems with the project as currently structured 
(Interviewee Braxton, Contractor Project Manager).  
Thomas became the agency CIO about that same time. The project then followed a 
course of integrating the legacy data collection with the data warehouse and the ID 
system along with development of additional reports requested by the districts. In doing 
this activity, they expended the funds allocated for the project and completed the project 
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with operational funds (Interviewees Thomas, CIO Project Gamma and Patsy, Deputy 
CFO, ECPR Member).  
Forrest left the employ of the department and returned to his college at the end of 2006. 
The project continued under the direction of Thomas until it was declared complete in 
August 2007 (Interviewee Thomas, CIO Project Gamma).  
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Figure 5.4: Timeline of Project Gamma 
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5.5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this study show two status reporting issues. First, there was distortion of 
status reporting to the ECPR panel in the case of project Gamma. Second, that the Deaf 
Effect occurred in the case of project Gamma while it did not occur in the cases of 
project Alpha and Beta. 
The findings of this study also show that the existing SISO status reporting process is 
dependent upon the voluntary disclosure of information by the projects. Projects Beta 
and Gamma encountered similar problems. How they responded to the problems 
determined the success or failure of the process. Project Beta responded by disclosure 
of the problems to the panel, which led to their resolution. Project Gamma responded by 
a systematic reduction in communication about the problems, which resulted in the 
ultimate failure of the project. Despite the monitoring by the IV&V, the SISO process and 
a steering committee, the project Gamma management was able to avoid disclosure of 
the issues until the first attempt at implementation. This illustrates that the IV&V, which 
acquired its information largely through attendance at various project management 
meetings, was dependent upon the project team in order to get information to assess the 
status of projects. 
Table 5.3 illustrates the differences in the information gathering opportunities between 
projects Alpha and Beta and project Gamma. The Agency Commissioner in projects 
Alpha and Beta was highly involved in the monitoring process as part of the steering 
committee, as a participant in the ECPR process. They also received status reports 
directly from the IV&V vendor. In project Gamma, however, the Agency Commissioner 
was largely left out of the process. SISO was involved in the process as part of the 
steering committee and by virtue of their review meeting prior to the ECPR meeting in 
projects Alpha and Beta. In project Gamma however, GTA was not involved in the 
process. Agency executives and stakeholders populated the steering committee in 
projects Alpha and Beta whereas that of project Gamma was comprised of relatively low-
level stakeholders. 
Table 5.3: Differences Between the Projects 
 Project Alpha Project Beta Project Gamma 
Involvement of 
Commissioner 
Part of Dashboard 
Review Process 
Part of Dashboard 
Review Process 
Oblivious 
(Interviewee 
Harvey, CIO, 
County 1 School 
District) 
GTA Review 
Meeting 
Part of Process Part of Process Not part of process 
Steering Committee Formal, Populated 
with top department 
and SISO personnel 
Formal, Populated 
with top department 
and SISO personnel 
Informal. Populated 
with low-level 
department 
personnel 
(Interviewee 
Harvey, CIO, 
County 1 School 
District). No SISO 
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personnel 
(Interviewee 
Sherman, SISO 
ECPR Facilitator). 
IV&V Participation 
in Project Meetings 
Yes Yes Yes 
Full Disclosure of 
Issues in Project 
Meetings 
Yes Yes No (Interviewee 
Braxton, Contractor 
Project Manager) 
IV&V Access to 
Commissioner 
Yes Yes No (Interviewee 
Joaquin, IV&V 
Project Gamma) 
EPD Agency 
Reporting structure 
To CIO To CIO Acted as CIO, 
reported to 
Commissioner 
State Government 
Relationship 
Reports Directly to 
Governor 
Reports Directly to 
Governor 
Reports to 
Constitutional 
Officer 
Results In process. No 
issues noted. 
Finalizing. Major 
issue occurred in 
7/06 but overcome. 
Finalized in 12/05 
but determined to 
have failed in 10/06.  
 
5.5.1 Distortion of the Message 
The distortion of the status report in project Gamma occurred in the reporting of status of 
project Gamma as “green” during the development and pilot stages of the project, when 
by testimony of the project management (Braxton, Contractor Project Manager and 
Jackson, Project Gamma Technical Project Manager), the status was actually “yellow” or 
“red”. The responsibility for the distortion was placed on Forrest. Table 5.4 displays the 
various theories that were discussed in section 5.2.2 that might cause distortion of the 
message and whether they occurred in project Gamma. 
Table 5.4 – Distortion Causing Conditions in Project Gamma 
Source of 
Distortion 
Theory / 
Source 
Condition in Project Gamma 
Errors of 
Understanding 
Status 
Reporting Bias 
(Snow and Keil, 
2002) 
This condition does not seem to 
exist. Braxton, Jackson, Forrest 
agreed on the facts. They differed 
on the required action. 
Bias in 
Reporting 
Status 
Reporting Bias 
(Snow and Keil, 
2002) 
Upper 
Echelons 
In the history of project Gamma, 
we see evidence of self-efficacy, a 
political interpretation of facts and 
a control fixation.  
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(Hambrick and 
Mason 1984) 
Reaction to 
Management 
Responses to 
Reports of Bad 
News 
Critical Upward 
Communication 
(Tourish and 
Robson 
(2006),Morrison 
and Milliken 
(2000)) 
Forrest had not experienced any 
bad repercussions from reporting 
bad news on this project. The 
actual responses by the ECPR 
and SISO were very encouraging 
as reported by project Beta. 
However, Forrest did not know 
this.  
Intrusive 
Supervision 
Athanassiades 
(1973) 
No evidence exists that show that 
Forrest considered the supervision 
intrusive. 
Adversarial 
Approach by 
Regulators 
Regulatory 
Theory (Scholz 
1984, 1991) 
No evidence exists that an 
adversarial relationship existed 
between IV&V, SISO, or ECPR 
and Forrest.  
 
The table shows that the theories that had been considered in section 5.2.2 do not 
explain the occurrence of distortion in the status report of project Gamma with the 
exception of Snow and Keil’s status reporting theory. Status reporting distortion may 
occur as a result of misunderstanding of the situation (Snow and Keil 2002; Snow, et al. 
2007). This situation did not occur in project Gamma. Jackson and Braxton indicated 
that there were serious problems. Forrest did not disagree with the facts, but rather with 
the seriousness and the proposed solution. Similarly, the responses of supervisors and 
regulators may cause distortion (Athanassiades 1973; Morrison and Milliken 2000; 
Scholz 1984; Scholz 1991; Tourish and Robson 2006). In project Gamma, we do not see 
any adverse responses to bad news by management, IV&V or the ECPR panel to 
Forrest that would cause such distortion. However, the findings do show potential biases 
to reporting in that Forrest considered the situation in which he found himself a highly 
political situation in which he felt he had to control the communications of the project so 
that the project would be viewed correctly. Thus he would bias the reporting in an effort 
to avoid loss of power. 
There is however, another theory which could add additional insight into this situation: 
agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory seeks to 
address the situation in which one party (the principal) delegates work to a second party 
(the agent) under a contractual relationship. Two problems arise under the contract: the 
agency problem where the goals of the principal and agent differ and it is difficult and/or 
expensive for the principal to verify that the agent is fulfilling his desires. This manifests 
itself in two issues: moral hazard in which the agent does not perform as agreed under 
the contract (shirking) and the principal does not have the information or the ability to 
acquire the information to verify the performance of the agent; and adverse selection in 
which the agent misrepresents his abilities in order to get the job and the principal 
cannot verify his statements. The second issue in the agency relationship is risk sharing 
in which the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The object of the 
theory is to identify the most effective contracting mechanism between them; whether 
behavior based or outcome based mechanisms are more effective (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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Two studies have applied agency theory in escalation situations. Harrison and Harrell 
(1993) investigated adverse selection. They found that managers who initiated 
unprofitable projects tended to consider them. This is due to the information asymmetry 
that existed which allow them to hide their incompetence. Where adverse selection did 
not exist, the agents behaved in the interests of the principal. Tuttle, Harrell and Harrison 
(1997) investigated moral hazard conditions in IS implementation situations. They found 
that agency theory predicted the behavior of students in moral hazard situations well. In 
laboratory experiments students indicate willingness to implement systems with known 
quality issues under conditions of moral hazard. This result was tempered with the 
finding that this effect is moderated by the individual’s moral code. In some cases, it 
overrides self-interest to not implement the system.  
In the situation of project Gamma, a definite moral hazard situation existed. Moral 
hazard exists when an agent has an incentive to not perform as expected by the 
principal and information asymmetries exists so that the principal cannot verify the 
performance of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989; Tuttle, et al. 1997). In that project, as 
discussed above, Forrest viewed his position as politically charged and that the 
maintenance of his position required the perception that all was well with the project. 
There was therefore a significant temptation to shirk. Similarly, table 5.5.1 shows that 
significant information asymmetries existed. Forrest controlled the communications 
external to the project so that external entities only received the information he wanted to 
provide them. Project Gamma therefore conforms to an agency theoretic view of project 
reporting. 
Thus in this situation, I suggest that Forrest’s perception of a highly politicized 
environment and need to control the information flow created an incentive to distort the 
status of the project which when combined with the information asymmetries in the 
project created a moral hazard situation resulting in distortion of the project status in the 
reports to the ECPR and the Agency Commissioners.  
5.5.2 Evaluating Project Gamma using the Individual Model from this 
Dissertation. 
The findings of this study showed that the Deaf Effect occurred at least three times in the 
case of project Gamma. This section addresses how well the model developed in 
chapters two through four explains the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in project Gamma 
and then addresses additional factors that could be added to the model that are 
illustrated in the case study. 
The individual model developed in the previous chapters placed the subject in a 
particular organizational environment. For the model to be validly applied, it must first be 
ascertained that that environment existed in this case.  
Four factors were included in the environment used in the scenarios:  
1) External pressures that moved the decision maker to continue the current course 
of action;  
2) A decision maker who could not perform the evaluation on his/her own; 
3) A report of bad news that did not communicate the potential disaster situation in 
terms that unambiguously indicated a coming disaster; 
4) Severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make 
a decision that prevented either evaluation of the situation or cut off alternative 
solutions. 
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There is no direct evidence of Forrest’s superiors constantly pressuring him to deliver. 
However, it is obvious that he felt some pressure. He stated that he had been brought in 
“to make it happen” whereas it had failed twice before. When presented with issues by 
Jackson, he repeatedly stated that it was “politically impossible” to take any alternative 
course. On the second point, Forrest did not have the technical skills to evaluate the 
technical performance of the project. He was reliant upon the representations of others. 
Third, while in retrospect, the warnings of the October, 2005 memo seem very prescient, 
at the time, Forrest may have been able to rationalize continuing by considering them to 
be overblown or perhaps he considered them capable of resolution by other means. 
Lastly, he definitely felt pressure to deliver a system by 12/05, which prevented him from 
considering any other alternatives at that late date.  
Given that the same conditions existed in the case that existed in the experiments, I now 
consider whether the model developed in chapters two, three and four holds in this case. 
Since there was an occurrence of the Deaf Effect, based on the model, we would expect 
that 1) the message of bad news was not considered relevant by the decision maker; 2) 
that there would be a perception of little risk in the project; 3) there would be a 
perception of low credibility in the bad news reporter; and 4) the bad news reporter 
would be not role prescribed to report bad news. 
Considering point 1, in the findings, there are statements that Forrest considered 
Jackson’s concerns to be irrelevant because they were 1) politically not feasible and 2) 
not based in knowledge of everything going on. He stated that a system had to be 
technically, operationally, economically and politically feasible and political feasibility 
would trump all other concerns. This meant that in order to maintain his political position, 
he couldn’t back track on the course of action. Therefore, given the situation, the report 
of bad news was not as relevant to the decision as the political factors, so, we see here 
a low Relevance ascribed to the report of bad news.  
Considering point 2 above, in the findings we see no indications that Forrest perceived 
the risk in the project to be exceptionally high or at least not beyond his capability to 
manage it. He believed that Jackson did not know about his work with the legacy 
systems that were going to resolve the data loading problem and therefore Jackson’s 
concerns did not escalate his perception of risk. He also perceived the legacy data 
collection system as his contingency plan in the event of failure of the project data 
loading system. Therefore, given that he perceived he had multiple paths to accomplish 
his goal, he did not perceive that there was a high risk of project failure.. 
Considering point 3, the credibility of the bad news reporter, we understand from source 
credibility literature that Credibility is formed from two primary constructs, trustworthiness 
and expertise (Pornpitakpan 2004). We see that Forrest held the reporter, Jackson in 
high regard. He considered him an excellent project manager. But he felt that his 
knowledge of what was going on in the rest of the project was lacking. He therefore 
lacked expertise. Therefore, his Credibility was low in this area.  
For point, 4, Role Prescription of the bad news reporter, we see that there was no 
specific aspect of his job which required Jackson, who reported the bad news in this 
project, to “blow the whistle” on the project. However, it is usually assumed that a project 
manager will report serious project problems to his superiors.  
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Considering these factors within the model developed above, we see the following 
conditions (figure 5.4). Forrest considered the risk of the project as low which would 
have the effect of reducing his willingness to change course of action. Because Forrest 
considered Jackson to lack complete knowledge of the situation, he had a lowered 
opinion of his credibility as a bad news reporter. This low Credibility acted to lower the 
perceived Decision of the report of bad news. While Role Prescription of the bad news 
reporter is seen as high, given the combination of low Credibility with high Role 
Prescription, we have seen that the effect size of Credibility is greater than that of Role 
Prescription (chapter 3) resulting in a low Relevance of the message. The low Credibility 
would also act to lower the perceived risk of the project. Given this set of conditions, a 
low relevance and low Risk Perception, the model predicts that Forrest have continued 
the current course of action which is what I found.  
Thus the individual model holds in predicting the decision to be made by the decision 
maker in this situation. 
5.5.3 Examining Other Escalation Factors 
In this section, I seek to expand the model to identify other factors by examining the 
other escalation determinants as defined in Staw’s (1997) classification of escalation. I 
examine each one in turn 
5.5.3.1. Illusion of Control  
One of the determinants for project escalation referenced by Staw (1997) is that of 
optimism and illusion of control. Keil, Depledge and Rai (2007) found that when a 
subject perceived that they had the ability to market around software quality issues they 
were more likely to not recognize the software quality problems and to escalate the 
commitment to the project by shipping a defective software product.  
In the current case, the project manager was supremely confident in his knowledge and 
abilities and it is therefore possible that he might consider himself able to deal with a 
software product with issues on implementation. In terms of the model, it can be 
hypothesized that when a project manager perceives that he has substantial skills and 
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abilities that can exert control over the project outcome,  it might cause him to perceive a 
report of bad news as less relevant. I could also hypothesize that his perceived abilities 
might come into play in the decision whereby he decides that he can compensate for 
problems in the product and thus overrule a relevant report of bad news. 
I then make the following propositions about the illusion of control: 
P1) Illusion of Control will reduce the relevance of the report of bad news to the 
decision maker. 
P2) Illusion of Control will increase willingness of a decision maker to continue the 
current course of action. 
5.5.3.2. Highly Politicized Environment 
Staw (1997) also describes a social determinant of escalation that derives from highly 
politicized environments.  In these types of environments, to stop a project or admit error 
can lead to loss of power, standing or position. Once a project is bound to the manager, 
the manager’s identity can be linked with the project’s fate. This can lead to escalation if 
the manager attempts to maintain his reputation by putting more effort into retrieving a 
failing project.  
In project Gamma, we see that in response to Jackson’s bad news reports and requests 
for de-escalation, Forrest responded that it was politically infeasible meaning that once 
started down the path, to back track is not possible, they would have to correct the 
problems that occur going forward. 
Thus in terms of the model, a perception of a highly politicized environment may act on 
the decision maker by suppressing the relevance of the report of bad news in favor of 
defending his political position. It may also impact the decision maker by introducing the 
consideration during the decision process that while the report of bad news is perceived 
to be important, it is overruled by political aspects of the situation to continue the current 
course of action.  
I make the following propositions about a politicized environment: 
P3) A highly politicized environment will reduce the relevance of the report of bad 
news to the decision maker 
P4) A highly politicized environment increases the willingness of a decision maker to 
continue the current course of action. 
5.5.3.3. Revised Model 
The existence of other escalation factors shows that there are two additional areas of 
research that can be examined, that of illusion of control and the politicization of the 
environment. 
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have seen that Project Gamma contained three occurrences of the 
Deaf Effect. In evaluating the situation, we see that the individual model of the Deaf 
Effect was consistent with the situation that occurred. The decision maker continued the 
current course of action in an environment where he perceived low risk of continuance 
and where the relevance of the report of bad news was reduced by the highly political 
situation and a perceived lack of credibility by the bad news reporter on this issue. This 
lack of credibility was perceived because of the lack of knowledge that the reporter had 
on the entire situation. 
We also saw that the case supports the addition of two new constructs to the model: 
illusion of control and highly politicized environment which are held to potentially reduce 
the relevance of the bad news report and increase the willingness of the decision maker 
to continue the current course of action. 
Separate from the occurrence of the Deaf Effect, we saw that the distortion in the report 
of the status of the project to the reviewing panel to be consistent with the predictions of 
agency theory. In this case, information asymmetries existed between the decision 
maker and the reviewing panel. Additionally, the perceived politically charged situation 
created a powerful motivation to shirk which in the presence of the information 
asymmetries that existed would create the distortion of the message to the reviewing 
panel. Thus having made his decision in accord with our model of the Deaf Effect, the 
EPD of project Gamma distorted his report of project status due to a perceived political 
environment enabled by information asymmetries that existed.  
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6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This chapter seeks to summarize and bring together the results of the four studies to 
propose a consolidated model and draw out some implications for research and practice. 
6.1 LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
While there are other situations in which the Deaf Effect might occur, in the laboratory 
experiments I explored the Deaf Effect as it occurs under the environmental conditions 
of 1) an environment which places strong emphasis on meeting deadlines and budgets; 
2) pressure from peers and management to retain the current course of action in a 
project; 3) inability for the decision maker to analyze the data and determine the situation 
for himself; 4) a report of bad news which is ambiguous in establishing the severity of the 
issue; and 5) time pressure. The following findings with respect to the occurrence of the 
Deaf Effect hold across multiple experiments: 
1) The continuance of the current course of action depends upon the perceived 
relevance of the report of bad news and the perceived risk of the project to 
achieving the desired end result. 
The consistent pattern of significant paths throughout all the lab experiments is shown 
below: 
 
The Relevance of the bad news report and perceived risk in the situation are the key 
direct effects on the decision to continue the current course of action. The effect sizes of 
variables show that Relevance has a large effect on Decision, while Risk Perception has 
a moderate effect in the western countries. In China, however, the perception of risk is 
the most important variable with a large effect size. Relevance has only a small effect 
sizes.  
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Table 6.1 – Effect Sizes of Relevance, Risk Perception, and 
Credibility on Decision 
 Relevance Risk Perception Credibility 
Study 1 .921 NA .055 
Study 2  .104 .061 .032 
Study 3 - USA .204 .134 .003 
Study 3 – Germany .180 .070 .003 
Study 3 – China .060 .330 .009 
 
The path from Credibility to Decision was significant in study 1 and in study 3 – China 
models and was near significant in study 2. The effect sizes of this variable were 
however very small. 
This finding shows that the decision to discontinue a course of action is made differently 
in western countries vs. China. In the west, Relevance has a moderate effect size while 
Risk Perception has a small to moderate effect size. Thus, the decision to continue a 
course of action is made largely upon how important the decision maker considers the 
report of bad news with some consideration of the risk of the project. However, in China, 
the perception of risk is the most important factor. Risk perception has a large effect size 
whereas the Relevance of the bad news report has a small one. The reason for this 
exchange in effect size is not evident from this study, however, as I speculated in 
chapter 4, it may be do to the difference in political cultures. In the western societies with 
many individual freedoms, no history of government oppression in the subjects’ lifetimes 
and no fear of serious personal retaliation for defying authority, perceived risk may be 
held as less important than in China where the opposite conditions hold. In this study, 
since we did not achieve complete metric invariance between the subjects, we cannot 
make any comparison between the Risk Perception measures between the cultures. 
Given that, I am left to hypothesize that in the mental model of the Chinese students, 
they must be more risk averse or attach more importance to perceived risk in their 
decision processes than western students as a result of their political environment.  
2) The Relevance of the report of bad news depends upon the Credibility and Role 
Prescription of the bad news reporter.  
As shown in the table below, the effect sizes show that Credibility has a very large effect 
on Relevance in all the studies while Role Prescription has only a small to non-existent 
effect.  
 
Table 6.2 – Effect Sizes of Role Prescription 
and Credibility on Relevance 
Study Credibility Role 
Prescription 
Study 1 .160 NA 
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Study 2  .483 .064 
Study 3 - USA .504 .111 
Study 3 – Germany .000 .000 
Study 3 – China .410 .019 
 
This finding indicates that the effect of Role prescription and Credibility is completely 
mediated by the Relevance of the bad news report,indicating that the function of these 
two constructs is to indicate whether the message is relevant to be considered.  
3) Credibility has a positive effect on the perception of risk in the project 
Credibility has a moderate effect size in China and the US and a large effect size in 
Germany. This indicates that the report of bad news from a credible reporter increases 
the perceived level of risk in the project.  
Table 6.3 – Effect Size of 
Credibility on Risk Perception 
Study Effect Size 
Study 1 NA 
Study 2 .159 
Study 3 - USA .226 
Study 3 – 
Germany 
.417 
Study 3 – China .117 
 
4) These findings are stable across cultures 
As shown in study 3, the significance of the paths and direction of paths is the same 
across all the cultures with some exceptions. Gender to Risk Perception and Risk 
Propensity is significant in study 2 and in the study 3 China sample but not in study 3 
USA or Germany samples. Similarly, Credibility is significant to Decision in study 1 and 
in the study 3 China samples and near significant in study 2. This indicates that these 
paths are probably weakly significant. The results will vary based on the sample. 
The major difference across the samples is the fact that Role Prescription does not have 
a significant effect on Relevance in the German sample. This was hypothesized to be 
due to a pervasive belief in Germany that auditors fulfill a non-value added role within 
the projects and therefore Role Prescription would not make a bad news reporter’s 
message more relevant. This finding deserves further study. 
5) This model has strong explanatory power for  Decision.  
As shown in the table below, the R2 of the Decision variable is over .56 in all the studies 
and over .6 in all the studies in western cultures. This indicates that the model has a high 
explanatory power for the Deaf Effect.  
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Table 6.4 – R2 of the Decision 
Variable 
Study Decision R2 
Study 1 0.618 
Study 2 0.612 
Study 3 - USA 0.641 
Study 3 – 
Germany 
0.661 
Study 3 – China 0.562 
 
 
6.2 CASE STUDY 
In this case study, the project status reporting system of a southeastern state in the U.S. 
was examined. In addition to observing the creation of the status reporting document 
(the dashboard) and the status reporting meetings, a detailed case history of project 
Gamma, a development effort to create a student information system was conducted. 
The results of this case history showed distortion of the status message as transmitted 
to the decision maker and an example of the occurrence of the Deaf Effect. 
The case of distortion was found to lie in the biases brought to the status reporting 
process by the Executive Project Director (Snow and Keil 2002; Snow, et al. 2007) 
consisting of a political interpretation of the facts, a control fixation and self-efficacy. 
These biases however only provided a motivation for the distortion. The information 
asymmetries that were allowed to exist made it possible for the Executive Project 
Director to distort the message and prevent this distortion from being detected. Agency 
theory was used to explain how the distortion occurred. The biases created a motivation 
to shirk while the information asymmetries created the opportunity.  
The examination of project Gamma also resulted in the confirmation of the findings of 
the laboratory experiments and the addition of new potential constructs: illusion of 
control and politicization of the environment. I also proposed four new propositions about 
the effect of those constructs. 
P1) Illusion of Control will reduce the relevance of the report of bad news to the 
decision maker 
P2) Illusion of Control will increase willingness of a decision maker to continue the 
current course of action. 
P3) A highly politicized environment will reduce the relevance of the report of bad 
news to the decision maker. 
P4) A highly politicized environment will increase the willingness of a decision maker 
to continue the current course of action. 
These new constructs are incorporated into a revised model (figure 6.2).  
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6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
AND PRACTICE 
6.3.1 Limitations 
In the cross-cultural study, the item biases and lack of demonstrated scalar equivalence 
creates an inability to compare means across the different geographies. Therefore while 
we know that the relationships are similar, we cannot know if the relationships are the 
same strength across geographies. Similarly the low power and coarse scales used in 
the laboratory experiments result in a lowered effect size in the moderation analyses. 
The moderation effects may be understated in this study.  
6.3.2 Implications for Research 
This dissertation has contributed to the scientific knowledge about bad news reporting by 
developing and testing a model of the Deaf Effect at the individual level. It has shown 
that one reason for the Deaf Effect is the determination by the decision maker that the 
report of bad news is not relevant to be considered in determination of the future course 
of action of the project. This determination is based upon the Credibility and Role 
Prescription of the bad news reporter.   
There are several directions for future research. There are other variables that should be 
examined such as the message characteristic variables. Future studies should examine 
such areas as message salience, recency, primacy and linguistic cues to determine how 
these characteristics of messages allow the message to break through or be lost in the 
background clutter or how they affect message relevance. Additionally, while the 
literature indicates that female decision makers have less confidence in their decisions, 
future studies should investigate this attribute of self-confidence and other beliefs about 
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themselves explicitly rather than using gender as a proxy. 
These studies have only examined a project situation in which there were the following 
four conditions: 
1) External pressures that moved the decision maker to continue the current course 
of action;  
2) A decision maker who could not perform the evaluation on his/her own; 
3) A report of bad news that did not communicate the potential disaster situation in 
terms that unambiguously indicated a coming disaster; 
4) Severe time constraints on the length of time to evaluate the situation and make a 
decision that either prevented evaluation of the situation or cut off alternative 
solutions 
There should be studies of the Deaf Effect that would be carried out in different 
situations. For example, as seen in the case study, self-efficacy and illusion of control 
may play a part. Studies in environment where the Deaf Effect occurred without external 
pressure or time constraints and the decision maker had or believed that he had the 
knowledge to determine the situation for himself should be undertaken to determine if 
self-efficacy could induce the occurrence of the Deaf Effect in those environments.  
This study also utilized the GLOBE metrics to assess the respondents’ view of the 
ambient culture. The use of these metrics resulted in insignificant differences in 
response to the cultural values across the different geographies. The values returned 
also differ significantly from that reported in House, et. al. (2004) (figure 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5 – Comparison of Calculated GLOBE Variables vs. that Reported by 
the GLOBE Study 
Calculated from this Study 
 UA FO IC IG PD PO 
Germany 3.23 3.82 3.53 4.00 3.27 3.53 
China 3.94 3.16 3.47 2.78 2.81 2.89 
USA 3.54 3.19 3.27 3.75 3.01 3.22 
Reported in House, et. al. (2004) 
Germany 5.22 4.27 3.56 4.02 5.25 4.25 
China 4.94 3.75 4.77 5.8 5.04 4.45 
USA 4.15 4.15 4.2 4.25 4.88 4.49 
 
The differences exist in both value and rank order. For example, in Institutional 
Collectivism, while the value for Germany returned by this study is very similar to that 
developed by the GLOBE study, those of China and the USA are very different (1.3 
points lower for China and .95 points for the USA). Additionally, China was highest in the 
GLOBE sample by 1.19 points over Germany. In the results from this study, their scores 
are virtually identical with Germany being slightly higher. 
This could be due to a number of differences in the samples. The GLOBE metrics were 
developed and operationalized for middle-management professionals. It could be that 
the perceptions of students of societal values are significantly different that those of 
middle-management professionals. Alternatively, it could be that the measures do not 
mean the same thing to students as to professionals (item bias). Or it could be that the 
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items require a certain level of experience that students do not possess (item bias). 
These results might indicate that these measures are only appropriate for use with 
middle-management professionals. Other possible causes could be that cultural values 
have shifted in those regions in the 14 years since the GLOBE study was performed. 
Additional research is required to validate these metrics for groups other than those 
under which the GLOBE consortium validated them.  
6.3.3 Implications for Practice 
For practitioners, this study points to some ways to avoid occurrences of the Deaf Effect. 
One key enabler of the Deaf Effect is a “high performance environment” characterized 
by unnecessarily short deadlines and lack of tolerance for project management errors. 
While there is always a need for deadlines and gross mismanagement should not be 
tolerated, there should be in addition a “quality” emphasis in which, it should be stressed 
that where possible a quality product should be delivered even if some dates are 
missed.  
For role prescribed bad news reporters such as auditors, every effort should be made to 
increase their credibility within the organization. Source credibility theory suggests that 
steps should be taken to increase their perceived expertise and trustworthiness. Keil and 
Robey (2001) have suggested that increasing the size of the audit staff, management 
support for the audit function, preservation of their independence and being able to add 
value to projects improve the credibility of the audit function. The actions of the IV&V 
vendor in the case study point toward a way that this can be achieved. By walking the 
fine line between independence and team membership, they contributed to the team by 
suggesting improvements to the methods used in the projects and then audited them on 
conformance to those “best practices”.  
Since Role Prescription enhances the Credibility of the bad news reporter, management 
should make reporting of bad news a component of each employee’s job. They should 
be trained to report bad news on the project to their leaders and up the chain of 
command as necessary to ensure project success. The effects of Risk Propensity and 
Risk Perception indicate that perhaps factors used in the selection of project leaders 
might include their propensity to accept risk. Management should ensure that they do 
not select “daredevils” for the role of project leaders. Similarly, all project decision 
makers should be trained to identify project risks so that when identified they might be 
more willing to change project direction and avoid failure.  
Another implication for practice concerns status-reporting systems. In the case study 
illustrated herein, the system as practiced avoided errors due to internal project 
management practices such as schedule adherence and internal risk and issue 
management. However, as was seen, at least three projects going through the process 
experienced requirements failures two resulting in serious crises. This may result from 
two aspects of the process: implementation of the IV&V activity only at the construction 
phase of the project and use of behavior controls to monitor the projects.  
Until the advent of project Alpha in 2007, IV&V was typically implemented only after the 
implementing contractor was assigned. This allowed the projects to go through the RFP 
development and bid process without independent review allowing for requirement 
errors to be passed through to implementation phase where the requirements were not 
reviewed by IV&V resulting in issues in implementation. IV&V should be placed at the 
beginning of the process to ensure that proper steps are taken to ensure correct 
requirement analysis. 
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The IV&V review process is largely that of reviewing the processes used and 
conformance to milestones such as schedule and budget. As described above, this 
review is limited to internal project controls and does not include requirements, the 
process therefore cannot ensure that the system developed can be successfully 
implemented or meets the need of the users. To close this gap, two additional activities 
can be undertaken. The IV&V can work with the users to ensure that the system meets 
their requirements and expectations and can be implemented.  
Another approach can be to implement the use of outcome controls. Agency theory 
suggests that outcome controls are more likely to motivate the agent to behave in the 
interests of the principal (Eisenhardt 1989). Outcome based controls are also a good 
way to pass risk to the agent and to resolve the goal conflict that occurs between 
contractors and outsourcing organizations (Eisenhardt 1989). To implement outcome 
controls, the outsourcing organization should require the contractor to use a more 
iterative approach to development such as prototyping, extreme programming or at least 
requirement interim useful deliverables. This approach would allow the outsourcing 
organization to verify that the contractor is meeting the requirements of the information 
system project. The use of outcome-based controls would also prevent the distortion of 
status reporting. By requiring frequent small deliverables of functionality, it prevents the 
status report from being distorted by either misunderstanding of the facts by the project 
manager or by bias as shown in the case study.  
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